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As regions across California begin to implement their 
Sustainable Communities Strategies (SCS) in compli-
ance with Senate Bill 375, communities are increas-
ingly concerned about how new transit investment and 
related infill development will affect the lives of exist-
ing residents, particularly low-income communities 
and communities of color. Locals are likely to benefit 
from improved mobility, neighborhood revitalization, 
lower transportation costs, and other amenities that 
spill over from the new development (Cervero 2004). 
However, more disadvantaged communities may fail 
to benefit, if the new development does not bring ap-
propriate housing and job opportunities, or if there is 
gentrification and displacement of low-income and/or 
minority residents (Pollack, Bluestone, and Billingham 
2010; Chapple 2009).
In 2009, we conducted a study on neighborhood’s 
susceptibility to gentrification in the San Francisco Bay 
Area (Chapple 2009). In it, we quantified the impact of a 
diverse set of variables on neighborhood gentrification, 
finding that proximity to transit significantly predicted a 
neighborhood’s later turnover and gentrification, which 
has been supported by more recent research as well 
(Pollack, Bluestone, and Billingham 2010). These find-
ing are further supported by research linking proximity 
to transit with a property value premium of between 3 
and 45% (Cervero and Duncan 2002b; Cervero and 
Duncan 2002a; Hess and Almeida 2007). 
This research seeks to explore more closely the phe-
nomena of gentrification and displacement in the San 
Francisco Bay Area, in an effort to better understand, 
predict and possibly prevent residential displacement. 
This report summarizes a year’s worth of communi-
ty-engaged research involving case studies on gen-
trification and displacement pressures in nine neigh-
borhoods across the Bay Area. We utilized mixed 
methods of quantitative data analysis, stakeholder 
interviews, and field observations to better character-
ize the various types of changes and pressures being 
experienced in diverse neighborhoods across the Bay 
Area. 
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The San Francisco 
Bay Area 
The 9-county Bay Area is one of the most expensive 
and challenging housing markets in the country. With 
over 7 million inhabitants, over a quarter of Bay Area 
households meet the Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development’s definition of severely housing bur-
dened, dedicating more than 50 percent of their income 
to housing. Four of the ten most expensive counties 
in the United States are located in the San Francisco 
Bay Area, where minimum wage workers would need 
to work 4.7 full time jobs to afford a two-bedroom unit 
(Arnold et al. 2014). The recovery from the Great Re-
cession, combined with a booming technology sector 
in Silicon Valley have resulted in rapid job growth at 
the top and bottom of the wage scale while the middle 
continues to shrink. Over a third of Bay Area workers 
earn less than $18 per hour, which is especially trou-
bling in the Bay Area because of the high cost of living 
(Terplan et al. 2014).
The continued growth at both ends of the income 
range will place even more pressure on the region’s 
housing market and transportation systems. Although 
planned new transit facilities will help to accommodate 
much of the population growth, they also present a 
challenge. Researchers generally agree that new tran-
sit investment will bring higher property values to the 
surrounding area (except in the immediate vicinity of 
the transit station). This could spur a process of gen-
trification, which will be beneficial to some – but not to 
those who cannot bear rent increases and are forced 
to leave the neighborhood.
By examining nine diverse Bay Area communities in 
depth, this report provides planners, advocates and 
city leaders with a rich understanding of how gentrifi-
cation proceeds, as well as what features encourage 
displacement and what policies slow it. 
Executive Summary
Outline of the Report
This report proceeds as follows: In Chapter 2 we out-
line the methodology used for case study site selec-
tion, data analysis, and community-engaged research 
methods. The heart of the report is found in the in-
dividual case study chapters 3 through 11, divided 
into three groups according to the nature of change in 
each neighborhood:
Section 1: Neighborhoods Long Experiencing 
Pressures of Gentrification and Displacement
Chapter 3. San Francisco’s greater Chinatown 
neighborhood has witnessed years of housing 
pressures. In part due to strong community or-
ganizing and planning restrictions, the core of 
Chinatown has stemmed the tide of gentrification 
and displacement, yet the greater area including 
the neighborhoods of Polk Gulch and parts of 
North Beach have witnessed significant change 
and loss of Asian households since 1980.
Chapter 4. Perhaps the icon of gentrification and 
displacement, San Francisco’s Mission District 
has been the site of active community organizing 
for decades, which has perhaps maintained more 
affordable housing and minority-owned business-
es than would otherwise be there. But the pres-
sures that began during the dot com boom con-
tinue, as more and more industrial land shifts to 
high-end residential uses.
Section 2: Places Currently Undergoing 
Rapid Neighborhood Change
Chapter 5. Years of city planning and redevel-
opment around San Jose’s Diridon Station 
have transformed the area into an affluent urban 
neighborhood, which is witnessing rapid devel-
opment supported by the City’s vision to create 
Urban Villages. Recent activism around the Sta-
tion Area plan has reignited the call for affordable 
housing, yet it remains to be seen what funding 
will be available in this post-redevelopment era.
Chapter 6. The neighborhoods surrounding 
North Oakland’s Macarthur Bart Station have 
undergone rapid demographic and physical 
change, associated with both its proximity to re-
vitalizing commercial districts, affluent neighbor-
hoods, and transit accessibility. 
Chapter 7. As an immigrant gateway in the city of 
Concord, the Monument Corridor was severely 
impacted by the Great Recession. However, its 
proximity to the BART, as well as the active plan-
ning and downtown redevelopment efforts of City 
government, have resulted in active speculation 
and displacement of low income and Latino res-
idents.
Chapter 8. In the heart of Silicon Valley, lead-
ers of Redwood City are trying to redevelop the 
once nearly abandoned downtown to create an 
active job and housing center. Yet this planning 
and growth nearly ignores the needs of future 
low income workers and existing residents of sur-
rounding neighborhoods, resulting in an acute 
risk of exclusionary displacement.
Section 3: Communities Vulnerable to 
Gentrification and Displacement
Chapter 9. The Canal neighborhood of San 
Rafael in the wealthy county of Marin continues 
to serve as a point of entry to immigrant com-
munities, specifically of Latin American origin. 
The substantial stock of low quality multi-family 
housing, significant overcrowding, as well as the 
physical separation (i.e., highway and industrial/
commercial land uses) has stabilized the neigh-
borhood for the time being. 
Chapter 10. The City of East Palo Alto was es-
tablished on the principles of protecting housing 
of lower income communities of color in the afflu-
ent Silicon Valley. These principles have translat-
ed to some of the strongest tenant protections in 
the Bay Area, preserving the affordability of the 
community. Yet continued high income job growth 
combined with the lack of new or affordable hous-
ing in surrounding communities suggest growing 
pressures already felt by the community.
Chapter 11. A historically African American com-
munity, established during WW II, the unincorpo-
rated Marin City houses over half of its residents 
in subsidized housing. Despite being surrounded 
by affluent communities of Marin County and re-
stricted in growth because of the County’s value 
of preserving open space, Marin City continues 
to be home to low and moderate income families 
even after racial and demographic shifts.
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Key Themes from the Nine 
Case Studies
Although the overall Bay Area exhibits many of the 
characteristics that scholars have documented in their 
studies of gentrification and displacement, we found 
wide variability in the nine case studies we explored 
and some contradictions of the basic underlying as-
sumptions about these processes. Below we summa-
rize our findings across the nine case areas, highlight-
ing specific examples to illustrate seven key findings:
1) In contrast to how gentrification is discussed 
in the media and modeled in quantitative studies, 
it is not an endpoint that happened or didn’t, but 
rather a complex, multi-stage process.
2) Researchers and practitioners alike often re-
gard the relationship between gentrification and 
displacement as linear and sequential, yet in 
many of our cases we found that displacement 
precedes gentrification and that the two process-
es are often occurring simultaneously.
3) Due to data limitations, the literature on gen-
trification and residential displacement frequently 
is restricted to 4 to 13 year periods. However, the 
process of neighborhood change can often take 
much longer often preceding what is perceived to 
be rapid change felt in very hot real estate mar-
kets.
4) On average, roughly 15% of Americans move 
each year. There are many reasons for people 
to move and it is therefore often desirable for 
researchers to separate voluntary moves from 
involuntary moves. Yet, we found in many of our 
cases that such a distinction is nearly impossible 
to discern, making such dichotomies in quantita-
tive research somewhat useless.
5) Due to analytical complexities, gentrification is 
often studied as a neighborhood phenomenon. 
Yet our research shows how the pressures of the 
housing and jobs market function at the regional 
scale, making an expansive lens particularly use-
ful in understanding the processes of neighbor-
hood change.
6) Despite continued pressures and much anxi-
ety, many of the cases have shown remarkable 
stability. We explore some of the housing policy, 
community organizing, tenant protections and 
planning techniques used in the Bay Area that 
appear to have been somewhat successful in 
mitigating the pressures of gentrification and dis-
placement.
7) The impact of public investment, particularly 
transit investment, on gentrification and displace-
ment is not well understood. Although this study 
lacked the data on investment timing needed to 
ascertain the precise relationship between pub-
lic improvements and neighborhood change, our 
research suggests that not just the investment 
itself, but also planning for the investment, can 
accelerate processes of displacement. 
1.  Gentrification as a process not an end-point 
From the outset of this research our advisory commit-
tee, consisting of housing policy experts around the 
Bay Area, insisted that the ways in which gentrification 
has been conceptualized and modeled in the literature 
was wrong. “Gentrification is not an on-off switch” one 
of our committee members told us. Instead, they ar-
gued, it is a multi-stage process that may not be easily 
captured or discerned from the data. Taking this into 
consideration, we set out to analyze existing demo-
graphic and housing datasets. To gather initial feed-
back on our findings, we held a workshop with our 
community partners and advisory committee. Kicking 
off the workshop, a researcher from our team showed 
data for the Monument community in Concord, CA – 
a low income, Latino community living proximate to 
the train station and downtown. We showed data that 
demonstrated a reduction in income, educational at-
tainment, and home sales price among other key in-
dicators of neighborhood change. In the presentation, 
the researcher noted “this place shows little signs of 
gentrification” a statement that put many of our com-
munity partners in a state of unease. How could we 
discount the current housing pressures they argued? 
Concord was a place that was being actively primed 
for gentrification by the City and local property owners 
– therefore, they argued, we need to redefine how we 
see the place. What we saw as neighborhood decline 
they saw as an early stage of gentrification. 
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This view that Concord may be experiencing an early, 
or pre-gentrification phase, was in fact later validated 
by interviews with key informants. One landlord, for in-
stance, told us that his building’s proximity to the BART 
commuter train station was useful for “catering to the 
laptop crowd,” that commute to work in San Francisco. 
He even boasted how he “got rid of… the 99% Latino” 
population that formerly lived in the complex, which he 
plans to convert into condominiums and sell once the 
market picks up again. Similarly, activists in the area 
report that following several years’ worth of advocacy 
to improve walkability along the Monument Corridor 
in Concord, they are beginning to learn about active 
speculation and property flipping happening in the 
area, as property owners begin to capitalize on public 
improvements there.
Many of the other cases that we chose were similar to 
Concord in this regard. Furthermore, reorienting our 
understanding of gentrification as a process and not 
necessarily an end helped us to see places that are 
usually considered to be already gentrified (e.g., the 
Mission) as further along in the process but not nec-
essarily at an end point as they continue to undergo a 
process of displacement and change. 
2.  Reframing the relationship between 
     gentrification and displacement
Much of the academic literature as well as popular 
media frames the relationship between gentrification 
and displacement as a linear one: a neighborhood is 
disinvested and property values decline, it becomes 
attractive for its amenities or location, the difference 
between the rents property owners receive and the 
amount at which they can sell (e.g., the rent gap; see 
Smith (1987)) increases, higher income households 
and investors begin to value the neighborhood and 
start moving in and buying up property, and eventually 
the pre-existing community of low income households 
and people of color are displaced from their neighbor-
hoods of origin. While this may certainly be the case in 
some neighborhoods, the linear relationship between 
revaluation, gentrification and displacement does not 
hold true for all the neighborhoods we studied, some 
of which instead witnessed this process in reverse.
The idea that displacement can in fact precede gentri-
fication is not a new concept. In their seminal framing 
paper on displacement in 1978, Eunice and George 
Grier distinguish between disinvestment displace-
ment and reinvestment displacement: “unrelated as 
they seem, these two conditions of displacement may 
be successive stages in the cycle of neighborhood 
change” (Grier and Grier 1978, p.3). Similarly, Peter 
Marcuse argued that when looking at the relationship 
between gentrification and displacement one must 
first consider the disinvestment of urban neighbor-
hoods and subsequent displacement, which makes 
land ripe for investment with gentrification of “vacant” 
land. From this perspective gentrification can happen 
long after disinvestment-induced displacement (Mar-
cuse 1986). On the other hand, investment-related 
displacement can also precede gentrification, a case 
made very clear during Urban Renewal and decades 
of Redevelopment.
Three of our cases that present early stages along 
the gentrification spectrum show signs of both dis-
investment- and reinvestment-related displacement 
that precedes the types of demographic and physical 
changes characteristic of gentrification. For instance, 
stakeholders in the Canal area of San Rafael dis-
cussed the active disinvestment of landlords that of-
ten leads to displacement, while residents of public 
housing in Marin City face similar experiences, albe-
it from government disinvestment in public housing. 
In Concord, residents are witnessing both disinvest-
ment- and reinvestment-related displacement simulta-
neously as discussed above, and all the communities 
studied are likely years away from being classified as 
gentrified according to their demographic character-
istics. Similarly, and as will be discussed in the next 
section, San Jose’s Diridon Station Area underwent 
significant redevelopment and displacement decades 
before the current housing boom and demographic 
shifts. Nearly all of our cases displayed these types of 
processes, and some in fact are currently experienc-
ing the commonly recognized gentrification-induced 
displacement. Therefore, these processes are neither 
linear nor mutually exclusive, and it therefore takes a 
reframing to be able to capture the full scale of the 
processes.
3.  Extending the time horizon of 
     neighborhood change
Often popular media and residents describe gentrifi-
cation as change occurring at a rapid rate – property 
values rising, people selling homes, and longtime resi-
dents moving out can feel like it’s happening overnight. 
Yet, the neighborhood change narratives told by our 
Center for Community Innovation, University of California, Berkeley     Executive Summary 4
CBO partners and stakeholders often extended back 
decades, frequently referencing the historic actions 
of Cities and their Redevelopment agencies that dis-
placed vibrant, albeit low-income, communities as well 
as the active disinvestment of the private sector. 
One example of this can be seen in our case study 
of the Diridon Station area in San Jose. When we be-
gan the study, people looked dubious when we men-
tioned displacement in the area. People argued that 
few people actually lived in the vicinity of the station. 
This is certainly true when looking at the recent past. 
However, when extending our analysis to a thirty year 
timeframe, we saw in the data and archival analysis 
that considerable displacement preceded the current 
renaissance of the area. A pattern familiar to the mod-
el of Urban Renewal, in the 1980’s the Redevelopment 
Agency made almost $2 billion in public investments, 
and devoted “nearly all its money and power,” to an at-
tempted revitalization of its downtown and surrounding 
areas (Terplan 2013). Redevelopment projects includ-
ed construction of a convention center, a luxury ho-
tel, expansion and construction of multiple museums, 
renovation and construction of parks and plazas, over 
500 units of market rate and moderate income hous-
ing, and 1.2 million feet of new office space (Kutzman 
& Farragher, 1988) alongside the razing of a low-in-
come Latino residential neighborhood totaling about 
12 square blocks. The analysis of Census data also 
revealed the significant drop in population between 
1980 and 1990 and the loss of approximately half of 
its housing units.
Ask any planner, developer or community activist and 
they will tell you that neighborhood change is a slow 
process that can take decades. Despite extensive 
recognition by practitioners and scholars alike, most 
research on gentrification and displacement to date 
has quantified it as change over a 10 year period or 
less, which may therefore significantly underestimate 
the magnitude of the problem. Peter Marcuse (1986) 
warned against such limited analysis that would un-
derestimate the total number of displaced households 
when scholars ignore what he refers to as “chains” or 
cycles of displacement. These findings indicate a need 
to pay specific attention to the timing of public and pri-
vate investments and disinvestments and the impact 
they have on communities over longer periods of time.
4.  The false dichotomy of voluntary and 
     involuntary displacement
Another key feature of contemporary studies of dis-
placement and neighborhood mobility is the categori-
zation of household moves as voluntary or involuntary. 
To many scholars (Freeman 2005; Ellen and O’Regan 
2011), only involuntary moves can qualify as displace-
ment (e.g., evictions). Furthermore, the voluntary na-
ture of people’s moves frequently enters into political 
debates about neighborhood change. In the Bay Area, 
scholars, activists, planners and many others debate 
these issues around the loss of low income and Afri-
can American households from San Francisco and the 
simultaneous rise in the eastern cities in Contra Cos-
ta County like Antioch and Pittsburg, CA (Schafran 
and Wegmann 2012). Despite the obvious links and 
accounts of families moving east, many have argued 
that such moves are likely voluntary, resulting from a 
family’s desires to move to the suburbs. 
These issues have frequently emerged in our cases, 
especially when analyzing the loss of African Ameri-
can households. Our CBO partners, from diverse com-
munities such as the public housing and entry homes 
of Marin City to the working class suburb of East Palo 
Alto, to the flatlands of Oakland, describe the loss of 
housing due to foreclosure or the simple inability to 
find nearby housing when normal life events lead to 
a move (e.g., having children). Communities in the 
South Bay, for instance, have shown that there is virtu-
ally no affordable housing in their communities, forcing 
residents to far out suburbs or to leave the Bay Area 
entirely. Despite what seems like a voluntary move 
perhaps because of childbirth or a desire for home 
ownership, many would argue that such decisions to 
leave their communities are anything but voluntary.
Again, we can hear the chiding from the early framers 
of displacement Eunice and George Grier (1978) who, 
despite using the term “forced” displacement, were 
careful not to equate it with involuntary. In fact, they 
conclude that:
“For most residents to move under such conditions is 
about as ‘voluntary’ as is swerving one’s car to avoid 
an accident. By the time the landlord issues notices 
of eviction, or the code inspector posts the structure 
as uninhabitable, few occupants may be left. Therefore 
we cannot define displacement simply in terms of le-
gal or administrative actions – or even draw a clear-cut 
line between ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ movement.” 
(p.3)
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Similarly, in another early study of displacement, New-
man and Owen (1982) argue that “low-income house-
holds who experience extremely large rent increases 
may technically ‘choose’ to move, but the likelihood 
that they had any real alternative is very small” (p.137).
Perhaps above all, a household’s motivation for mov-
ing is rarely known, making it particularly difficult to 
analyze. Although the National Housing Survey asking 
people’s reasons for moving, the motivation is rarely 
known and can in fact be masked. For instance, in the 
case of the Mission we learned about the proliferation 
of tenant buy-outs that may seem voluntary on the 
books as tenants may be “choosing” to accept cash to 
move. However, the amount of actual choice in such 
decisions is up for debate. Furthermore, documenting 
the scale of this phenomenon is unknown. Although 
San Francisco has recently begun requiring landlords 
to register buyout negotiations with the City, experts 
believe what has been registered thus far to be signifi-
cantly lower than actual buyouts. Furthermore, argues 
Sara Shortt of the Housing Rights Committee, “Too of-
ten tenants don’t see [buyouts] as a choice or even a 
negotiated process” (Sabatini 2015).
From these cases we learned that although the dis-
tinction between voluntary and involuntary moves is 
conceptually sound, it is nearly impossible to analyze 
quantitatively and at scale. Some scholars have there-
fore eliminated the dichotomization of voluntary and 
involuntary displacement from their studies, either due 
to data limitations (McKinnish et al. 2010) or ideolog-
ical disagreement (Atkinson et al. 2011), and have 
characterized displacement as the loss of any vulner-
able populations including low income households, 
renters, and people of color among others. We employ 
a similar approach in the case studies presented in 
this report.
5.  The value of the regional lens on housing 
     markets and neighborhood change
From our complementary regional analysis of gentri-
fication and displacement (Zuk 2015), we found that 
over half of Bay Area tracts are neither currently expe-
riencing displacement nor are they at any significant 
risk of doing so in the near future. Yet, the prevailing 
narrative in strong market regions is that large swaths 
of their center cities are “at risk” for gentrification. Is 
it only a matter of time before the others “switch on”? 
Or is the dominant narrative being driven by extreme 
cases (e.g., the Mission)?
Although our regional analysis attempts to identify 
characteristics that had in previous years led to gen-
trification and displacement, for instance, proximity to 
a transit stations and jobs, rising housing prices and 
pre-war housing stock, among other factors, this kind 
of analysis will inevitably fail to capture the range of 
factors and events that can set the stage for gentri-
fication and displacement in future decades. For in-
stance, in the Concord case, as well as in many other 
neighborhoods across the country, planning and revi-
talization efforts have unfurled processes of housing 
speculation. But it may take years or decades for the 
switch to turn “on.” Likewise, the rent gap is frequently 
a precursor of gentrification (Smith 1987). But home-
owners and landlords do not respond overnight to the 
gap; their inclination to realize the gain will depend on 
their use value for the housing unit, among other fac-
tors. 
The larger economic and regulatory environment 
is also a factor. For example, in San Francisco, the 
changing regional economy (from manufacturing to 
high-tech) combined with a loop-hole in the zoning 
code allowed light industrial buildings to be convert-
ed to “live-work” units without having to change zoning 
classifications, allowing conversions to proceed at a 
much faster clip, and accelerating gentrification. 
Another underappreciated factor in neighborhood 
change is the issue of demographic succession. The 
aging of a generation, or the dying out of the first gen-
eration of an immigrant group, may set the stage for 
neighborhood transformation. But whether the gener-
ation chooses to remain in the neighborhood depends 
on a variety of factors not captured in secondary data, 
such as group affinity. These issues have emerged 
consistently in our cases, especially in places like 
Marin City and East Palo Alto, where community 
groups struggle to understand why the children of civil 
rights activists sell their parents homes. Finally, analy-
sis at the tract level may be deceptive, since changes 
are often occurring at the micro-scale. For instance, 
some of the stable or at risk tracts we identify in our 
regional analysis may have had housing price appre-
ciation on certain blocks and decline on others, what 
Wyly and Hammel (1999) memorably call “islands of 
decay in seas of renewal.” We found as much in our 
ground-truthing exercise, where adjacent blocks often 
appeared to be at very different levels of investment. 
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Figure 1.1: From neighborhood to regional trajectories 
of displacement
Using the regional lens on neighborhood change, rath-
er than simply focusing on strong markets, allows us to 
understand the variety of types. Gentrifying tracts are 
likely just the tip of the iceberg, and our current meth-
ods of secondary data collection and analysis may not 
be up to the task of describing the rest of the iceberg. 
Finally, intra-regional mobility means that no commu-
nity’s housing or jobs market is acting in isolation. As 
described above, developers in Concord are reacting 
to changes in the San Francisco housing market and 
the Silicon Valley jobs market when they make long-
term plans for redevelopment. The renters evicted or 
excluded from San Francisco put new pressures on 
communities like East Palo Alto, where families are 
doubling up. As housing conditions worsen on the pe-
riphery, the prospects of realizing profit from the rent 
gap improve. Thus the regional process of displace-
ment makes it clear that reinvestment in one place 
works hand in hand with disinvestment in another. The 
regional lens helps us understand displacement as a 
dynamic and long-term process, rather than a singular 
event.
6.  What mitigates the negative impacts of 
     gentrification?
When looking across the nine case studies, we can 
begin to understand the variable scale of the displace-
ment process and investigate what may be attenuating 
it in some places in comparison to others. Using the 
place categories presented above we roughly group 
our nine neighborhood case studies into 3 groups: 
1) places that have been undergoing pressures of 
gentrification and displacement for many years and 
have potentially limited the magnitude due to years of 
strong community organizing, tenant protections and/
or zoning restrictions (e.g., Chinatown and Mission); 2) 
places that are undergoing active redevelopment and/
or speculation (e.g., Diridon, Redwood City, Macar-
thur, and Monument); and 3) places that have antici-
pated gentrification and displacement for a while due 
to their close proximity (and even enclosure by) afflu-
ent neighborhoods, but may not yet be experiencing it 
because of weaker housing markets or a large supply 
of public housing (e.g., East Palo Alto, the Canal and 
Marin City). 
In general, we identify the following 5 factors as poten-
tially attenuating the scale of displacement: 1) weak 
housing markets, 2) large and stable subsidized hous-
ing stock, 3) strong community organizing, 4) tenant 
protections, and 5) restrictive zoning. 
Slower/weaker markets
A number of the cases we analyzed that may be char-
acterized as being at very early stages of gentrifica-
tion, showed little to no signs of such when looking 
at the numbers. Yet, when we spoke to stakeholders, 
we heard about their anxiety about housing pressures 
from surrounding affluent communities and some ev-
idence of budding speculation. Especially when con-
sidering the time frame of our analysis, which encom-
passes the Great Recession, these are places that 
were struck by the foreclosure crisis, are slower to 
recover, and in general have weaker housing markets. 
From 2000 to 2013, for instance, the Canal neighbor-
hood of San Rafael, where residential sales values 
actually declined by 30%, lost only 17% of its mar-
ket rate housing units that were affordable to low in-
come households, although it started off with very few. 
In contrast, the Macarthur Station Area of Oakland, 
which saw a 70% increase in sales values during the 
same time period, lost nearly 70% of its market rate 
affordable housing stock, or nearly 500 units. These 
differences may be due to the quality of the housing 
stock, proximity to undesirable land uses, or perhaps 
the overwhelming housing demand from low-income 
immigrants that flood the market and double up in 
homes. Nevertheless, the proximity to more affluent 
neighborhoods as well as jobs and other amenities 
heighten the risk in these communities leading to on-
going community anxiety over the prospects of gentri-
fication and displacement.
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Large and stable subsidized housing stock
Certainly the prevalence of income-restricted housing 
in a neighborhood guarantees the stability of low in-
come populations, at least for the duration of the deed. 
This guarantee has been especially important for sta-
bilizing the large proportion of low income households 
in Marin City, and even the number of households in 
the Mission which would have declined even more 
precipitously if it weren’t for the doubling of the sub-
sidized housing stock from 2000 to 2014 (excluding 
units that used only local sources of funding). Neigh-
borhoods with few subsidized housing units (e.g., 
Macarthur Bart where only 7% of the housing stock 
is subsidized), saw a steeper decline in the number 
of low income households from 2000 to 2013, when it 
lost 523 low income households. 
Tenant protections
Often the neighborhoods that have strong tenant pro-
tections (e.g., strong rent control and just cause evic-
tions ordinances) are the same ones that are expe-
riencing the largest gentrification and displacement 
pressures (e.g., the Mission). Tenant protections often 
arise out of community activism to dampen housing 
pressures in strong market communities. These pres-
sures can often mask the benefits of strong tenant pro-
tections, yet the displacement effects would have likely 
been magnitudes larger without such protections. 
Strong community organizing
No case with strong neighborhood protections exist-
ed in the absence of strong community organizing. In 
the case of East Palo Alto, the city was established 
by housing and social justice advocates that sought 
to ensure the stability of their communities in the long 
term. Similarly, Chinatown and the Mission have a long 
history of community organizing, which has led to both 
the production of subsidized units as well as other 
protections. The places that lacked such policies were 
also places where community organizations were no-
tably absent (e.g., Redwood City and Concord). 
Planning strategies
Finally, zoning and other planning strategies appear 
to have been the saving grace for neighborhoods like 
San Francisco’s Chinatown. Certain height and use 
restrictions have made it virtually impossible to tear 
down existing single room occupancy and other low in-
come units. Similarly, residential uses have been pro-
tected by limiting office conversions and buildings. The 
effects are clearly evident when comparing the loss of 
low income households in Chinatown Core and neigh-
boring Polk Gulch. Whereas Polk Gulch lost 571 (14%) 
low income households between 2000 and 2013, Chi-
natown Core lost only 80 households (5%). In other 
places, such as the Mission, planning responses are 
being sought to correct previous actions that had neg-
ative consequences, such as the live-work ordinance. 
7.  How does public investment, particularly 
     transit investment, shape gentrification 
     and displacement?
Public investment, from infrastructure investment like 
bike lanes and landscaping, to fixed rail transit sys-
tems, can accelerate processes of displacement. As 
investment is planned, the very anticipation of change 
can lead to either disinvestment or investment, both of 
which can result in displacement. The implementation 
of the improvement is associated with property price 
increases (as shown by the hedonic price literature).
This study measured transit investment through prox-
ies such as location relative to a rail transit station and 
use of transit in the commute to work. Lack of fine-
grained data on the location and timing of other pub-
lic infrastructure improvements made it impossible for 
this study to evaluate the effect of investment more 
broadly. However, we found a significant positive re-
lationship between transit investment, gentrification, 
and displacement, although sometimes the time lag 
between rail investment and gentrification has been 
significant (e.g., Diridon, Macarthur, Mission, etc.).
The planning and implementation of transit improve-
ments also shapes displacement in less tangible 
ways. As investment is planned – yet not funded in 
current budgets – a climate of uncertainty takes hold. 
Anticipating future changes, such as the arrival of the 
SMART train in San Rafael, residents may feel they 
have to move – yet, as noted above, this may not be a 
real choice.
In practice, there is a general expectation that pub-
lic intervention, whether in the form of investment or 
policy changes like rezoning, will trigger a positive 
process of neighborhood transformation, often lead-
ing to gentrification and subsequent displacement. On 
average, redevelopment projects or highway improve-
ments or new transit stations do generate increases 
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in local property values. But individual responses may 
vary. In our Bay Area cases, improved transit access in 
the form of BART meant one thing in the Mission, but 
another in Concord. Rezoning of the San Francisco 
downtown has put tremendous pressure on rents in 
Greater Chinatown, but rezoning of Uptown Oakland 
is not what is transforming Temescal. 
Finally, the existence of transit investment creates the 
possibility of mitigating displacement. As improve-
ments are planned, it is possible to create more sub-
sidized housing and change local zoning to protect 
existing affordability. Awareness of the upcoming im-
provements can also help to spur community organiz-
ing.
Concluding Thoughts
The San Francisco Bay Area is undergoing rapid so-
cio-spatial transformations that provide rich material 
for better understanding and modeling gentrification 
and displacement. In this report we show the invalu-
able insights that community-engaged research can 
provide and specifically highlight the need to more 
accurately define gentrification and displacement as 
a long term regional process that involves both invest-
ment and disinvestment. 
The San Francisco region experiences demand for 
its housing from around the world, not just from in-mi-
grants but also investors seeking to profit from the 
market’s strength. Yet, these nine case studies illus-
trate the diversity of sub-regional housing markets, 
with lessons applicable to metropolitan areas around 
the U.S. The islands of affordability such as East Palo 
Alto and Marin City behave essentially as weak hous-
ing markets, characterized more by poor housing con-
ditions than high rents. But housing dynamics in these 
neighborhoods unfold in relation to the ongoing com-
petition for housing in the Bay Area’s inner core. This 
study thus underscores the importance of using the 
region as the unit of analysis when examining gentrifi-
cation and displacement. 
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Case Study Methods
This research builds on the methodologies utilized in 
past studies of neighborhood change, gentrification 
and displacement (Ellen and O’Regan 2011; Freeman 
and Braconi 2004; Newman and Wyly 2006; McKin-
nish, et al. 2010) by adding a layer of data validation 
and analysis through community-engaged participato-
ry research. 
Given the fact that community groups are often at odds 
with the results of academic, quantitative research on 
gentrification, these case studies sought to bridge the 
chasm through the validation and enrichment of our 
data analysis through community-engaged research. 
The community-engaged and ground-truthing compo-
nents of this research were accomplished through two 
main venues: case studies and the validation of parcel 
and census data through field observations. 
To select case study neighborhoods that were both 
geographically representative of the region and cap-
ture the myriad housing pressures felt by low income 
communities, a screening analysis was done to iden-
tify Census tracts that had recently undergone neigh-
borhood change and would be classified as having 
undergone gentrification from 2000 to 2010 using the 
definition of gentrification put forth by Freeman (2005), 
modified slightly for the Bay Area: 
-Housing price appreciation above the regional 
median
-Increase in educational attainment above the  
regional median
-Household income at or below the 40th per-
centile of regional household income (roughly 
80% of median income, a standard definition of 
low-income) in the starting year (as the process 
begins). 
Given the wide variability between counties in the Bay 
Area, with extreme wealth in the south bay counties 
(San Mateo, Santa Clara) and poverty in some north 
and east bay counties (Solano, Sonoma, Alameda) we 
chose to compare each tract to its respective coun-
ty average, to reflect regional variability and change. 
Additional preference was given to communities that 
were proximate to rail transit and were designated 
as Priority Development Area during the last region-
al planning process. A panel of regional stakeholders 
that were participating in the region’s HUD Sustain-
able Communities Initiative analyzed the results and 
selected a final set of 9 neighborhoods around the Bay 
Area (Figure 2.1).
We used mixed methods to study demographic and 
housing changes in case study neighborhoods. We 
first analyzed indicators from the US Census and 
American Community Survey that are associated with 
processes of gentrification and residential displace-
ment, and/or thought to influence susceptibility to 
such processes (Chapple 2009) from 1980 to 2010. 
Because of the changes in Census tract boundaries 
between decades, we used the Geolytics Neighbor-
hood Change Database, which normalized histor-
ic Census data to 2010 Census Tracts, allowing for 
standardized comparisons across decades (Geolytics 
2014). Data regarding real estate sales trends were 
obtained through Dataquick, Inc. In addition, qualita-
tive data from stakeholder interviews and archival re-
search were collected to provide richer neighborhood 
descriptions and a more in-depth understanding of 
how and why neighborhoods change.
Figure 2.1: Case Study Communities
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Community Engagement
To engage community-based organizations (CBOs) in 
the case studies, request for proposals were released 
and 7 CBOs were selected to participate in the re-
search, which was funded by the Regional Prosperity 
Plan of the Metropolitan Transportation Commission. 
CBOs were engaged in three stages of the anal-
ysis: scoping, research validation/feedback, and 
ground-truthing of secondary datasets. Researchers 
met with CBO partners to scope the case studies by 
jointly selecting the neighborhood boundaries (based 
on Census tracts), discussing the most important in-
dicators for each community, and identifying potential 
stakeholders to interview and important documents 
to review. Simultaneous to our research, CBO part-
ners prepared narratives on how they perceived their 
neighborhood changed. Following preliminary analy-
sis, two workshops were held in which the researchers 
presented preliminary analyses and CBOs presented 
their narratives. Rich discussion and feedback ensued. 
A second set of CBO analysis and feedback occurred 
after preliminary drafts of the cases were prepared.
Ground-truthing
In order to ground-truth the secondary datasets (Cen-
sus and real estate data), a visual analysis tool was 
developed adapting similar methodologies used to 
observe gentrification and neighborhood change in 
Chicago (Hwang and Sampson 2014; see appendix 
for the observation tool developed for this study). We 
conducted an initial screening analysis of block-level 
Census and Assessor data to identify blocks that have 
recently undergone change in each case study area. 
Criteria used to select blocks included higher than av-
erage percentage change in tenure (from owner-oc-
cupancy to renter-occupancy or vice versa), percent-
age of white residents, and percentage of parcels sold 
since 2012. Upon initial screening, CBO partners were 
engaged to select the most important blocks to ana-
lyze from the screened list.
Researchers and community partners visited the se-
lected blocks and recorded a set of indicators for each 
parcel on the block. These indicators include the pri-
mary land use, building type (multi-family, single-fam-
ily, business, etc.), the number of units it appears to 
Table 2.1: CBO Partner Organizations
Case Study Neighborhood CBO Partner Organization
Chinatown, San Francisco Chinatown Community Development Center
The Mission, 
San Francisco
People Organizing to Demand 
Environmental & Economic 
Rights (PODER)
Diridon Station Area, 
San Jose Working Partnerships USA
Macarthur Bart Station 
Area, Oakland Causa Justa :: Just Cause
The Monument Corridor, 
Concord Monument Impact
Redwood City San Francisco Organizing Project / Peninsula Interfaith Action
The Canal, San Rafael Marin Grassroots
East Palo Alto San Francisco Organizing Project / Peninsula Interfaith Action
Marin City Marin Grassroots
Table 2.2: Selected Census Tracts
Case Study Neighborhood Census Tracts Included in the Study
Chinatown, San Francisco
Chinatown Core: 113, 118
Polk Gulch: 109, 110, and 111
Chinatwon North: 106, 107 and 
108
The Mission, 
San Francisco
177, 201, 202, 207, 208, 209, 
210, 228.01, 228.03, 229.01, and 
229.02
Diridon Station Area, 
San Jose 5003, 5008 and 5019
Macarthur Bart Station 
Area, Oakland
Temescal: 4011
Temescal-Broadway: 4012
Longfellow: 4010
Hoover-Foster: 4014
Koreatown-Northgate: 4013
The Monument Corridor, 
Concord
3361.01, 3361.02, 3362.01, 
3362.02, and 3280
Redwood City 6100, 6101, 6102.1, 6102.2, 6102.3, 6105, 6107, and 6109
The Canal, San Rafael 1122.01 and 1122.02
East Palo Alto 6118, 6119, 6120, and 6121
Marin City 1290
Center for Community Innovation, University of California, Berkeley Research Methodologies 12
hold, and indicators of recent investment such as per-
manent blinds and updated paint. Researchers also 
looked for signs of concern over safety, such as secu-
rity alarm signage or barred windows, as well as signs 
of disinvestment, such as litter or debris, boarded win-
dows, or peeling paint. 
Finally, data collected from the observation tool was 
compared to Tax Assessor and Census data. The re-
sults of the ground-truthing exercise for each case 
study is included in the Appendix. Additionally, ob-
servations from community members encountered 
during the ground-truthing and CBO partners further 
enriched the analysis and validating of data and case 
study conclusions. 
Final Review
Upon incorporating the results from the various stages 
of analysis, the final case study report was submitted 
to CBO partners. Researchers collected and incorpo-
rated feedback on the general tone of the report as 
well as specific points. 
chinatown
Chapter 3: Community Organizing 
amidst Change in SF’s Chinatown
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Introduction
As one of the oldest ethnic enclaves in the US, San 
Francisco’s Chinatown has been a major immigrant 
gateway as well as a cultural, economic and residen-
tial hub for the Bay Area’s Chinese American and 
Asian American communities for over 150 years. Since 
establishment in 1848, it has experienced constant 
transformation as nexus of complex transnational so-
ciopolitical forces—from immigration laws and trends 
to global movements of capital—that have evolved 
alongside Chinese American identity in the San Fran-
cisco Bay Area (Tan 2008; Li 2011). 
Chinatown’s current location (Figure 3.1) was estab-
lished after the original neighborhood was destroyed 
in the 1906 earthquake and fire that razed over 80 
percent of San Francisco. To this day, the official Chi-
natown neighborhood remains a relatively small land 
area of approximately 30 city blocks. With the rapid 
growth of the Chinese American population beginning 
in the 1960s, neighborhoods adjacent to the core area 
became home to many Chinese American families, 
and businesses and institutions serving the Chinese 
American community likewise began establishing 
themselves beyond the boundaries of Chinatown.
With this expansion, Chinatown has deeply influenced 
the evolution of these neighboring areas, which in-
clude portions of the historically affluent neighbor-
hoods of Russian Hill, Nob Hill and Polk Gulch, as well 
as tourist hotspots like North Beach, which is known 
as San Francisco’s Little Italy. For the purposes of this 
case study, we use the term “Polk Gulch” to refer to 
the western portion of Greater Chinatown, which in-
cludes sections of Nob Hill and Russian Hill between 
Van Ness Avenue and Leavenworth Street. We also 
use the term “Chinatown North” to refer to the areas 
3 Greater Chinatown is a term that we use specifically to refer 
to the case study area. It should be noted that this is term is 
not colloquial. Though neighborhood boundaries and names 
are varied and contested, San Francisco residents generally use 
neighborhood names of Nob Hill, Polk Gulch and North Beach 
to refer to the geographies that we include in the term Greater 
Chinatown. 
directly North and Northwest of the official Chinatown 
boundaries, including portions of North Beach and 
Polk Gulch. The area officially 
recognized as Chinatown is referred to as “Chinatown 
Core” in this case study. Though each of these areas 
has maintained their own distinct character and identi-
ty, each of their individual neighborhood changes have 
been deeply informed by development and market 
pressures in the others. As we analyze this intricate re-
lationship between the Chinatown core and peripheral 
communities throughout this case study, we examine 
this entire geography as “Greater Chinatown.” 3   
Historically, tensions between Greater Chinatown’s 
core and periphery have manifested through compet-
ing demands on the City’s limited housing stock – in 
particular, the vast need for affordable housing for 
low-income residents in Chinatown and the ever-in-
creasing desirability of San Francisco real estate.  The 
following case study explores the roots and impacts 
of this dynamic, seeking to elucidate possible implica-
tions for future neighborhood change and residential 
displacement throughout the different communities 
within Greater Chinatown.
Figure 3.1: Greater Chinatown Boundaries
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Overview and Historical 
Context
Since the 1960s, Greater Chinatown’s population has 
included a large percentage of foreign-born, low-in-
come Chinese American and Asian American fami-
lies. Elderly residents have also consistently made up 
a significant share of the population; between 2009 
and 2013, approximately 17 percent of Greater Chi-
natown’s residents were age 65 and over (US Census 
Bureau).4 While the Asian population’s overall number 
has decreased over time, its influence remains pres-
ent to varying degrees within all three neighborhoods. 
In 2009-2013, 55 percent of households within Great-
er Chinatown were Asian (Geolytics 2014).
Greater Chinatown is situated at the center of San 
Francisco’s booming real estate market, with close 
proximity to the Financial District, Downtown, and af-
fluent neighborhoods such as Russian Hill. Due to its 
prime location, it has consistently endured pressures 
of development and speculation that have transformed 
surrounding areas and much of San Francisco. Differ-
ing land use regulations between Chinatown Core and 
the rest of Greater Chinatown have led to varied pat-
terns of neighborhood change throughout the area. 
While the Chinatown Core community has largely 
resisted displacement and gentrification, increasing 
market pressure and ongoing neighborhood improve-
ments, such as the construction of the Chinatown 
Central Subway Station that is scheduled to open in 
2016, may profoundly impact the area’s affordability 
and further shift its demographics.
Chinatown’s History
The area’s built form is rooted in the early history of 
discriminatory policies directed at Chinese immigrants 
in the late 1800s, including the 1882 Federal Chinese 
Exclusion Act, which prohibited further migration of 
individuals from China until it was repealed in 1943 
(Yip 1985). With this institutionalized halt in migration 
for nearly an entire century, Chinatown’s built environ-
ment did not evolve from the influence of its earliest 
cohort of settlers, who were predominantly male con-
tract laborers from Chinese provinces near Pearl Riv-
er Delta. These men arrived in California in search of 
4 This percentage of residents age 65 and over is a bit higher 
than in San Francisco as a whole, where 14.2 percent of resi-
dents were age 65 and over between 2009 and 2013 (US Census 
Bureau).  
wealth during the Gold Rush and later also took on 
jobs in the railroad industry (Yip 1985). Few arrived 
with the intention of permanent settlement; rather, San 
Francisco, “was merely the point of arrival” (Yip 1985). 
Instead of a residential community, Chinatown initially 
functioned as a “provision station” for Chinese workers 
(Li 2011). 
Within this context, much of Chinatown’s housing was 
built as single room occupancy (SRO) residential ho-
tels or small rooms in commercial structures or com-
munity spaces. Chinese immigrants, who were barred 
from property ownership, were subjected to discrimi-
natory housing practices by absentee landlords seek-
ing to maximize profits. Housing was thus poorly main-
tained and often overcrowded (Yip 1985).
After the US Civil War, anti-Chinese sentiment driven 
in part by labor disputes led to thousands of Chinese 
immigrants relocating to Chinatown for protection 
from racialized violence, which resulted in the neigh-
borhood transforming into a permanent residential 
community (Li 2011). The Chinese community’s spa-
tial segregation and social isolation contributed to the 
development of “an impenetrable social, political, and 
economic wall” between Chinatown and the rest of 
San Francisco (Wang 2007). While the neighborhood’s 
insularity allowed for the formation of strong social 
networks and a self-sufficient system of community 
institutions, small businesses and cultural activity (Yip 
1985), it also reinforced a language barrier that still 
presents a challenge for socio-economic integration 
and contributes to persistently high poverty and un-
employment rates (Wang 2007). 
When Chinatown was rebuilt after the 1906 earth-
quake, Chinese immigrants were able to lease land 
from white landowners, who dictated the parameters of 
building design and construction (Asian Neighborhood 
Design 2008). With the goal of attracting tourists and 
outsiders, new Chinatown buildings were deliberately 
designed by white architects using elements intend-
ed to signify the community’s heritage, with the hope 
that Chinatown would generate increased revenue for 
the City through commercial activity (Li 2011). During 
this period, much of the housing was reconstructed as 
SROs, which were considered economically efficient
In the 1960s, the liberalization of US immigration poli-
cy led to a population boom and subsequent shortage 
of affordable housing. Chinatown quickly became one 
of the densest neighborhoods in the country, with an 
overwhelming majority low-income renter population. 
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SROs and other small residential units were often 
overcrowded, in poor condition, and yet still expensive 
for very low-income residents (Tan 2008). 
The influence of Chinatown Core on portions of North 
Beach (Chinatown North), Nob Hill, and Russian Hill 
(Polk Gulch) manifested between 1970 and 1990, 
when the Chinese American populations, mostly made 
up of families with US-born children, in these areas 
grew as previous immigrant communities moved out 
(Fujioka 2014). The incremental dispersal of the Chi-
nese community during this period was informed by 
social changes brought about through the Civil Rights 
Movement, which facilitated challenges to norms of 
racial segregation (Li 2011). By 1990, the large pro-
portions of Asian households in Chinatown North and 
Polk Gulch—73 and 49 percent, respectively—signi-
fied the establishment of the areas’ connection to the 
Core Chinatown community. 
Today, Greater Chinatown is still primarily renter-oc-
cupied, though the share of owner-occupied housing 
units has grown in recent years. With an estimated 
residential density of 85,000 people per square mile 
in the Chinatown Core (Tan 2008), overcrowding and 
housing affordability remain pressing issues for the 
community. Although most of Greater Chinatown has 
maintained its relative affordability in relation to the 
rest of San Francisco, the dramatic rise in real estate 
values and the cost of living in surrounding neighbor-
hoods has driven increasing “rent gaps,” or disparities 
between what existing residents pay and the amount 
landlords could charge in the current market (Smith 
1979). This has spurred a resurgence of concern over 
possible residential displacement. This case study 
seeks to address these concerns by deconstructing 
the unique forces that have allowed the neighborhood 
to remain affordable and analyzing the implications 
that these factors may have for potential displacement 
and gentrification. 
The Changing Chinatown 
Community
Chinatown residents make up approximately 4 percent 
of the San Francisco population. Though its density 
remains incredibly high, Chinatown’s population de-
creased slightly since 1980, in contrast to a 21 per-
cent increase in the overall San Francisco population 
(Table 3.1). This can be explained by the growing den-
sification of other San Francisco neighborhoods, while 
by the 1990s, parts of Greater Chinatown were largely 
built out, with high rates of overcrowding. 
However, as shown in Table 3.2, the population decline 
was not distributed evenly throughout Greater China-
town. While Chinatown North experienced a popula-
tion decline of 8 percent, Polk Gulch and Chinatown 
Core’s populations increased by 4 and 12 percent, re-
spectively, between 1980 and 2009-2013. 
This discrepancy exemplifies a broader difference in 
degrees and types of neighborhood change between 
Chinatown North, Polk Gulch and the Chinatown 
Core, which will be explored further throughout this 
case study. 
Greater Chinatown’s general population decline co-
incides with a drop in its average household size 
between 1980 and 2009-2013, which fell across all 
three neighborhood areas, as shown in Table 3.3. In 
contrast, San Francisco’s average household size in-
creased nominally. 
Table 3.1: Total Population in Greater Chinatown and 
San Francisco, 1980-2013
Year Chinatown San Francisco
1980 34,607 677,678
1990 35,938 723,959
2000 34,891 776,733
2009-2013 34,557 817,501
% Change,
1980 to 
2009-2013
-0.1% 21%
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000. (Geolytics, 2014). 2009-
2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates.
Table 3.2: Population Change in Chinatown by Area, 
1980 to 2009-2013
Area 1980 2009 
-2013
% Change, 
1980 to 2009-
2013
Chinatown 
Core
4,464 5,012 12%
Chinatown 
North
15,315 14,067 -8%
Polk Gulch 14,830 15,478 4%
Greater Chi-
natown
35938 33018 -4%
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 2009-
2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates.
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Table 3.3: Average Household Size in Greater 
Chinatown and San Francisco, 1980 to 2009-2013
Year Chinatown San Francisco
1980 2.22 2.27
1990 2.30 2.37
2000 1.97 2.36
2009-2013 2.03 2.31
% Change,
1980 to 
2009-2013
-9% 1.8%
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 2009-
2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates.
This trend also correlates with the slight growth in the 
share of non-family households in Greater Chinatown. 
Between 2009 and 2013, 61 percent of the neighbor-
hood’s 17,457 households were non-family house-
holds, up from 59 percent in 1980.
Greater Chinatown also saw a drop in the share of 
overcrowded households between 2000 and 2009-
2013, as shown in Figure 3.3. Despite this decrease, 
its rate of overcrowding in 2009-2013—defined as 
more than one person per room—was still over twice 
that of San Francisco, which had 3 percent overcrowd-
ed and 3.3% extremely overcrowded units.
Combined declines in family households, average 
household size and overcrowding are often associated 
with the process of gentrification, and changes in Chi-
natown’s racial/ethnic composition, further reinforce 
that possibility. Between 1990 and 2013 , the share of 
Asian households in the neighborhood decreased by 
11 percentage points, corresponding with a growth of 
5 percentage points in the share of white households. 
The largest change, however, occurred between 1990 
and 2000.  
Though the concentration of Asian residents between 
Chinatown North, Polk Gulch and Chinatown Core 
varied greatly during the baseline year of 1980, all 
three areas reflected a broader trend of a declining 
share of Asian households in the following decades. 
By 2010, the share of Asian households dropped by 
10 percent in both Chinatown North and Polk Gulch, 
alongside a 7 and 6 percent increase, respectively, in 
the share of the white households. Chinatown Core 
showed a much slower rate of decline in the share of 
Asian households; by 2010 it fell by only 5 percentage 
points to 83 percent. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 depict these 
varying rates of change in concentration of Asian 
households across Greater Chinatown’s census tracts. 
Figure 3.2: Households in Greater Chinatown, 
1980 to 2009-2013
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 2009-
2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates.
Figure 3.3: Overcrowded Households in Greater 
Chinatown, 1980 to 2009-2013
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 2009-
2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates.
Figure 3.4: Racial/Ethnic Composition of Greater 
Chinatown Households, 1980-2013
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 2009-
2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates.
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Figure 3.5: Asian Households as a Percentage of all 
Households in Greater Chinatown by 
Census Tract, 1980.
Figure 3.6: Asian Households as a Percentage of all 
Households in Greater Chinatown by 
Census Tract, 2010.
Source: US Census 1980, 2010 (Geolytics, 2014).
Educational attainment among Chinatown residents 
also increased  as the share of white households in-
creased, as shown in Figure 3.7
. By 2013, 48 percent of the population 25 and old-
er had a college degree or higher. Polk Gulch is driv-
ing this figure; there, the same figure was 61 percent, 
compared to 21% in Chinatown Core.
 
Figure 3.7: Educational Attainment in Greater 
Chinatown, 1980 to 2009-2013
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 2009-
2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates.
Since the increase in educational attainment was con-
current with significant shifts in the population’s racial/
ethnic composition, this increase may signify new resi-
dents moving in, rather than existing residents achiev-
ing higher levels of education. 
Data also show another key difference among the 
areas regarding the change in proportion of foreign- 
born residents. Between 1980 and 2013, the percent-
age of foreign-born individuals decreased by over 10 
percentage points in Chinatown North and Polk Gulch. 
Meanwhile, the same figure decreased by only 4 per-
centage points in Chinatown Core. This suggests that 
the Chinatown Core has served as the primary immi-
grant gateway in Chinatown as the other two areas 
have become less accessible to first generation immi-
grant households. 
This shift is likely attributable to changes in rent-
al prices, which have deviated significantly by area. 
Figure 3.8 shows that in contrast to other areas and 
San Francisco overall, median rent in the Chinatown 
Core has remained exceptionally stable since 1980. 
This is primarily due to the large number of subsidized 
and rent-controlled units in Chinatown Core. By 2013, 
median rent in Chinatown North and Polk Gulch had 
approximately doubled the median cost of rent in the 
Chinatown Core. 
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Figure 3.8: Median Rent in Chinatown and San Fran-
cisco (in 2010 dollars), 1980 to 2009-2013. 
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014).  American 
Community Survey 2009-2013.
An even closer look at the spatial differentiation in 
rental prices shows wide disparities within each of 
Chinatown’s three areas at the tract level. The spread 
of Chinatown North’s distribution is most notable; in 
2013, Tract 107’s median rent was only $575, com-
pared to $1,455 in adjacent Tract 108. 
Although Greater Chinatown’s rental prices on aver-
age have maintained their affordability, data suggest 
that its community was deeply impacted by the reces-
sion, and as a result, the neighborhood has grown in-
creasingly unaffordable for its residents. Between 2000 
and 2009-2013, Greater Chinatown’s median house-
hold income fell by 36 percent, and its poverty rate 
increased by 4 percentage points to 18 percent. Again, 
disaggregation by area shows that the recession’s im-
pact varied significantly by geography. As shown in 
Figure 3.9, Chinatown Core’s poverty rate had more 
than doubled the rate of Polk Gulch’s by 2009-2013.
Polk Gulch is the only area that saw an overall growth 
in median household income from 1980 to 2013. 
Amidst increasing income stratification in Chinatown, 
low-income residents are very vulnerable to displace-
ment. The extreme rise in percentages of rent- and 
mortgage-burdened households between 2000 and 
2009-2013, as shown in Figure 3.11, serves as an in-
dicator of this.
 Figure 3.9: Poverty Rates in Greater Chinatown and 
San Francisco, 2000 to 2009-2013.
Figure 3.10: Median Household Income in Greater 
Chinatown and San Francisco (in 2010 dollars), 
1980 to 2009-2013.51
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014). American 
Community Survey 2009-2013.
Figure 3.11: Rent- and Mortgage-Burdened 
Households in Greater Chinatown, 1980-2013.
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 2009-
2013 American Community Survey. Burdened means paying more 
than a third of income towards housing costs.
5 Data for 1980 is the average rent rather than the median rent.
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Given the lower cost of housing in Chinatown than the 
City on average, displaced residents from Chinatown 
would likely struggle to find more affordable housing 
elsewhere in San Francisco and thus be forced out of 
the City as a whole. 
The threat of displacement, which appears to have al-
ready impacted portions of Polk Gulch, seems to be 
rising in Chinatown North and inward toward China-
town Core, which has largely resisted gentrification 
up to this point. If patterns of change in Polk Gulch 
and Chinatown North continue to diverge from those in 
Chinatown Core, the geography of what is considered 
Greater Chinatown may shrink as residents’ connec-
tions to the Core community weaken. 
Chinatown Housing Policy 
and Planning
In the face of external pressures of gentrification, a 
number of key policies and planning efforts have 
uniquely allowed Chinatown Core to maintain its his-
toric character and accessibility to low-income San 
Franciscans. One of the most influential and com-
prehensive policy changes took place in 1986, with 
the adoption of the City Planning Department’s offi-
cial Chinatown Rezoning Plan as an amendment to 
the General Plan, which resulted in the designation 
of Chinatown as a mixed use area distinct from the 
downtown.
CCDC’s predecessor, the Chinatown Resource Cen-
ter, led this planning effort with the Chinese Chamber 
of Commerce and Asian Neighborhood Design. In the 
years prior, Chinatown Resource Center had worked 
tirelessly to stave off infringing developers, many of 
whom sought to purchase land for office uses (Chinn 
2014). Between the mid-1970s to mid-1980s, approxi-
mately 1,700 residential units in Chinatown were con-
verted to office use, and at the same time, an influx 
of capital from Asian firms drove up both commercial 
and residential rents (Li 2011). As these factors ex-
acerbated the threat of displacement, the Chinatown 
Resource Center realized the unsustainability of this 
project-by-project approach and switched course to-
ward advocating for structural changes to the neigh-
borhood’s land use policy in an attempt to slow devel-
opment (Chinn 2014). 
They organized residents behind oposed set of zoning 
regulations that were originally conceived of as part 
of a Chinatown community planning process that took 
place over several years prior (Chinn 2014), during 
which the San Francisco Planning Department had 
proposed a new Downtown Plan and housing advo-
cates across the city sought to limit the proliferation 
of office buildings to preserve affordable housing (Li 
2011). With the growing threat of speculation and en-
croaching development from the downtown, residents, 
community-based organizations, and City officials all 
exhibited political will for policy change, agreeing that 
action must be taken to preserve Chinatown’s charac-
ter and culture for its existing residents (Chinn 2014). 
The proposal, which specifically addressed the core 
portion of Chinatown, sought to downzone the neigh-
borhood by setting lower height limits that would curb 
the neighborhood’s development potential. Previous 
zoning had set limits at much higher than the prevail-
ing scale of most existing buildings. This was due to 
the fact that Chinatown had originally been zoned as 
“a creature of downtown,” resulting in regulations that 
did not align with the neighborhood’s distinct character 
(Chinn 2014). The community’s proposal was broadly 
viewed as a necessary, sensible shift toward land use 
policy that was indigenous to Chinatown (Chinn 2014). 
The 1986 Rezoning Plan’s central aim was to protect 
what the Planning Department acknowledged was a 
“virtually irreplaceable” resource of affordable housing 
in Chinatown. The plan effectively prohibited demoli-
tion, allowing it only “if that is the only way to protect 
public safety or for a specific use in which there is a 
high degree of community need,” and furthermore 
banned conversion of residential buildings into differ-
ent uses (San Francisco Planning Department). 
Chinatown’s large stock of SROs was granted further 
protection by the 1980 citywide Residential Hotel Or-
dinance, which made it very difficult for developers 
to convert residential hotel rooms to commercial use 
by requiring replacement of lost affordable units and 
mandating that 80 percent of the replacement cost be 
paid by developers to the City for conversions or dem-
olitions (Fribourg 2009). 
With these requirements in place, approximately 50 
percent of the Chinatown Core’s housing stock has re-
mained SRO hotels (Tan 2008), and an estimated 92 
percent of units are protected by the 1979 San Fran-
cisco Rent Control Ordinance (San Francisco Depart-
ment of Public Health).
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Nearly 30 years later, the 1986 effort can thus be 
considered to have essentially achieved its policy ob-
jectives to “preserve the distinctive urban character 
of Chinatown” and “retain and reinforce Chinatown’s 
mutually supportive functions as a neighborhood, cap-
ital city and visitor attraction.” (San Francisco Planning 
Department) However, some would problematize the 
lack of new development in Chinatown Core amidst 
the City’s affordable housing shortage (Tan 2008). 
County Assessor data shows that since 1987, only 22 
residential buildings have been constructed in China-
town Core (Dataquick 2014). By comparison, 65 build-
ings in Chinatown North and 353 residential buildings 
in Polk Gulch have been built within the same time 
frame (Dataquick 2014). Construction of affordable 
housing in Chinatown Core has also been limited; the 
small stock of 342 subsidized and public units has not 
increased since 1990, despite increasing need (CHPC 
2014). Thus, the neighborhood’s land use policy has 
given rise to other unresolved challenges of supplying 
sufficient housing in San Francisco. 
With few new housing units built in Chinatown Core 
after 1986, the vast majority—75 percent, compared 
to 61 percent in San Francisco overall—were built 
before 1949 (pre-World War II). A combination of age 
and weak code enforcement has led to many build-
ings falling into disrepair (Chinn 2014). Consequently, 
two mutually reinforcing phenomena have emerged in 
Chinatown Core: a shortage of supply and a declin-
ing quality of housing as buildings have deteriorated 
(Chinn 2014). With low profit potential, particularly for 
rent-controlled units, and exceedingly high demand 
throughout the neighborhood, owners are dis-incen-
tivized to rehabilitate their rental units (Chinn 2014). 
In some cases, they have opted to take units off of the 
market to avoid necessary maintenance costs, which 
has further contributed to the broader housing crisis 
that most severely impacts lowest income individuals 
(Tan 2008). 
Further pressure was placed on the housing stock 
as developers often opted to build commercial rath-
er than residential buildings. By 1992, an estimated 
25 percent of land was used for commercial activities, 
which led to a lack of parking and open space, while 
50 percent was used for residential purposes. Land-
scape architecture scholar Chuo Li notes that these 
proportions differed greatly from New York and Chica-
go’s Chinatowns, which had dedicated 70 percent of 
land to residential uses and 20 percent to commercial 
uses (Li 2011).  
These constraints surrounding both redevelopment 
and rehabilitation have made Chinatown Core some-
what less desirable to residential real estate specula-
tors (Chinn 2014). Since many buildings would likely 
require major rehabilitation and potentially demolition 
to allow for conversion into condos or tenancies in 
common (TICs), a conversion project would be a 
much more difficult and costly undertaking in China-
town Core compared to other San Francisco neighbor-
hoods that have been systematically impacted by such 
types of redevelopment. In some senses, then, China-
town Core has avoided gentrification because other 
areas were—and continue to be—more susceptible  to 
gentrification and/or lucrative for speculators seeking 
to flip residential properties (Chinn 2014). 
Signs of Displacement
Despite Chinatown Core’s ability to resist gentrifica-
tion in the past decades, the threat of displacement 
looms large for the share of residents facing unem-
ployment, poverty and rent or mortgage burdens. Gen 
Fujioka, Public Policy Manager at CCDC, notes that 
even the modest increases in rents for SRO units have 
led to both economic and exclusionary displacement. 
Though occurrences of eviction have been rare, these 
other factors suggest a tenuous future for the China-
town Core. 
Trends in other areas of Greater Chinatown present 
a starkly different picture of change. Fujioka explains 
that the Chinatown North and Polk Gulch communities 
have experienced “reoccurring waves of evictions,” in-
cluding Ellis Act and Owner-Move-In evictions, as well 
as “many more under-the-table evictions that are un-
recorded” (Fujioka 2014). With a growing number of 
accounts from Chinese American residents of informal 
threats of buyout or eviction in these areas, anxiety 
over displacement runs high. 
Without the force of the 1986 rezoning policy that ap-
plies only to Chinatown Core, the Chinatown North 
and Polk Gulch areas have not been immune to the 
proliferation of TIC or condo conversion. Tract lev-
el census data suggests that much of this activity is 
primarily occurring in Polk Gulch, where the share of 
owner-occupied units has gone from 9 to 16 percent 
between 1980 and 2013. According to an analysis of 
the San Francisco Department of Public Health of no-
fault evictions during the period 2009-2012, approxi-
mately 34 no-fault evictions – which include evictions 
due to the Ellis Act, owner move-in and demolition—
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have occurred in Polk Gulch, compared to 12 in Chi-
natown North and 1 on the border of Chinatown North 
and Chinatown Core (San Francisco Public Health De-
partment 2014).  
Census figures also show that this trend has gen-
erally corresponded with declines in the number of 
Asian households and increases in the number of 
white households. For example, in Tract 110 (in Polk 
Gulch), the number of Asian households decreased 
from 3,519 to 2,527 between 1980 and 2013—a de-
crease in share of total population of 22 percentage 
points. This corresponds with an increase in the share 
of white residents by 17 percentage points over the 
same time period (Geolytics 2014). 
Figure 3.12: Instances of No-Fault Evictions and 
Percentage of Rent-Controlled Units in San Francisco 
by Census Tract (zoomed in to case study area).
Source: San Francisco Department of Public Health
In addition to the pressure of evictions and conver-
sions, changes to the culture and dynamic of the Chi-
nese American community have contributed to the 
shifting demographic composition of Greater China-
town. As the foreign-born population that moved to 
Polk Gulch and Chinatown North in the 1970s has 
aged and passed on, some second generation Chi-
nese Americans are not returning in adulthood to the 
neighborhood to establish their own homes (Chinn 
2014). It is unclear whether this is due to exclusionary 
displacement or simply shifting preferences and/or cir-
cumstances among the second generation. Many are 
deciding to sell their parents’ properties, which have 
often appreciated enormously in value, and are thus 
regularly purchased for conversion into condominiums 
or TICs (Chinn 2014).
Resistance to 
Displacement
Multiple layers of transformation signify a changing 
social fabric throughout Greater Chinatown. Neverthe-
less, a profound sense of community identity persists 
among Asian American residents as well as a broader 
set of Asian American individuals who live outside the 
area yet remain deeply connected to Chinatown’s cul-
ture, institutions, and spaces. The driving force behind 
this sense of cohesion is a high rate of civic engage-
ment, which has continued to shape Greater China-
town’s built environment since the 1986 rezoning vic-
tory. (Fujioka 2014)
With affordable housing as an unceasing concern in 
Greater Chinatown as well as all of the Bay Area, the 
Chinatown Community Development Center and oth-
er community-based organizations have formed re-
silient organizing networks with citywide reach. They 
have also brought their resident base into the broader 
movement around the right to the city. Recent cam-
paigns have taken on the uptick in owner-move-in 
evictions that singled out elderly residents as well as 
Ellis Act evictions. Informed by a commitment to com-
munity-based neighborhood planning from the ground 
up, CCDC, together with tenant groups such as the 
1,000 member Community Tenants Association, have 
won new eviction protections for seniors and residents 
with disabilities. 
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In preserving community spaces and connections 
throughout Chinatown, strong political engagement 
has also preserved tight social networks among Chi-
nese American residents. These social connections 
have also played a key role in the neighborhood’s 
ability to resist gentrification. For example, with apart-
ment vacancies often posted only within local Chinese 
language newspapers rather than more broadly uti-
lized forums such as Craigslist, information on hous-
ing availability is not widely accessible to the public. 
Property sales also typically occur within existing so-
cial networks, resulting in many real estate ownership 
turnovers occurring within the Chinese American com-
munity. Within Chinatown Core, these dynamics have 
maintained the racial and ethnic composition in spite 
of many other neighborhood changes. 
 
Conclusion
The unique history of land use politics and policy in 
Chinatown—from the earliest days of forced segrega-
tion through to recent years of housing rights activ-
ism—has given rise to a complex set of challenges as 
well as community assets to address them. New in-
frastructure initiatives, such as the Chinatown Central 
Subway Station construction project, alongside ongo-
ing work by community based organizations, will have 
a major impact on the community’s future. 
Data and information from residents suggest that 
while housing in Chinatown Core has been preserved 
for low-income individuals, many of whom are for-
eign-born Asian Americans, all of Greater Chinatown 
faces significant pressure as rates of rent- or mort-
gage-burdened households have skyrocketed since 
2000. 
Different factors within each area have driven this 
pressure. In Chinatown Core, they include internal cir-
cumstances such as high rates of poverty and unem-
ployment among residents. On the other hand, pres-
sures in Chinatown North and Polk Gulch appear to be 
rooted in external market forces, which have caused 
significant increases in rental costs. 
While part of the broader picture of San Francisco’s 
affordability crisis, the unduplicated factors that shape 
Chinatown’s built form require a locally-tailored ap-
proach to preserving the neighborhood’s livability and 
vibrancy. 
As with the 1986 Rezoning Plan, the neighborhood’s 
effectively mobilized resident base allows for poten-
tial solutions to be indigenous to the community. Con-
tinued organizing efforts by community groups like 
CCDC will be critical as both the population and the 
neighborhood’s infrastructure continue to evolve. 
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Community Organizing and Resistance in SF’s Mission District
Introduction
The Mission District is located in the southeastern re-
gion of San Francisco. Since the 1950s, the neighbor-
hood has been San Francisco’s Latino enclave. Prior 
to this time, the neighborhood was an Italian and Irish 
working-class neighborhood with an industrial charac-
ter (PODER, 2014).
In this case study we will examine the time period from 
1980 to 2013, with a focus on the changes caused 
by the rapid growth of the internet sector, alternatively 
known as the dotcom boom, in the late 1990s. The 
result of this rapid speculative growth was an increase 
in the cost of living and a rise in the cost of housing 
in the Mission, which led to the displacement of long-
time residents. During this time, much of the industrial 
sector in the Mission District was wiped out (Casique, 
2013). The changes experienced by the Mission during 
the dotcom boom are those typically associated with 
the traditional conception of gentrification, or the influx 
of investment and higher-income, usually White, res-
idents to areas with low-income, often minority, resi-
dents. 
New residents were—and are still—attracted to the 
amenities provided by higher density, the cultural rich-
ness of the neighborhood and to the transit accessibil-
ity of the area. Multiple bus lines as well as two BART 
stations (16th Street and 24th Street Mission Station) 
service the neighborhood for an easy commute to the 
financial district. The neighborhood is also close to the 
freeway and the Caltrain, which provide accessibility 
to the greater region, including Silicon Valley.
This first wave of gentrification is the main story in 
the neighborhood’s shift from a lower-income Latino 
area to its present state. Although the bust of the dot-
com bubble caused gentrification pressures to slow, 
the neighborhood has continued to be a high demand 
area, seeing an influx of high-income residents once 
again from the tech sector. However, this current wave 
of gentrification is taking place in a neighborhood 
context that has already undergone years of gentri-
fication—not just with new residents who had moved 
in, but with an ongoing influx of new retail and public 
investment. 
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Today’s ongoing battle over the Mission is therefore of 
a different kind, with weaker community organizations 
and fewer units left to gentrify. Many long-time resi-
dents are holding on and benefitting from the neigh-
borhood’s new investment and amenities, but there is 
even more pressure than before on the remaining af-
fordable units and less of a community to defend them.
This case study examines demographic, housing, 
and commercial characteristics from 1980 to 2013 to 
identify changes and trends in the Mission District. Af-
ter outlining basic demographic changes in the area 
between 1980 and 2013, we provide a close look at 
the dotcom boom period and the displacement effects 
this time of rapid change had on industrial, business, 
and residential uses, as well as the community’s re-
sponse. Next, we turn to an examination of housing in 
the area—perhaps the clearest way to observe gentri-
fication, change, and displacement. We briefly outline 
some of the affordability concerns for residents, and 
then detail several strategies used to slow displace-
ment, as well as strategies used to speed it up. Before 
concluding, we outline public investment in the area—
which can contribute to gentrification—and recent 
commercial displacement. 
Demographic Changes
The Mission District is home to almost 52,000 of San 
Francisco’s approximately 818,000 residents (Ta-
ble 4.1). Since 1980, the area has seen significant 
shifts in racial composition, occupancy, educational 
attainment, and median income. Tensions are grow-
ing among various groups with an interest in the fate 
of the Mission: lower-income Latino residents, tech 
Table 4.1: Total Population SF & Mission District, 
1980-2013
Year San Francisco Mission
1980 677,678 45,788
1990 723,959 51,640
2000 776,733 54,428
2013 817.501 51,578
Percent Change 
1980-2013
21% 13%
Source: Source: U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 
ACS 2009-2013
sector employees who often work in Silicon Valley but 
prefer to live in urban neighborhoods like the Mission, 
longtime residents, small business owners, and oth-
ers. These tensions have made news across the coun-
try as the Mission has in many ways become the post-
er-child of gentrification (Goode, 2013; Nieves, 2000). 
Understanding how these changes have taken place 
may provide some insight into the causes and indica-
tors of residential displacement. From 1980 to 2000, 
the population of the Mission district swelled by about 
19%, then declined slightly in 2013. In contrast, San 
Francisco’s population has steadily increased in the 
last three decades.
The decrease in population from 2000 to 2013 may 
be linked to the steady decrease of family households 
since 1980 (Figure 4.2). The share of family house-
holds dropped to 38% in 2013 from 52% in 1980.
The decrease in family households is accompanied 
by a decrease in the Latino population, shifting from 
44% in 1980 to 38% in 2013 while the White popula-
tion increased from 36% to 43%. The racial and ethnic 
demographics of the Mission in 2013 is similar to the 
city’s (Figure 4.3). 
There were significant shifts in educational attain-
ment from 1980 to 2013. The percentage of residents 
aged 25 or older with a bachelor’s degree or higher in-
creased from 18% to 52%, and the percentage without 
a high school diploma decreased from 41% to 17% in 
the same period (Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.3: Race & Ethnicity in the Mission District by 
population and percent, 1980-2013, and San Francisco, 2013
Source: U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 
ACS 2009-2013
Figure 4.2: Number of Households in the Mission, 
by type 1980-2013
Source: U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 
ACS 2009-2013 
Figure 4.4: Educational Attainment in the Mission 
(1980-2013)
U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); ACS 2009-2013
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Figure 4.5: Median Income, Mission vs. SF (1980-2013), 2013 $
Source: U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); ACS 2009-2013 *Median income unavailable, average income used
As may be expected, an increase in median income 
accompanied the increase in educational attainment 
in the study area. Median household income in the 
Mission District has risen significantly from 2000 to 
2013, increasing at a faster pace than San Francisco 
overall (Figure 4.5).
The Dotcom Boom: 
Displacement of Industry, 
Business, and Residents—
and Community Response
The dotcom boom in the late 1990s fundamental-
ly changed the character of the Mission District. The 
boom hit its peak in 2000 and by 2002 was in decline. 
This short boom resulted in residential and commer-
cial displacement (Casique, 2013). The industrial sec-
tor in the Mission is primarily located in the Northeast 
Mission Industrial Zone (NEMIZ), an area taking up 
the northeast corner of the Mission District. Even 
though the zone was designated in the midst of the 
dotcom boom, the market for industrial uses was “de-
pressed,” according to a stakeholder, and “a bunch of 
companies had moved out,” like a brewing company 
and lumber yards. This devaluing of the land for indus-
trial purposes due to the changing economy coincided 
with the growth of San Francisco as a result of the 
dotcom boom.
Industrial uses began to change to office space and 
housing. According to a community-based organi-
zation staff member, the emerging technology com-
panies were in need of office space and able to pay 
higher rents, so they began converting former light 
industrial uses to office space; many of these offices, 
in turn, became empty after the dotcom bust, but light 
industrial uses did not return. 
In terms of conversions to housing, a 1988 ordinance 
allowed the conversion of industrial spaces into so-
called “live/work” spaces, where it is presumed a res-
ident both lives and does their work (Casique, 2013). 
Advocated by artists, the live/work ordinance was 
seen as an opportunity to promote the art industry 
in the city by providing affordable housing arrange-
ments in San Francisco (PODER, 2014). Under the 
ordinance, developers interested in constructing live/
work units in the NEMIZ did not need to get the area 
rezoned nor did they need a conditional land use per-
mit to build and therefore did not need to conduct an 
environmental impact report (EIR)—major hurdles for 
construction developers were able to avoid. As a re-
sult, many small developments “started springing up 
everywhere,” according to one stakeholder, and be-
gan converting many industrial structures, vacated 
due to the changing economy, into expensive “live/
work” spaces to house the new residents coming to 
work in the technology sector as a result of the dot-
com boom. According to the San Francisco Housing 
Databook report issued by the SF Rent Board in 2002, 
2,324 live/work units were constructed in San Francis-
co from 1987 to 2000.6 Right before the dotcom crash, 
the number of constructed units peaked at 587 units in 
1999, more than twice the amount of units built in any 
other year (SF Board of Supervisors, 2002). 
6 Only four units or more were counted which might result in 
undercounting.
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Once it became clear that such conversions were pos-
sible, land values in the NEMIZ area began to rise, 
making remaining industrial uses difficult to sustain 
and resulting in business displacement (San Francis-
co Planning Department, 2002). The live/work ordi-
nance allowed conversion without the requirement of 
hearings or public comment, allowing them to proceed 
unnoticed for a long time (Casique, 2013). Once ad-
vocates became aware of the situation, the Mission 
Anti-Displacement Coalition worked with Sue Hestor, 
a notable SF land use attorney, to force hearings at 
the Planning Commission and before the board of su-
pervisors (PODER, 2014). Before the formation of the 
Mission Anti-Displacement Coalition, the “Committee 
for Jobs, Arts, and Housing had been raising concerns 
about the developers’ scam on live/work develop-
ments,” according to a community-based organization 
stakeholder.
Residential displacement in the Mission was also a 
concern during this period. Between 1990 and 1999, 
an estimated 925 households were evicted in the Mis-
sion (MEDA, as cited by Kennedy & Leonard, 2001). 
The Mission Anti-Displacement Coalition (MAC) was 
a major player during this time period, advocating for 
existing tenants’ rights. According to a stakeholder in-
volved with the Coalition, “the value of MAC’s work is 
that unlike most other anti-gentrification work in other 
parts of the country…MAC focused not only on tenants’ 
rights and stabilizing the neighborhood through that 
strategy but also on preserving space for local-serving 
businesses and [production, distribution and repair, or] 
PDR/light industrial space, especially given that those 
jobs paid often better [than other jobs available at the 
time].” Due to MAC’s successful lobbying efforts, the 
San Francisco Board of Supervisors passed a morato-
rium on the live/work conversions and the production 
of market rate housing in the Mission that ultimately 
lasted two years (Casique, 2013).
Another of MAC’s efforts was the creation of a “Peo-
ple’s Plan.” Published in 2005 after a community en-
gagement process, it outlined community members’ 
vision and priorities for the district, including econom-
ic, cultural, and community development, affordable 
housing, livability in the streetscape, environmental 
issues, transportation, and a specific land use map—
essentially, a comprehensive plan for the Mission 
done by the people (The Mission Anti-Displacement 
Partnership, 2005). According to PODER, “aspects of 
this community-led effort were incorporated into the 
city’s Eastern Neighborhoods Plan” (PODER, 2014). 
When asked to assess the impact of the People’s Plan 
on the Mission, an organizer involved with the effort 
shared that he does not believe there was a “caus-
al” effect on affordability in the neighborhood; instead, 
“market conditions in and of themselves eased some 
of the pressures on prices given the [dotcom] bust.” 
However, he believed that even with the bust, rents 
were not decreased in a “substantive way.” Instead, 
he believe that the planning process was significant 
for the “social capital” it built “by having trained people 
work on planning issues in the neighborhood and un-
derstand the zoning and planning conditions and how 
those decisions get made.” 7
A park that is currently under development at the inter-
section of 17th and Folsom Streets represents some 
of the successes of the People’s plan. The park, will in-
clude a grassy area, playground, community gardens 
with trees bearing edible fruit, and public art that hon-
ors the Latino character of the neighborhood. multi-
year community outreach process was conducted in 
partnership with PODER, starting in 2009. According 
to a staff member at PODER, community members 
were prepared to have meaningful engagement with 
the city due to the understanding of planning and zon-
ing they developed working on the People’s Plan. The 
staff member said that, the “areas that were rezoned 
through [the People’s Plan] process in the 2000s are 
coming to fruition after these many years....that speaks 
to the social capital that has been built. Not just, ‘let’s 
rezone and forget about it.’ But, ‘let’s make sure these 
policies come into fruition.’ And we’re going to be see-
ing that happening this year” when the park opens.
7 The stakeholder also shared the following outcomes of the 
process: “The whole Mission Anti-Displacement Coalition and 
the People’s Plan work did a couple of things. One, with MAC, I 
think it gave visibility to a new level of leadership in the neigh-
borhood that was less accomodationist in terms of the interests 
of developers, of downtown, of some of these interests. And I 
think it pointed to a generational divide in the Mission in terms 
of the Latino ‘old guard’ and newer leadership...The People’s 
Plan in particular, because of the need to engage with the city 
and community, I think it also helped the new generation...
for understanding how these often arcane and technical issues 
like land use and zoning are addressed…How we need to be 
informed and engaged in these processes at the neighborhood 
and city level...there’s an aspect of that reflected in the newer 
leadership.”
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Housing: Conditions for 
Residents
As is the case in the rest of the city, the housing mar-
ket in the Mission District is competitive. In 2000, right 
before the dotcom bust, the vacancy rate was at an 
extreme low of 3%. In 2013 the vacancy rate jumped 
to 7.6%, representing the decline of the house mar-
ket. This figure cannot be seen as representing current 
patterns of gentrification as the housing market has 
since rebounded.
In terms of tenure, there has been a slight decrease in 
the portion of occupied housing units that are rented: 
from 87% in 1980, to 76% in 2013, which is consistent 
with gentrification patterns.
Overcrowding, when more than 1 person per room lives 
in an apartment or home, was 50% lower in 2013 than 
2000 (Figure 4.6). One explanation is the decrease in 
both family households and of the Latino population, 
as low- and moderate-income Latino households often 
live with extended family members in overcrowded liv-
ing conditions (MEDA, 2011). 
San Francisco has one of the most expensive hous-
ing markets in the nation and market rate rents in the 
Mission are reflective of the city’s high cost of living. In 
2013, the average price of a market-rate one bedroom 
apartment in the Mission District was $2,850 while 
the average for a two bedroom was $4,705 (Zumper, 
2013). With 76% of residents in the Mission renting (as 
of 2013), these high rents prevent low-income house-
holds from moving into the neighborhood. Additionally, 
current residents experience a very high rent burden. 
From 2000 to 2013, the share of rent burdened house-
holds, those paying 35% or more of their income on 
housing costs, increased from 27% to 34%.
Despite high demand for the area, the Mission Dis-
trict has failed to see significant increases in its hous-
ing stock, thereby exacerbating pressures on existing 
housing (Table 4.2). This lack of new development was 
a common concern among the stakeholders inter-
viewed. A realtor in the area discussed the difficulty in 
obtaining approvals for new buildings because of the 
lengthy environmental impact review process, which 
sometimes caused developers to walk away from proj-
ects. A senior staff person from an affordable housing 
developer spoke about the challenges of building new 
housing, in part due to the real estate market collapse 
and the elimination of redevelopment as a funding 
source for affordable housing in California.
Meanwhile, as few units are being constructed, 80% 
of households have recently moved in to their hous-
ing unit (Table 4.3). This puts upward pressure on the 
rents in the older housing stock.
Figure 4.6: Overcrowded Units in the Mission 
(1990-2013)
Source: U.S. Census 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 
ACS 2009-2013 
Table 4.2: Number of Housing Units by Year of 
Construction
Total 23,106
Built 2010 Or Later 96 <1%
Built 2000 To 2009 96 7%
Built 1990 To 1999 1,516 5%
Built 1980 To 1989 1,212 4%
Built 1970 To 1979 918 4%
Built 1960 To 1969 854 6%
Built 1950 To 1959 1,337 7%
Built 1940 To 1949 908 4%
Built 1939 Or Earlier 14,662 63%
Source: American Community Survey 2013 5-year estimate
Table 4.3: Mission District Percent of Householders 
who Moved in Last 5 Years, 1980 – 2013
Year Percent Moved in Last 5 Years
1980 62%
1990 55%
2000 53%
2013* 80%
 Source: U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 
American Community Survey 2009-2013 *Note: The 2013 figure 
is the percent of households who moved in last 3 years.
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Rent Control
San Francisco’s rent control laws protect tenants who 
live in multi-unit rental buildings built before June of 
1979. The rent control ordinance limits the amount 
a landlord can raise the rent annually, based on the 
consumer price index. When the unit is vacated, land-
lords can raise the rent to market rate, also known as 
“vacancy decontrol”.8 Once the rent is raised, future 
rent increases are still governed by rent control. There-
fore, while units may technically be considered rent 
controlled they may be unaffordable due to vacancy 
decontrol. To prevent landlords from evicting tenants 
in order to raise rents to market rate, the ordinance 
also includes a “just-cause evictions” clause requiring 
landlords to have a good reason for eviction such as 
chronic late rental payments or a nuisance complaint. 
There is no record of units that have undergone va-
cancy decontrol and their new base-rent. 
We attempt to estimate the number of rent-controlled 
units in the Mission District by identifying parcels that 
contain a building with two or more units, built in 1978 
or before, and are identified as an “apartment” or “flat” 
using tax assessor data from Alameda County (Figure 
4.7). This estimation method is imperfect, as housing 
units that are condominiums, tenancies-in-common, 
or currently not rented (through the Ellis act) are not 
rent controlled. However, data on these exempt hous-
8 SF’s rent control ordinance never included vacancy control and 
due to the passage of Costa Hawkins in 1996, vacancy control 
was banned statewide. 
9 This estimate is derived using estimates of the total number of 
rental occupied housing units from the American Community 
Survey (2009-2013 five-year estimates) in combination with data 
from the San Francisco Public Health department on the percent 
of rental units in each tract that are subject to rent control. These 
data sources allowed us to estimate a number of units in each 
census tract that are subject to rent control. Since ACS figures are 
reported with a margin of error, we found a range for this figure. 
Then, we turned to ACS data for counts of renter households who 
had moved in since 2010. We multiplied this by the proportion of 
units in the tract subject to rent control (the Public Health data), 
assuming that the newly moved-in households moved into rent 
controlled and non-rent controlled units at the same proportion 
as exist in the tract. This figure—the number of rent control units 
that experienced turnover between 2010-2013—is taken to be the 
same as the number that experienced vacancy decontrol. We then 
divide this figure by the total rent controlled units in the tract to get 
the percent of units that experienced vacancy decontrol. To get the 
figures for the whole Mission, we simply add the counts from each 
tract of vacancy decontrolled units and total rent controlled units, 
and divide these sums.
ing units are not available. Approximately 68% of units 
in the Mission census tracts are potentially rent-con-
trolled. Eighty-nine percent of these units were built in 
1939 or earlier (Figure 4.8). Older buildings are often 
highly desirable to wealthier residents due to their ar-
chitectural value; that so many buildings in the Mission 
District are from the Victorian era increases the likeli-
hood of displacement.
As noted earlier, rent controlled apartments do not 
necessarily signify affordability due to vacancy decon-
trol; hence estimating the number of recently vacancy 
decontrolled units and when these vacancies occurred 
is important for the purpose of understanding afford-
ability in the rent-controlled market. Our estimate sug-
gests that a maximum range of between 18-28% of 
rent controlled units experienced rent increases due 
to vacancy decontrol between 2010-2013.9 This is a 
maximum because, while we are reasonably sure that 
18-28% of rent controlled units experienced turnover, 
it is not guaranteed that landlords would increase the 
rent when that turnover happens; therefore, the actual 
figures may be lower. 
The map in Figure 4.9 shows that there is a high per-
cent of vacancy decontrolled units in the tracts west of 
Valencia Street. A walk down Valencia Street shows a 
trend in higher-end commercial and retail stores. This 
 
Figure 4.7: Potentially Rent Controlled Units
Source: Association of Bay Area Governments, 2014
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trend, to be discussed in greater detail in a later sec-
tion, might explain the higher vacancy decontrol rate in 
census tracts along Valencia Street as landlords may 
be taking advantage of the economic investment along 
the street to appeal to wealthier tenants.
 
Figure 4.8: Housing built before 1979 by Block
Source: Association of Bay Area Governments, 2014
 Figure 1: Percent of Units with Vacancy Decontrol by 
Census Tract 
Valencia Street 
Figure 4.9: Percent of Units with Vacancy Decontrol 
by Census Tract
Source: 2009-2013 American Community Survey and San Fran-
cisco Public Health Department 
(“Proportion of Housing Stock that is Rent-Controlled or Afford-
able, San Francisco, CA | Data | San Francisco,” n.d.)
Public and Subsidized 
Housing in the Mission 
While many residents of the Mission struggle to afford 
rent, the area is host to a sizable stock of subsidized 
housing: nearly 2,000 units, as detailed in Table 4.4 
(excluding any units built only with local funds, some 
of which are discussed in the next section). The neigh-
borhood would have likely experienced even greater 
displacement rates without these units.
Table 4.4: Public and Subsidized Housing 
in the Mission, 2013
Type of Unit # of units
Public Housing 170
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 962
Section 8 New Construction 194
Section 202 (Senior Housing) New 
Construction and Substantial 
Rehabilitation
152
Project Rental Assistance Contract 115
Other (including Loan Management 
Set-Aside and others)
319
Grand Total 1,912
Source: HUD Yearly Data Picture (Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, n.d.) for Public Housing figure; (California 
Housing Partnership Corporation, n.d.) for the rest. Note these 
figures do not include residents who rent using tenant-based 
vouchers or units developed as part of SF’s inclusionary ordi-
nance or any subsidized units developed only with local funds.
Inclusionary Housing
Stakeholders said San Francisco’s inclusionary hous-
ing ordinance has had a limited impact. Inclusionary 
Housing began as a policy in 1992 and later became 
“part of the Planning Code” in 2002; it was revised in 
2006 and 2010 (San Francisco Mayor’s Office of Hous-
ing and Community Development, 2014). The policy 
requires developers to build affordable units equal to 
15% to 20% of a market-rate development or pay a fee 
in lieu of building such units. The policy has resulted 
in  the creation of 1,560 units of below-market rental 
andownership units in San Francisco between 1992 
and 2013 (Table 4.5).
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Table 4.5: Inclusionary Housing, 1992 - 2013
Projects with 
Inclusionary 
Units (On or 
Off-Site) or 
In-Lieu Fees
Projects Choosing On-Site 
Inclusionary Housing
Projects Choosing Off-Site 
Inclusionary Housing
Projects 
Choosing to 
pay Fee
Total Number of 
Projects
Number of 
Projects
Number of 
Affordable Units
Number of 
Projects
Number of 
Affordable Units
Number of 
Projects
Mission District10 24 21 136 0 0 3
San Francisco 198 157 1,214 7 346 34
Source: San Francisco Mayor’s Office of Housing and Community Development, 2014
However, a court ruling in 2009 has limited the im-
pact of the ordinance. In the case, Palmer/Sixth Street 
Properties LP vs. City of Los Angeles, the California 
Supreme Court let stand a lower court’s ruling that 
held jurisdictions may not mandate developers to build 
inclusionary rental units, since doing so entails the 
setting of rents by the city, which was banned by the 
Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act (California Plan-
ning and Development Report, 2009; Reuben, Junius 
& Rose LLP, 2009). The ruling does not affect inclu-
sionary policies for ownership units. The city made re-
visions to the law in 2010 that “require developers to 
pay an affordable housing fee rather than construct in-
clusionary affordable housing” (San Francisco Budget 
and Legislative Analyst, 2012). That resulted in a sig-
nificant decrease in the number of inclusionary units 
produced under the program, from 384 in 2008 to 32 in 
2009, without a comparable increase in the fees paid, 
which could be related to the overall dynamics of the 
real estate market in these years (San Francisco May-
or’s Office of Housing and Community Development, 
2014).
Community Opposition to 
Development at 16th and 
Mission Streets
Some believe more housing for all income levels is 
needed to improve affordability in San Francisco, while 
others believe housing production should focus on af-
fordability for low-income residents. An example of this 
tension is the proposed ten-story, 351-unit building on 
the corner of 16th and Mission Streets. The develop-
ment is under community scrutiny, with the Plaza 16 
Coalition leading the opposition. The new apartment 
complex would replace a Walgreens, a Burger King, a 
bar, a Chinese restaurant, a market and a parking lot 
(Elsen, 2014). Despite the fact that no existing tenants 
or housing would be displaced, the coalition argues 
that if this development were to proceed, it would re-
sult in business and residential displacement (Chris-
topher, 2014). This type of opposition highlights the 
social and cultural complexity of gentrification. The 
10-story luxury apartment complex represents devel-
opment for new residents, leaving the Latino commu-
nity feeling neglected and disrespected. According 
to a community-based organization stakeholder, the 
“Plaza 16 Coalition has made substantive arguments 
against the project ranging from the height, impacts 
on the adjacent school, traffic concerns, and yes, the 
pressures luxury condos have on housing prices in the 
neighborhood.”
The developer of the 16th street Mission housing 
apartment complex has yet to determine how it will sat-
isfy the city’s affordable housing requirement (Dineen, 
2013). Yet regardless of how the developer will satisfy 
the affordable housing requirement, residents oppose 
this development as the project represents a change 
in the Mission’s character. In an article entitled, “Coa-
lition protests 16th Street development”, an organizer 
for Causa Justa :: Just Cause put this clash succinctly, 
“the height of these towers will keep Marshall Elemen-
tary [School] next door in a constant shadow….this 
project will literally overshadow the Latino students at-
tending that school” (Christopher, 2014). While it may 
be true that residents will not be directly displaced by 
the development, the project will have an impact on 
surrounding businesses and could potentially increase 
the cost of living in the neighborhood. A city official ex-
plained that once new housing development happens 
“there is such a huge impact on the surrounding area, 
prices immediately respond.” This same city official ex-
pressed skepticism that simply building more housing 
will make the Mission more affordable.
10 As defined by the Mayor’s Office on Housing; a map was 
not provided to compare to the area we have defined as the 
Mission.
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Ellis Act Evictions
Another highly public issue in the Mission has been 
the impact of the Ellis Act. The Ellis Act is a state law 
passed in 1985 that allows landlords to evict tenants 
building-wide by removing the building from the rental 
market entirely or for five years before being allowed to 
rent apartments at market rate. The result in San Fran-
cisco has been a decrease of rental options in a city 
where the supply of housing is already strained. The 
increase in the percent of residents who are home-
owners from 13% in 1980 to 24% in 2010 may reflect, 
at least in part, Ellis Act condo conversions.
While the Ellis Act continues to be a subject of con-
tention in the housing market debate, Figure 4.10 
shows that the number of evictions has decreased 
since 2001. The number of Ellis Act evictions tends to 
mimic the health of the economy and housing market: 
in down periods, such as after the crash of the dot-
com boom (2001-2004) and during the recent reces-
sion, evictions decrease. During up periods, such as in 
2005-2007 during the height of the housing boom and 
more recently, as the economy has begun to recover, 
evictions increase.
A city official working in the government for the last 
three decades commented that the planning depart-
ment saw the peak of Ellis Act evictions in the nineties. 
This is supported by compiled data from the time ref-
erencing 1998 as the “peak” year of Ellis Act evictions 
(Capps, 2014). The city official believes that since the 
Planning Department has authority over land use it 
could restrict the conversion of rental properties to 
ownership properties. For example, zoning changes 
or other policy interventions could restrict conversion 
or make it difficult to do, thereby deterring landlords 
from pursuing it.
Regardless of the fact that the total number of Ellis 
Act and no fault evictions has gone down since 2001, 
the total number of evictions for the Mission compared 
to the rest of the city has been very high during this 
twelve-year timeframe. The Mission District (represent-
ed in the report issued by the SF Board of Supervisors 
Budget and Legislative Analyst by the zip code 94110) 
had a higher number of Ellis Act and no-fault evictions 
than any other neighborhood, with 383 evictions and 
1,222 notices, respectively. Between 2009 and 2013, 
of the seven neighborhoods with the most Ellis Act 
evictions, the Mission continued to exhibit the highest 
number of evictions with 71 evictions, a demonstration 
of its lucrative housing market (Table 4.6).
 
Figure 1: No-Fault Evictions in the Mission, 2001-2013 
Ellis Act Evictions allow landlords to exit the rental housing business
Other ‘no fault’ evictions include those where the eviction is not a 
result of tenant’s actions (e.g., owner move-ins, etc.)
Figure 4.10: No-Fault Evictions in the Mission, 
2001-2013
Source: SF Rent Board as reported by SF Board of Supervisors 
Budget and Legislative Analyst, 2012
Table 4.6: Top Seven Neighborhoods for Ellis Act 
Evictions, 2009-2013
Neighborhood Ellis Act
Eviction Notices
Mission 71
Russian Hill./Polk Gulch 46
Castro/Eureka Valley 43
Outer Richmond 41
Inner Richmond 38
North Beach 37
Haight-Ashbury/Western Addi-
tion
29
Total 305
San Francisco Total 476
Source: SF Rent Board, accessed through (San Francisco Board of 
Supervisors Budget and Legislative Analyst, 2013)
Tenant Buyouts 
In addition to evictions, tenant buyouts are anoth-
er strategy in which landlords attempt to lure current 
tenants out of their homes with cash to increase rent 
for wealthier residents. The Mission district has ex-
perienced the highest concentration of buyouts from 
2008-2014 (“Tenant Buyouts Are On The Rise In S.F., 
As Are The Dollars Involved - SocketSiteTM,” 2014). 
Buyouts offer landlords several advantages over Ellis 
Act evictions: the landlord can immediately rent out the 
unit at market value and retain the option to convert 
units into condominiums at a later date. The total num-
ber of reported buyouts in SF went from 90 in 2007 
to 175 in 2013115(City and County of San Francisco, 
11 The data reported by the SF Tenant Union likely undercounts 
the number of actual buyouts as these are self-reported by 
tenants.
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Budget and Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2014). The 
Mission district had the highest number of buyouts in 
2008-2014 with 165 or about 28% of the total share 
of buyouts, however there is no requirement to report 
buyouts so these are likely underestimates. There is 
no regulation of the amount that must be paid for a 
buyout and sometimes tenants are offered just a few 
thousand dollars (City and County of San Francisco, 
Budget and Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2014). San 
Francisco Supervisor David Campos has introduced 
legislation to regulate buyouts. One of the regulatory 
features he is proposing is to impose the condo con-
version prohibitions that are already in place for no-
fault evictions (Taylor, 2014). 
Sales and Investment
While the percent of households who are mortgage 
burdened has stayed constant over time, the cost to 
buy a home has increased substantially since the 
1980s in the Bay Area, San Francisco, and, especial-
ly, the Mission District, as shown in Figure 4.11 and 
Figure 4.12. The rise in price during the dotcom boom 
is clear, as is the more recent rise in costs between 
2002-2007, then a slight downturn during the reces-
sion with a quick recovery since 2012. Single-family 
homes have shown more dramatic change, particular-
ly recently in the Mission, whose home have shot up in 
price above San Francisco and the Bay Area.
Use Changes 
The increases in housing prices have been paralleled 
by a gradual increase in the number of parcels whose 
land use is residential. Many of these are new con-
struction, but others represent use changes. A small 
portion of parcels changed use each year, but in 2007, 
9% of parcels with a commercial use had converted 
from other uses (mostly industrial and miscellaneous) 
and 5% of parcels with a residential use had convert-
ed from other uses (mostly commercial) (Dataquick, 
2014).
Figure 4.11: Median Sale Price per Square Foot – Multi-Family Properties 
Source: Dataquick, “Bay Area” includes all tracts in the 9-county area)
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Figure 4.12: Median Sale Price Per Square Foot - Single Family Homes 
Source: Dataquick, “Bay Area” includes all tracts in the 9-county area)
Private Investment
We examined trends in sales and building permit 
data to identify spatial characteristics of investment 
in residential property. This analysis has the poten-
tial to demonstrate how outside pressures and public 
investments impact patterns of private investment in 
the Mission District over time.12 As Figure 4.13 shows, 
there are a higher number of residential sales in the 
northwest and central-western portions of the Mission. 
The northwestern concentration may be related to 
higher density of housing stock. 
12 Sales data was taken from the first quarter of 2003 through 
the fourth quarter of 2013 from DataQuick, (DataQuick, 2014). 
We joined the data to a shapefile containing San Francisco 
parcels and converted to point data using ArcGIS (ABAG, 2005). 
These points, which each represent a sale, were spatially an-
alyzed and visualized at different geographies through spatial 
joining. Building permit data from the San Francisco Planning 
Department were analyzed similarly (San Francisco Planning 
Department, 2014a).
 
24thSt. BART 
RT 
16th St. BART 
RT 
Valencia Street 
Figure 4.13: Number of Residential Sales by Block, 
2003 – 2013
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The number of residential sales peaked in 2003 and 
2004, declined through the housing bubble burst, but 
appears to have stabilized (Figure 4.14). San Francis-
co as a whole recovered from the impact of the finan-
cial recession and housing market crash much faster 
than the rest of the nation.
Figure 4.15 displays the average residential sales pric-
es per square foot in the Mission and shows a slight-
ly different pattern than Figure 4.14, with the largest 
cluster of high prices seen in the southwest.
Figure 4.14: Yearly Total Number of Residential Sales 
in the Mission, 1988-2013
Source: Dataquick, 2014
 
24thSt. BART 
RT 
16th St. BART 
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Valencia Street 
Figure 4.15: Average Residential Sales Price per 
Square foot by Block, 2003-2013
Figure 4.16: Total Annual Cost of Residential Permits 
in the Mission, 2005-2013
Source: San Francisco Planning Department, 2014
  
 
Average Permit 
Cost per Unit 
Figure 4.17: Average Permit Cost per Unit in the Mis-
sion by Census Tracts, 2005-2013
Source: San Francisco Planning Department, 2014a
The amount of private investment in residential prop-
erties has also been increasing since 2005 (Figure 
4.16). The total annual value of permits (as ascertained 
through the cost of building permits) in the Mission in-
creased by 545% from 2005 to 2013. When comparing 
investment in the Mission to the rest of the city, Figure 
4.17 shows how parts of the Mission are averaging 
higher permitting investments per unit.
Public Investment
Public investment, in so far as it makes the neighbor-
hood more desirable, has the potential to contribute to 
gentrification pressures. The public project that seems 
most clearly related to gentrification is one on Valen-
cia Street between 15th and 19th streets completed 
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by the Department of Public Works in July 2010 at a 
cost of $6.1 million. In 2004 the Municipal Transporta-
tion Agency (MTA) began the planning for the Valencia 
Streetscape Project, which expanded and beautified 
sidewalks, resurfaced and restriped the street with 
bike lanes, and provided other infrastructure improve-
ments (City of San Francisco, n.d.). The street looks 
nicer than nearby streets and, today, the commercial 
establishments along Valencia Street are mostly new 
places that serve a higher-income clientele (further 
analysis of commercial change is in the next section). 
By contrast, along Mission Street, another main com-
mercial corridor in the district, more of the older, leg-
acy resident-serving establishments are still around, 
and visible gentrification is less advanced. This may 
be, at least in part, connected to the completion of the 
Valencia street beautification process. Additional im-
provements (some completed, some planned) include 
several streetscape improvement projects, road diets, 
and new plazas throughout the district. These are de-
tailed in an appendix.
Together, these projects signal an interest in the Mis-
sion on the part of city agencies. The investment they 
bring is a parallel and reinforcing factor to the other 
changes discussed here. One stakeholder interviewed 
said that a lot of residents see streetscape improve-
ments like these as a sign of gentrification. All of these 
projects included public processes, and several affirm 
the Latino cultural identity of the neighborhood. They 
also ostensibly improve the neighborhood for existing 
residents. On the other hand, the improvements could 
contribute to residents’ dissonance, especially if they 
feel the neighborhood is being upgraded for others 
or being made more attractive for outsiders to move 
in. The improvements may make the area even more 
desirable to higher-income people and, therefore, en-
courage gentrification and displacement. 
None of the improvements include provisions to en-
sure permanent housing affordability for existing res-
idents to stay in the neighborhood and enjoy the new 
streets, plazas, and parks. In this way, the investments 
may not benefit existing residents in the long run, rep-
resenting a missed opportunity to stabilize the neigh-
borhood.
Commercial Displacement
In order to understand how gentrification may put 
pressure on retail businesses, we evaluated data on 
commercial establishments from the National Employ-
ment Time-Series Database (NETS), a proprietary 
database (Walls & Associates, 2013). Using census 
tracts, we analyzed the data by dividing the Mission 
District into three distinct commercial neighborhoods 
shown in Figure 4.18 based on our own assessment 
of commercial uses.
In 1990, there were more retail businesses in the 
24th Street corridor neighborhood than in the 16th 
St. BART neighborhood (Figure 4.19). Since then, the 
number of retail businesses has steadily declined in 
the 24th Street corridor and steadily increased in the 
16th Street neighborhood. Today there are about twice 
as many businesses in the 16th Street BART neigh-
borhood as in the 24th Street corridor.
 
Figure 1: T e Mission District, Comm rcial 
Neighborhoods 
Figure 4.18: The Mission District, Commercial 
Neighborhoods
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Here, we compare trends in the 16th Street Bart and 
24th Street Corridor areas13. The businesses in the 
16th Street Bart neighborhood may face problems due 
to neighborhood gentrification, customer dislocation, 
and increased wage costs for their workers. Business-
es along 24th street may feel less pressures, in part 
due to the activism that has led to protecting business-
es and tenants in the area (Dicum, 2005).
13 The number of retail businesses in the Northeast Mission 
Industrial neighborhood increased slightly, but is lower than the 
other two neighborhoods; we exclude it from the remainder of 
our analysis.
 
16th St. 
BART 
24th St. Corridor 
NE Mission  
16th St. BART/ N. Mission/ Valencia 24th St. Corridor NE Mission Industrial 
Figure 4.19: Number of Retail Businesses in the Mission, 1990-2011
Source: National Employment Time-Series (NETS) Database
Figure 4.20: Total Number of Businesses, 16th St. BART (left) and 24th Street Corridor (right)
Source: National Employment Time-Series (NETS) database
To ascertain the change in local- versus  region-
al-serving businesses, we categorize them based on 
their North American Industrial Classification System 
(NAICS) code into businesses that are more likely to 
serve local residents (such as markets, drug stores, 
and hardware stores) and businesses more likely to 
serve regional markets (such as department stores 
and furniture stores). In the 16th Street Bart neighbor-
hood, growth has occurred in both local and regional 
serving businesses, while on 24th Street, local-serving 
businesses have decreased in number (Figure 4.20).
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This suggests that changes in the 16th Street area 
may be spurred both by changes in the local resident 
population and in the neighborhood’s capacity to draw 
customers from the region. For example, this corridor 
is a night-life destination where people from outside 
come to visit restaurants and bars. Changes in the 24th 
Street corridor, by contrast, appear to be more related 
to changes in the local residential population, resulting 
in a decline in local-serving businesses, without com-
parable increases in regional-serving businesses. 
When asked about how different parts of the Mission 
have experienced change differently, a non-profit stake-
holder identified the 24th and Mission neighborhood 
as one that has maintained its character more than 
others, keeping a high percentage of Hispanic-owned 
retail businesses. However, an analysis of businesses 
owned by Hispanic people on the 24th Street corridor 
reveals a different story. Of the businesses that closed 
in recent years (2007-2010), nearly 50% of them were 
owned by Hispanics, compared to 38% of businesses 
that opened over the same time frame.14 Additionally, 
the overall proportion of businesses owned by Hispan-
ic people decreased from 40% to 36% between 2000 
and 2011. Though this is a small change, it still shows 
a change in the character of local retail and minority 
owned businesses.
Nonprofit funding has changed since the first wave 
of displacement as well. During the first dotcom era, 
funding and staff were available to Mission Housing 
when it spearheaded MAC. Today, the organization 
has fewer resources. One stakeholder believes the 
“velocity of change” is faster today than the previous 
dotcom boom; another commented that, due to fewer 
resources, more-formidable opponents (large technol-
ogy firms as opposed to smaller start-ups during the 
previous era), and the “Mayor’s pro-tech agenda,” the 
community’s capacity to respond has diminished.
Conclusion
The Mission District is a potent example of the demo-
graphic and commercial changes that can occur in a 
high-demand location with walkability, accessibility, 
and access to amenities in the center of an expensive 
region. The data presented here show clear signs of 
change in the Mission. 
14 The corridor is defined as 24th Street between Mission and 
Potrero; note that this definition is different than that used in 
the other figures in this section. Source: NETS data and 2000 US 
Census. Methodology explained in appendix.
Over the last thirty years, the area has seen a de-
crease in the proportion of family households and a 
decrease in the Latino population, while the percent-
age of the population with a bachelor degree or higher 
and median income have both increased dramatical-
ly—all consistent with gentrification patterns.
Despite an increase in income, housing burden has 
increased in the Mission, demonstrating the neighbor-
hood’s high desirability and, therefore, high cost of liv-
ing. Rent control, public and subsidized housing, and 
inclusionary zoning all seek to limit displacement and 
increase affordability for low income households, but 
all have shortcomings, and, overall, are only partially 
mitigating the intense displacement resulting from new 
investment. 
Evictions and buyouts are two of the processes con-
tributing to displacement. While the number of Ellis Act 
and no-fault evictions has gone down in the last de-
cade, the Mission continues to see the highest rate of 
evictions in the city. Meanwhile, buyouts in the Mission 
are at a rapid incline, perhaps indicating a switch in 
landlords’ tactics from evictions to buyouts.
A perennial question in anti-displacement policy is 
which of two approaches to pursue: preserving exist-
ing housing as affordable, or increasing production of 
new housing, either market-rate or affordable. Preser-
vation, in the face of strong market forces, is difficult. 
As during the dotcom boom, today streams of high in-
come workers are flooding the housing market, plac-
ing upward pressure on housing prices and encour-
aging landlords to use various tactics to raise rents. 
Furthermore, there is a dwindling supply of naturally 
affordable housing units left to preserve; most renters 
are already cost-burdened, and with vacancy decon-
trol, even rent control units can jump to market simply 
from someone moving. Strengthening eviction policies 
could limit these effects.
Increased production of market-rate units is consid-
ered an affordable housing strategy by some, but not 
all: the increased overall supply, some would argue, 
will bring down rents across the board. However, com-
munity opposition to this approach is fierce, as evi-
denced by the 16th and Mission project. While in the 
long run new housing may relieve pressure on rents, 
in the short term it is certain to contribute to upward 
pressure as the neighborhood gentrifies. In addition, 
the scarcity of land in the Mission means that new de-
velopment will be limited. Can enough new housing be 
built that these supply effects will bring down rents? 
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That is unlikely, especially since new housing is likely 
to be oriented toward the highest end of the market, 
given the larger trends in the economy. 
Therefore, to ensure a long-term supply of affordable 
housing in the Mission, affordable housing production, 
in addition to preservation of the existing stock, is key. 
Inclusionary housing has produced only 136 units in 
the Mission in over twenty years; this policy’s future 
impact will be limited due to recent legal changes. The 
area is host to nearly 2,000 units of affordable hous-
ing. But more will be needed to keep low-income fam-
ilies living in this area. 
The Mission has already undergone significant gen-
trification and continues to experience displacement. 
This neighborhood has been here before: the dotcom 
boom at the turn of the century foreshadowed (and 
set the stage for) many of the changes facing it today. 
The capacity building activists engaged in at that time 
provide a foundation for residents and advocates to 
incorporate successful tactics—and new approach-
es—to the present situation. While Valencia Street on 
a Saturday night may be unrecognizable to residents 
from twenty years ago, the neighborhood still hosts a 
sizable Latino population, and, in the words of a com-
munity-based organization stakeholder, “contestation 
for place and the right to stay is still going on.” 
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Introduction
Within the Bay Area, San José stands out for long pro-
viding affordable homes for a wide range of incomes, 
and an ethnically diverse population including many 
immigrants. By annexing more and more land through-
out the 20th century, San José’s sprawling housing de-
velopment has “carried the burden of housing for de-
cades” in Silicon Valley, in the words of former Mayor 
Chuck Reed (Hepler, 2014b). It is now the biggest city 
in the Bay Area, and city leaders have their sights set 
on jobs, with a “jobs first” general plan meant to correct 
its jobs housing imbalance. As a city planner stated, 
San José is “the only city over 500,000 people that’s 
a bedroom community” with a jobs-to-employed-resi-
dents ratio below 1 – “even Detroit is better than us!” At 
the same time, there are efforts in San José to move 
away from the city’s suburban reputation with denser, 
concentrated development focused on “place-making” 
through designated Urban Villages. As it embarks on 
this path, it is not clear that the city will be affordable to 
low-income people who fill some of the new jobs that 
are created. This case study outlines this tension, dis-
cussing the new jobs focus and several development 
plans, as well as proposals and efforts to ensure these 
changes are inclusive of low-income people.
One major site of attention is Diridon Station, a tran-
sit hub on the western edge of downtown San José, 
with stops for Caltrain, Amtrak, VTA light rail, ACE, and 
multiple bus lines. The station is also a planned stop 
for BART’s extension to San José and high-speed rail. 
While there is significant vacant and non-residential 
land surrounding Diridon, there are also surrounding 
neighborhoods that are home to low and middle-in-
come residents where displacement spurred by ris-
ing housing costs is a major concern. Despite San 
José’s strong track record of building housing, includ-
ing deed restricted affordable housing, housing costs 
in San José are now at an all-time high, while wag-
es for low-income workers are stagnant. Community 
members have raised concerns about the possibilities 
for their children to stay in the neighborhoods where 
they grew up, while service providers report increasing 
overcrowding, family stress, and need for emergency 
assistance. 
Diridon is also the site of a Station Area Plan passed 
in June 2014, which includes plans for significant resi-
dential and mixed-use infill. The area overlaps with two 
“Urban Villages,” corridors where the city hopes to tar-
get further residential and commercial development. 
Gentrification seems evident in some of the surround-
ing neighborhoods, particularly directly adjacent to the 
station, where new market-rate condominiums have 
been constructed in the past decade, and wealthy 
and highly educated residents have moved in. The 
area’s trajectory will also be impacted by the policies 
laid out in San José’s Housing Element, as the City 
struggles to come up with viable funding mechanisms 
for producing much needed affordable housing. There 
is also a significant historical component to this case, 
as the study area, particularly parts that overlap with 
downtown, saw direct displacement and destruction of 
housing units due to redevelopment in the 1980s and 
90s. By taking a longer view, this history allows us to 
see how the area may have been primed for gentrifica-
tion beginning decades earlier. 
The case study begins with a qualitative discussion of 
some key residential neighborhoods surrounding Di-
ridon Station, and their relationship to the census tracts 
included in the study area. It then reviews a number of 
demographic and housing indicators, based primarily 
on census data, for 1980 to 2013. Next, it explores the 
current planning contexts and struggles over housing 
affordability and rights in the area, concluding with 
comments on broader issues of income inequality. 
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The Diridon Station Area 
Neighboorhoods 
Today the area surrounding Diridon Station is home 
to a wide range of neighborhoods and land uses, in-
cluding industrial commercial areas, residential neigh-
borhoods dominated by single-family homes, new 
luxury condominium development and lower income 
renter communities. In one interview, a San José res-
ident and community organizer described the station 
as at “the intersection of a number of neighborhoods, 
but lack[ing] a strong identity of its own.” Highway 87 
and Highway 280 divide the station area from nearby 
neighborhoods to the east and south respectively (Fig-
ure 5.1). While Diridon Station itself is considered to 
be in downtown San José, Highway 87 creates a bar-
rier between the station area and the denser parts of 
downtown; though one can walk or drive directly from 
the station to downtown, the highway limits high-den-
sity development in this area. The Diridon Station Area 
Plan, passed by the City of San José in June 2014 and 
discussed further below, does contain design recom-
mendations to strengthen some of these connections, 
but the freeways will certainly remain defining features 
of the area.  
Because the census tracts used in the demographic 
analysis for this case study do not neatly align with the 
neighborhoods surrounding the station, the census 
data can mask some of the diversity within the area. 
Stakeholder interviews, as well as neighborhoods de-
scriptions provided by our partners at Working Partner-
ships USA, provide the additional context to introduce 
the neighborhoods in the following section. Figure 5.1 
shows neighborhood boundaries developed by the 
City of San José as part of a neighborhood planning 
initiative in the late 1990’s. 
Tract 5003
The neighborhoods in this tract have experienced sig-
nificant investment, including the opening of several 
large condominium buildings and a Whole Foods. The 
Garden-Alameda, a residential neighborhood between 
The Alameda and the light industrial commercial areas 
to the northeast of Stockton Ave, extends almost to 
Diridon Station, and has been a site of notable recent 
market rate residential development. While the major-
ity of this neighborhood is just to the west of census 
tract 5003, and so technically outside of the study area 
analyzed for this case study, nearly every stakeholder 
interviewed agreed that the Garden-Alameda was a 
key factor in the area, and that is was one of the more 
desirable urbanized neighborhoods within San José. 
The Alameda is a site of ongoing streetscape improve-
ments totaling $4.5 million in investment, and the cor-
ridor will continue to see attention from the City of San 
José, as it has been identified as one of 70 “Urban Vil-
lages” in San José’s 2040 General Plan – areas where 
the city hopes to direct commercial and residential de-
velopment (Donato-Weinstein, 2014; Field Paoli et al., 
2014). A planner involved in economic development 
at the city stated in an interview “if you wanted to in-
vest in property anywhere in San José, you should do 
it on The Alameda.” A number of market-rate condo 
developments have been built along the boulevard in 
the past 10 years, including some major developments 
very close to Diridon Station and within census tract 
5003. One example of this is the Plant 51 building, 
shown in Figure 5.2; an old cannery building that was 
converted to 265 market-rate condominiums in 2008. 
It is a 5 minute walk from Diridon Station and within the 
case study area (“Plant 51,” 2011). 
Figure 5.1: Neighborhood Boundaries in Diridon 
Study Area
Note: Diridon Station is marked with a red star. Source: City of 
San José (City of San José, Planning Services Division, 2004)
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Just across The Alameda from Plant 51, bordering the 
study area, a new Whole Foods Market has recently 
opened. Several stakeholders cited the Whole Foods 
as a “game-changer.” One sustainable planning advo-
cate involved the Diridon Station Area Plan stated that 
the new Whole Foods “could be considered a cata-
lytic project, part of why we’re seeing huge amounts 
of development” in the area. A spring 2014 article in 
the Silicon Valley Business Journal cited the “Whole 
Foods effect” as spurring further, high-end commer-
cial and residential development. Right next to the new 
market, a mixed-use development including 132 luxu-
ry apartments is slated to break ground in 2015, and 
developers acknowledged that the grocery store was 
a big attraction, saying “It’s not just a grocery store, 
it’s exactly the one you would want” (Chandler Pratt 
& Partners, 2014; Donato-Weinstein, 2014). The high-
er end development along The Alameda has largely 
been welcomed by residents of the Shasta-Hanchet 
neighborhood, a wealthy neighborhood of primarily 
single-family homes adjacent to Garden-Alameda to 
the southwest.
This development along The Alameda borders the 
St. Leo’s neighborhood, which is dominated by small 
single- family homes. Right next to Diridon station, 
a number of stakeholders identified St. Leo’s as an 
area where both renters and owners are feeling pres-
sures associated with rising property values (WP 
USA, 2014). The neighborhood is home to a lower-in-
come, largely Latino immigrant population, including 
“long-standing local businesses with a working class 
feel” (WP USA, 2014). According to one local service 
provider, rising property values have encouraged lon-
ger-term residents who do own their homes to “cash 
out” and sell to younger buyers. In 2004 Georgetown 
Place, a development with 94 market rate units in-
cluding condos and townhomes, was completed in St. 
Leo’s. In an interview, the developer of that project de-
scribed the neighborhood as a “very strong, desirable 
market…If somebody could wave a magic wand and 
say, ‘OK right across the street from Georgetown was 
vacant property, you could build the same thing right 
now today’…I’d do it in a minute, it’d be perfect.” The 
question for low- and middle-income residents of St. 
Leo’s is whether this desirability will translate to bene-
fits for them (WP USA, 2014).
Tract 5008
This tract contains neighborhoods with a mix of uses 
as well as part of downtown San Jose. To the south-
east of Diridon station is the Delmas Park neighbor-
hood. Located in a pocket created by highways 280 
and 87, Delmas Park is east of Diridon Station in tract 
5003, and contains a mix of commercial, light industri-
al and residential uses. In this area, a challenge is to 
successfully create a pedestrian- and transit-friendly 
environment, with commercial uses that serve resi-
dents, without displacing the industrial uses that pro-
vide viable jobs (WP USA, 2014). The neighborhood 
is the site of a prominent affordable development, the 
Delmas Park Apartments, a mid-rise building complet-
ed in 2007 with 123 below-market-rate apartments 
ranging from $575 per month for a studio to $1,498 per 
month for a two-bedroom (Delmas Park Apartments, 
n.d.). The project is aimed primarily at providing hous-
ing for teachers (Simonson, 2007). 
Tract 5019
This tract hosts a commercial corridor (West San Car-
los) surrounded by older residential neighborhoods 
which have experienced varying levels of change. Like 
the Alameda, West San Carlos has been slated as an 
Urban Village in the San José General Plan. A plan-
ner described this commercial corridor as “full service, 
with a gritty character… it is the most practical street 
in the whole city! … [P]eople think of it as pretty funky, 
and we got push back from the community – we want 
to keep the funk.” 
West of the study area on the south side of West San 
Carlos is the Buena Vista neighborhood. While it is only 
partially within the census tracts explored in this case 
Figure 5.2: Plant 51 Condominium on The 
Alameda, a 5-minute walk from Diridon Station
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study, stakeholders repeatedly identified this neigh-
borhood as an area where low-income renters, many 
of them Latino immigrants, faced rising housing costs 
and immediate threats of eviction. When discussing 
the Urban Villages plan, a city planner noted that while 
along the Alameda, “the issue is inclusion, in West 
San Carlos we’re more worried about displacement.” 
There are additional concerns about displacement of 
locally owned commercial establishments in favor of 
chain stores. We return to this neighborhood and to 
issues faced by renters there later in the case study.
Demographic and 
Housing Changes
The study area overall saw significant population 
growth from 1980 to 2013, but only after a loss in pop-
ulation in the 1980s. As shown in Table 5.1, population 
growth accelerated in the 2000s. The area’s growth 
has gone in an opposite trajectory as San Jose as a 
whole, which showed a faster pace of growth during 
the 1980s and 1990s.
Not all of the areas around the station grew at the 
same rate. For example, Tract 5008 lost population 
from 1980 to 2000, after which it grew by 35% from 
2000-2013. Tract 5003 experienced the same trend. 
Tract 5019 showed a steady increase in population 
throughout the decades, with a dramatic increase be-
tween 2000 and 2013.
Table 5.1: Total Population in Diridon Study Area and 
City of San José, 1980-2013
Year Diridon Study Area San Jose
Total Change (%) Total Change (%)
1980 7,668 -- 629,442 --
1990 7,133 -7% 782,225 24%
2000 7,761 9% 894,943 14%
2013 11,662 50% 968,903 8%
Percent 
Change 
1980-2013
-- 52% -- 54%
Figure 5.3: Total Population in Diridon Study Area by 
Census Tract, 1980-2013 
Source: U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000  (Geolytics, 2014); Ameri-
can Community Survey 2009-2013
Figure 5.4: Race/Ethnicity, 1980-2013
Source: U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); American Community Survey 2009-2013. 
San Jose bar shows percent, not number of residents.
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Figure 5.5: Diridon Study Area Educational Attainment, 
1980-2013
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); American 
Community Survey 2009-2013
There were significant changes in the area’s racial 
composition from 2000 to 2013, when the White and 
Asian population increased dramatically. Latinos de-
creased in this same time frame (Figure 5.4). Com-
pared with the city of San José overall, the study area 
has a notably smaller percentage of Asian residents.
More dramatic than the changes in race and ethnicity, 
the study area has seen major changes in education-
al attainment in the past thirty years, shown in Figure 
5.5. The percentage of residents without high school 
degrees has steadily decreased, while the percentage 
with college degrees has steadily increased, a com-
mon indicator of gentrification. The City of San José 
as a whole has shown similar increases in educational 
attainment, particularly since the 1990s. However, the 
increase in residents’ educational attainment between 
2000 and 2013 was quite pronounced in the Diridon 
Study Area.
Since 1980, the area has had a significantly lower 
percentage of family households than San José as a 
whole, which is an indicator considered to be related 
to gentrification (Chapple, 2009). Just under half of the 
households in the area were families in 2013. By way 
of comparison, ¾ of San José’s 300,000 households 
were family households in 2013 (Figure 5.6). The me-
dian household income in the study area is just about 
even with San José overall. While median income in 
San José dipped during the recession, median income 
in the study area continued to climb. However, there 
are significant differences in income between the Cen-
sus tracts. Most notably, Tract 5003, the site of major 
investment, saw a spike in household income from 
2000 to 2013, surpassing median income in the city, 
as seen in Figure 5.7. This may be indicative of high-
er income residents moving in, many of whom likely 
moved into new housing built during this time period.
The study area has been dominated by renter house-
holds since 1980, and as Figure 5.8 shows, the per-
centage of renter occupied units changed little from 
1980 to 2000. However, there was a notable shift from 
2000 to 2013, when the percent of units that are own-
er-occupied jumped to 37% from 22% as new condo-
miniums were built in the area.
Figure 5.6: Household Composition in Diridon Study Area, 1980-2013, and San Jose, 2013
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); American Community Survey 2009-2013
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Figure 5.7: Median Income in Diridon Study Area by Census Tract, 1980 – 2013
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000  (Geolytics, 2014); American Community Survey 2009-2013
Figure 5.8: Housing Tenure in Diridon Study Area, 1980-2013, and San Jose, 2013
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000; American Community Survey 2009-2013 (Geolytics, 2014)
Figure 5.9: Median Monthly Rent in Diridon Study Area and San José, 1980 – 2013
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000  (Geolytics, 2014); American Community Survey 2009-2013
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The share of renter occupied units is still twice as high 
in the Diridon study area than in San José as a whole. 
Rents have been climbing in the study area since 
1980, although historically they have been significant-
ly lower than in the city as a whole, as shown in Figure 
5.9. In the 2009-2013 period, rents shot up in Tract 
5003 as new market-rate buildings were constructed, 
surpassing rents in the city.
Yet advocates have expressed concern that it is really 
within the last several years that housing costs have 
skyrocketed, and the recently released draft Housing 
Element confirms that rents in the city at large are at 
an all-time high with average the rent now at $2,169. 
This average underestimates the cost of newly con-
structed rental housing which can range between 
$2,200 - $2,700 per month for a one-bedroom unit and 
between $3,000 - $3,500 for a two-bedroom unit in 
North San José (City of San José, 2014). Figure 5.10 
shows monthly rent per square foot for zip codes in the 
area from Zillow and shows that rent has indeed crept 
upwards in recent years.
Increases in rent have occurred as the area has added 
a significant amount of housing since 2000, as shown 
in Figure 5.11. Yet development activities, including a 
significant loss of housing units in the 1980s, may have 
primed this area for the gentrification it is experiencing 
today. The next section reviews some of the historical 
context of direct displacement in the study area.  
Figure 5.10: Monthly Rent Per Square Foot in Diridon 
Study Area by Zip Code, Nov 2010-Jan 2014
Source: Zillow 2014
Figure 5.11: Total Housing Units in Diridon Area by 
Census Tract, 1980 – 2013
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); American 
Community Survey 2009-2013
Figure 5.12: Median Sale Price Per Square Foot – Multi-Family Properties 
Source: Dataquick , 2014; “Bay Area” includes all tracts in the 9-county area
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Figure 5.13: Median Sale Price Per Square Foot - Single Family Homes
Source: Dataquick, 2014; “Bay Area” includes all tracts in the 9-county area
Before its dissolution in 2012, San José was known for 
having a particularly powerful Redevelopment Agency, 
and beginning in the 1980s the agency made almost 
$2 billion in public investments, and devoted “nearly all 
its money and power,” to an attempted revitalization of 
its downtown (Terplan, 2013). The City achieved this 
by merging redevelopment tax revenues from across 
the city, so that revenues generated by redevelopment 
in north and south San José, could be used to fund 
development Downtown (Terplan, 2013). A number 
of the Agency’s Downtown Project Areas, which were 
eventually merged into a single area, overlap with the 
study area. These Downtown Redevelopment Areas 
are shown in the map in Figure 5.14. Redevelopment 
projects included construction of a convention center, 
a luxury hotel, expansion and construction of multiple 
museums, renovation and construction of parks and 
plazas, over 500 units of market rate and moderate in-
come housing, and 1.2 million feet of new office space 
(Kutzman & Farragher, 1988).
Three of the projects were the Guadalupe corridor 
transportation project, a widening of the Guadalupe 
River channel, and the construction of a large arena 
(now the SAP Center). From planning reports obtained 
about these three projects, we can get a sense of the 
nature of the displacement that was occurring. The 
transportation project, meant to improve State Route 
While the Diridon Station Area neighborhoods have 
experienced other changes consistent with gentrifica-
tion, multi-family and single-family home sales have 
closely tracked Santa Clara County and the Bay Area 
overall (Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.13). However, while 
the price per square foot of multi-family properties in 
Diridon Station had usually been lower than in Santa 
Clara County overall, beginning in 2009 it surpassed 
it; the recession hit the county harder than the case 
study area. For single-family homes, the opposite is 
true: the lows in Diridon Station were deeper than in 
the county overall, and the case study area only sur-
passed the county briefly in 2004-2005.
“No strangers to 
displacement” 
As the population data discussed above shows, part 
of the study area lost residents from 1980 to 1990. 
As seen in Figure 5.11, while tract 5019 added hous-
ing units each year, tracts 5003 and 5008 both saw a 
major loss of units during the 1980s, and then large 
numbers of new units constructed in the 2000s. This 
loss of housing was due at least in part to the activities 
of San José’s Redevelopment Agency, particularly in 
tract 5008, about half of which is east of Highway 87 
and in downtown San José. 
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85 and US Highway 101 with light rail, expressway 
and bicycle infrastructure, was projected to displace 
225 people, mostly Hispanic (58%) and with lower 
incomes than San Jose at large (Santa Clara Coun-
ty, 1983). A second project, focused on combating 
flooding downtown, was to expand the river channel, 
which would displace 173 residents who were most-
ly Hispanic and renters paying below-market rents for 
housing units in “fair to poor condition…there was little 
maintenance being done” (Klingensmith, Arthur P. K, 
1988). A third project was a large arena that replaced 
about 25 businesses but only two homes (Santa Clara 
County, 1987). 
The flooding study, and several others, opens with an 
interesting high-level overview of the state of San Jose 
in the 1980s:
“San Jose and the surrounding cities that make up 
Santa Clara County have become economic leaders 
in the Bay Area. In the not so distant past, San Jose 
was primarily an agricultural producing, packing and 
distribution hub. With the advent of high technolo-
gy and computer related industries, the Santa Clara 
Valley has created a more balanced economic base” 
(Klingensmith, Arthur P. K, 1988).
This sense that San Jose’s economy had changed 
significantly seems to be a driving motivation for the 
redevelopment at the time. This foreshadows today’s 
jobs-focused development strategy.
The Guadalupe-Auzerias redevelopment area, partial-
ly contained within census tract 5008, was a low-in-
come Latino residential neighborhood of about 12 
square blocks. This neighborhood was selected in 
1984 as the site for a pair of museums, the Technology 
Center of Silicon Valley and the Children’s Discovery 
Museum (Novoa, 1985).15 A relocation study for the 
technology center stated that:  
“[The area] has excessive substandard structures 
which have undergone major physical and econom-
ic decline since the 1950s. Since the construction 
of State Route 87 and US Highway 280, it has be-
come an isolated neighborhood, suffering blight and 
deterioration caused by heavy commercial traffic, 
slight-to-moderate deferred maintenance structures, 
and inadequate lot sizes (City of San Jose, 1985).
15 Both of these museums are located within tract 5008.
The neighborhood was demolished, and about 300 
households eventually displaced over the course of 
several years (Fujioka, 1986). In the words of one ser-
vice provider who works with low-income renters in the 
city, and witnessed the Downtown’s redevelopment, 
the neighborhoods around Diridon are “are no strang-
ers to displacement. A whole barrio was displaced for 
the Children’s Discovery Museum.” 
After mounting a fierce legal campaign, residents of 
Guadalupe-Auzerias who were evicted received a 
settlement package that included relocation benefits. 
Costs of moving would be covered by the city, and ten-
ants received rental subsidies until the city could make 
new below-market rate apartments available, which 
were supposed to be “in reasonable proximity” to the 
downtown area (Farrell, 1986). Yet it is unknown how 
many of these residents actually returned to the neigh-
borhood, and for some housing activists in San José, 
this process was indicative of the city’s disregard for its 
low-income residents. One of the final buildings to be 
torn down in 1989 was one of downtown’s few remain-
ing single room occupancy hotels, described as “one 
of the last bastions of low- cost housing downtown” 
(Grant, 1988). In an op-ed in  
the San José Mercury news, Gen Fujioka, who served 
as legal aid for Guadalupe-Auzerias residents, decried 
the downtown’s redevelopment as gentrification, in an 
argument that parallels advocate’s fears about San 
José’s current planning strategies: 
Figure 5.14: San José Downtown 
Redevelopment Areas
Source: Successor Agency to the Redevelopment Agency of the 
City of San Jose, (Redevelopement Agency of the City of San Jose, 
2006)
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This process of “gentrification” will, in turn, force out 
many existing residents and businesses. A retired 
cannery worker on a fixed income cannot compete on 
the rental market with an unmarried accounts manag-
er with money to spare. Similarly, many neighborhood 
businesses will not be able to compete for commercial 
rentals with boutiques, espresso and fashion shops, 
and expensive restaurants…The irony here is that 
communities that have maintained the vitality of the 
downtown area through many lean years of marginal 
public and private services will now be pushed out of 
their historic neighborhoods exactly at a time when the 
area becomes, because of massive public investment, 
a “desirable” place in which to live and do business 
(Fujioka, 1986).
Redevelopment did provide the city with a robust 
fund for below-market rate housing, but advocates 
also raised concerns that spending was not focused 
enough on the residents with the lowest incomes. Half 
of the city’s housing funds went to very low- and low-in-
come households, with the remainder going to moder-
ate-income households. In the late 80’s a special task 
force on housing recommended that 85 percent of the 
funds should go to very low- and low-income house-
holds, arguing that then Mayor Tom McEnery’s vision 
for downtown was too exclusive: “He wants yuppies—
people who’ve got the money to spend in his 24-hour 
downtown” (Farragher, 1988). While these recommen-
dations were not fully adopted, an advocate who is still 
active in housing issues today noted that to the extent 
that San José did build housing for households with 
the lowest incomes, it was in response to persistent 
community organizing. In the current planning context 
– such as the Diridon Station Area Plan, discussed 
next – advocacy and activism are still crucial parts of 
the equation for housing affordability.
The Diridon Station 
Area Plan 
The city of San José passed the Diridon Station Area 
Plan (DSAP) in June 2014 for a 250-acre area sur-
rounding Diridon Station, largely contained within 
census tract 5003. The area included in the DSAP is 
shown in Figure 5.15. 
Diridon is already a significant transit hub, with stops 
for Caltrain, Amtrak, VTA light rail and multiple bus 
lines, and the station is a planned stop for both BART’s 
extension to San José and high-speed rail. The DSAP, 
in the works for over five years, also assumes the 
inclusion of a proposed future baseball stadium just 
south of the station. This aspirational plan envisions 
an “iconic world class work of architecture for the new 
terminal building,” as well as an urban design and land 
use overhaul to “establish the Station and surround-
ing area as the local, citywide, and regional destina-
tion,” and “foster a vibrant public realm” emphasizing 
pedestrian and transit uses (Field Paoli et al., 2014, 
1-9 - 1-10).
The DSAP prioritizes ground-floor entertainment and 
retail uses in the central area where the station is lo-
cated, and an “Innovation District” to the north. This 
“high-intensity business district in an urban format,” is 
designed specifically to attract high-technology busi-
nesses (Field Paoli et al., 2014, 2-1). The plan calls for 
increased residential densities and mixed-use devel-
opment, projecting a total of 2,600 new units of hous-
ing, along with 420,000 square feet of retail and nearly 
5 million square feet of office space (Wampler, 2014). 
Owing to persistent efforts from local and regional ad-
vocates, it also contains language designed to ensure 
that at least 15% of new housing will be affordable to 
low- and moderate-income households, with some 
council members advocating for 20% (Beasley, 2014). 
The challenge now is ensuring there are mechanisms 
available to create that affordable housing – and con-
cerns remain about whether 15% or 20% of housing 
will be enough to prevent displacement as property 
values rise.
Figure 5.15: Diridon Station Area Plan
Source: City of San José (Field Paoli et al., 2014)
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In an interview, one advocate noted that when DSAP 
planning began in 2009, San José was a clear lead-
er in housing supply and housing affordability. At that 
point the city was confident that they had tools to en-
sure that at least 15% of housing would be affordable: 
“The draft plan was released in 2011, [it said], ‘we rec-
ognize that affordable housing is important, we have 
an inclusionary zoning ordinance, and there’s the re-
development agency, so we’re covered.’” Shortly after 
that, however, redevelopment agencies across Cali-
fornia were dissolved, leaving a large shortfall in af-
fordable housing dollars. Inclusionary zoning has also 
been limited due to legal challenges in San José and 
across California (Kirshbaum-Ray, 2013). In the state-
wide inclusionary housing case, Palmer/Sixth Street 
Properties LP vs. City of Los Angeles, the California 
Supreme Court let stand a lower court’s ruling that 
held jurisdictions may not mandate developers to build 
inclusionary rental housing units, since doing so en-
tails the setting of rents by the city, which was banned 
by the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act (California 
Planning and Development Report, 2009; Reuben, Ju-
nius & Rose LLP, 2009). In the case of the DSAP, it may 
not apply, since it does not place the full burden on 
the developer to price the units below market, but sim-
ply requires that 15% of all units constructed end up 
affordable through whatever means, including grants 
and other public funding. The Palmer ruling does not 
affect inclusionary policies for ownership units. How-
ever the building industry’s lawsuit against the City of 
San Jose’s inclusionary law that applies to ownership 
units has now reached the California Supreme Court, 
potentially limiting this mechanism as well.
A draft Environmental Impact Report of the plan, re-
leased in December 2013, assumed that at least 15% 
of new housing in the station area would be affordable, 
even as the document acknowledged that there were 
no mechanisms to guarantee this percentage (Nzeg-
wu, 2014). Public Advocates, a non-profit law firm and 
advocacy organization, argued in their comments that 
“affordable housing and anti-displacement strategies 
must be a concrete part of the Final Plan and its imple-
mentation” or that significant environmental impacts 
would result, for example through increasing vehicle 
miles travelled if available housing does not address 
the needs of new workers (Nzegwu, 2014). 
Two community groups, Greenbelt Alliance and Public 
Advocates, came together in a coalition with several 
organizations with an interest in the plan to submit a 
letter voicing concern about several aspects, including 
requesting a higher proportion of units affordable--20% 
instead of 15%. The letter received attention from the 
city, according to a stakeholder, and in particular by 
one council member, Donald Rocha, who, following 
this advocacy, came forward in support of much stron-
ger terms to ensure affordable housing. In a memo to 
the mayor and city council, Rocha plainly recognized 
that economic realities necessitated more stringent 
affordable housing objectives, “to help ensure that Di-
ridon is a neighborhood open to all of our citizens.” The 
concerns expressed by Rocha in some ways echoed 
those of advocates who felt low-income residents 
were being excluded from downtown redevelopment 
decades earlier:
“I am mindful that while high-tech clusters and impres-
sive architecture may be necessary components for a 
great city, they are not the only components. An iconic 
station building will need janitors to clean the floors. 
Knowledge workers will need teachers to educate 
their kids. An entertainment zone needs waiters and a 
stadium needs ushers. The stations and stadiums, the 
prestigious tech companies-all will rely, at least in part, 
on the labor of people who do unglamorous work for 
modest pay and spend a good portion of their income 
on just getting by. I believe there should be some con-
sideration in our plan for them” (Rocha, 2014).
Ultimately, the recommendations that Rocha made 
were adopted by the city in the Final DSAP, which stat-
ed that, “[i]t shall be the policy of this plan to achieve 
a rate of affordable housing production at 15% of the 
housing units built within the plan area” (Field Paoli 
et al., 2014). It recommends considering policies that 
would direct any fees generated by new housing ei-
ther within the Diridon planning area or to immediate-
ly adjacent neighborhoods. The DSAP then identifies 
a suite of potential strategies to achieve affordable 
housing goals, including:
-Impact fees 
- Development agreements 
-Public-private partnerships 
-Tax increment financing 
-Assessment districts 
-Planning tools such as density bonuses, overlay 
zones, or public benefits conferred through rezonings
- Development of affordable housing on publicly owned 
land
-Use of proceeds from development of publicly owned 
land to fund affordable housing
-Phasing of market rate residential units contingent on 
achievement of affordable housing targets 
(Field Paoli et al., 2014)
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Some of these are only just starting to be explored, 
and may not end up being viable in San Jose. Activists 
have been successful in elevating the issue of housing 
affordability within the planning department. Even if 
new, subsidized housing is built, it may not be enough 
for San José’s low-income workforce. Ensuring the 
policies are implemented will require ongoing pres-
sure and organizing as described by one stakeholder: 
“The city of San José is totally burnt out on Diridon…
but as advocates…we’ve gotta keep their feet to the 
fire.”
Jobs-Housing Strategies: 
Urban Villages and the 
Housing Element 
Urban Villages
The DSAP also sits within a web of other policies and 
plans, including San José’s Urban Village strategy 
and recently-released Housing Element. As previous-
ly mentioned, the major current planning and “place-
making” strategy within San José is its Urban Villages 
plan, articulated in Envision San José 2040, the Gen-
eral Plan update passed in 2011. 70 sites in total have 
been identified as Urban Villages and two of them in-
tersect with the study area: The Alameda and West 
San Carlos. The vision articulated for Urban Villages 
across the city aspires to planning ideals of livability 
and sustainability:
“…active, walkable, bicycle-friendly, transit-orient-
ed, mixed-use urban settings for new housing and 
job growth attractive to an innovative workforce and 
consistent with the plan’s environmental goals. Urban 
villages will enable location of commercial and public 
services in close proximity to residential and employee 
populations, allowing people to walk to services while 
also providing greater mobility for the expanding se-
nior and youth segments of the population.” (City of 
San Jose, 2011)
Urban villages are also a primary strategy in the city’s 
attempt to remedy its jobs-housing imbalance, wherein 
the city has a disproportionate amount of housing. San 
José intends to develop plans for each site, and sites 
without specific plans are currently open only to com-
mercial and mixed-use development. The City hopes 
that this strategy will pave the way for value capture 
mechanisms – such as a housing impact fee current-
ly in the works – but housing advocates are wary of 
the short-term impacts of the jobs first approach, and 
want explicit policies to ensure that Urban Villages are 
affordable for the lowest income households. As de-
scribed by one stakeholder: 
“[Y]ou have the Planning and Economic Development 
staff saying that San Jose has, for so long, been hous-
ing the region’s folks, and now it’s time to put a stake 
in the ground and overemphasize jobs…They are 
working on the housing impact fee and looking to the 
raising of land value in Urban Villages, and we should 
be strategic in how we capture some of that. [But we] 
think some of that should be focused on preventing 
displacement.”
In interviews, advocates and activists also raised the 
issue of the jobs-housing fit, rather than just a focus on 
jobs-housing balance. This “fit” measures the extent to 
which an area provides sufficient housing for the low-
wage workers employed there. In this regard, despite 
being a regional leader in producing both market-rate 
and affordable housing, there are still major gaps in 
affordability for San José low-wage workers. While the 
jobs-housing balance ratio is relatively low at 1.18 for 
San Jose, the low-wage jobs-housing fit is much great-
er at 3.98 meaning that there are almost 4 low-wage 
jobs to every affordable housing unit (UC Davis Cen-
ter for Regional Change). The UC Davis Center also 
estimates that there is an affordable housing deficit 
of 18,416 units in the city, which is high compared to 
other cities in Santa Clara county. San José’s former 
mayor Chuck Reed expressed in a recent interview 
that the city would continue to gauge success based 
on the overall ratio of jobs-to-employed residents: “The 
low-income jobs versus low-income residents is an 
interesting question, but it doesn’t address the fiscal 
sustainability that drives our interest in improving the 
jobs to housing ratio” (Hepler, 2014a). To follow the in-
tent of the Urban Villages, as walkable places where 
people live and work, the City should pay attention to 
this jobs-housing fit, since the new commercial and 
retail development will likely create low-wage jobs, 
whose workers will only be able to live nearby if afford-
able housing is constructed.
Housing Element
The city has completed a draft Housing Element for 
2014-2023 in which it attempts to craft a strategy for 
meeting the state mandated Regional Housing Needs 
Allocation: over 35,000 units of new housing in the 
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next seven years (by 2022), with over 15,000 of those 
units for households with low or very low incomes. As 
context, the city produced less than half that amount 
in a previous 7-year period: between 1999 and 2005 
the city added 6,361 affordable units through new con-
struction and made provisions for another 10,152 units 
through rehabilitation and acquisition (City of San Jose 
Department of Housing 2006). The draft Housing Ele-
ment lays out a variety of potential strategies, similar 
to the list presented in the DSAP (City of San José, 
2014). This increase in housing is critical given pro-
jected employment growth of 147,000 jobs between 
2010 – 2040 (Association of Bay Area Governments & 
Metropolitan Transportation Commission, 2013).
One avenue San José is pursuing to fund affordable 
housing is a housing impact fee, with a nexus study 
completed in June 2014 and a City Council resolu-
tion to adopt it in November of that year. The nexus 
study calculated the city’s maximum legally defensi-
ble impact fee at about $28 per square foot per new 
market rate apartment, and in its initial policy recom-
mendation, the city’s Housing and Community Devel-
opment Division recommended a fee of $17 per rent-
able square foot, which was later adopted by the City 
council (Corsiglia, 2014). The total subsidy required for 
building a new unit of affordable housing, as reported 
in draft Housing Element, ranges from about $77,000 
to $136,000, and one advocate involved in the DSAP 
acknowledged, “the housing impact fee is great, the 
problem is, it is just a trickle of money – it’s very small 
when compared to the need.” According to another 
stakeholder, the impact fee would not come anywhere 
close to restoring previous funding for affordable hous-
ing; an organizer said that advocates were “pushing 
the housing impact fee because it is viable politically, 
[but] other tools are more ideal – those that won’t ebb 
and flow with the market.” They raised the idea of a 
parcel tax, but recognized that new taxes presented a 
major political challenge. Other strategies advocates 
are looking at include Cap & Trade funding, commer-
cial impact fees, boomerang funds, and more, accord-
ing to a stakeholder.
Weak Renter Protections
Parallel to the focus on producing new affordable units, 
there are concerns about San José’s existing rental 
stock. The city has relatively weak protections for rent-
ers, with no just cause required for eviction, and a rent 
control ordinance that several interviewees described 
as full of loopholes. The City has stated an intention 
to revisit existing renter protections in its Housing El-
ement, a possibility that city planners also raised in 
interviews, but no clear timeline has been set for such 
a process. This issue is a significant concern in the 
neighborhoods along West San Carlos, such as Bue-
na Vista. As mentioned above, the West San Carlos 
corridor has been designated as an Urban Village. The 
area includes an unincorporated county pocket, and 
is home to many undocumented immigrants, many 
whom are distrustful of the City and face immediate 
needs associated with housing rights and immigra-
tion status. In an interview, one advocate described 
the challenges in attempting to mobilize low-income 
parents at a local school to get involved in long term 
planning processes at the city: 
“We found it difficult to engage, the principal told us 
they were distrustful of the City, they hear about all 
this redevelopment, and they’re not quite sure how 
it’s going to benefit them.  They’re dealing with being 
[undocumented], they have landlords that illegally lock 
them out of their apartments…and planning out 30 
years is not that important…We needed to address 
immediate needs, they didn’t know what their rights 
were…And then they we’re wondering, how come San 
José doesn’t have better tenant protections?”
One reason the City lacks stronger tenant protections 
is its relatively smaller share of renters: 42% of occu-
pied housing units rent. This means there is a smaller 
political base to support better protections, according 
to a stakeholder. In the short-term, advocates have 
partnered with legal aid organization to offer fair-hous-
ing workshops, hoping this will spur community orga-
nizing that can also push for longer term strategies. 
But this also points to the need to ensure that renters 
in sites slated as Urban Villages are not directly dis-
placed through evictions as the areas become more 
desirable sites of investment. Advocates who are wary 
of the Urban Village strategy fear that without protec-
tions, displacement will lead to homogenization as 
lower-income households move out. And one planner 
at the City of San José predicted this could occur in 
Buena Vista: “It will become more educated and more 
affluent. It will reflect that the middle class is shrinking, 
and those that don’t fall in that category will be moving 
out of the area. When the patriarch and matriarch die 
the kids will sell the house and move to Stockton.” In 
response to this, a second planner had a somewhat 
more optimistic approach: “It depends on how suc-
cessful we are at creating inclusive, equitable commu-
nities.”
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Affordability Means 
Higher Wages 
Ultimately, getting to jobs-housing-fit in San José will 
require not only affordable housing, but living wages. 
Like the Bay Area at large, San José faces persistent 
economic inequality. According to a San José plan-
ner, new affordable developments will not be able to 
meet the need on their own: “the Gini coefficient [a 
measure of inequality] for Silicon Valley is the highest 
in the country…There is a market failure and discon-
nect between the labor and housing markets.” If San 
José’s efforts to attract new commercial development 
are successful, at Diridon Station and across the city, 
new jobs will continue to produce the service sector 
jobs that support higher wage industries. Under that 
scenario, even housing advocates acknowledge that 
housing on its own will not be enough to ensure new 
employees can live in the city, too: “Wages are stagnant 
and costs just keep going up. It isn’t just that we need 
more affordable housing, people need to be earning 
more money. That’s why we not only have overcrowd-
ing, but also people working two jobs. This is a whole 
societal issue and not just one thing is going to fix it.” 
This is part of the reason many of affordable housing 
advocates are also involved in living wage activism. 
Conclusion
Organizing around increasing wages has had success: 
Working Partnerships USA, a community-based orga-
nization, was involved in a 2012 effort that raised the 
minimum wage from $8 to $10 an hour, with inflation 
indexing. The issue is “widely and deeply felt among 
residents,” according to a stakeholder, and San Jose 
“led the recent wave of cities” increasing their mini-
mum wages. 
In addition, following Working Partnerships USA’s Au-
gust 2014 report “that highlighted the poor working 
conditions of janitors, security guards and other con-
tract staff, supplied by third-party companies” at large 
technology companies, Google committed to putting 
security guards on its payroll; Apple has followed suit 
in March 2015 (Ribeiro, 2015). With a coalition of 
workers, faith leaders, and other organizations, they 
launched a new effort, Silicon Valley Rising, in Febru-
ary 2015, “to advance the singular cause of raising the 
standard of living for the often ‘forgotten’ workers and 
families in the Silicon Valley tech economy” (Working 
Partnerships USA, 2015). The coalition is focused on 
raising wages and increasing affordable housing. Or-
ganizing efforts like these are key to addressing dis-
placement pressures in San Jose, especially given the 
overall political dynamic in San Jose, well summarized 
by this stakeholder: 
Of the urban cities in Santa Clara county, San Jose 
has the worst tax base…during the 1960s and 1970s, 
it was just endless urban sprawl, which you could get 
away with fiscally before Prop 13—obviously no lon-
ger true. So San Jose has been frantically trying to 
play catch up and is very much aware that its imbal-
ance between residential development and industrial/
commercial development is a cause of much fiscal dis-
tress, so San Jose is very reluctant to allow housing 
development of any kind—market rate or affordable. 
So the general plan reflects that political view. San 
Jose wants more jobs, more industrial/commercial 
development, and doesn’t want to continue to be the 
housing location for the whole county.
Existing community organizing among residents 
around issues like immigration may provide a base for 
organizing on issues related to housing and resisting 
displacement (WP USA, 2014). Recent efforts have fo-
cused on implementing a housing impact fee to collect 
a city-wide pool of money to fund affordable housing; 
establishing a just cause evictions policy; and creating 
a value capture mechanism for the increased densifi-
cation associated with urban villages. Legislation di-
recting city staff to study and propose new tenant pro-
tection policies is working its way through the Council. 
These would include expanding rent control, imple-
menting a “just cause” evictions policy, a mobile home 
park conversion ordinance, a policy prohibiting dis-
crimination based on source of income, and more(A-
genda: May 13, 2015, n.d.).
Challenges remaining in San Jose include how to en-
sure that the goal of 15% of new housing in the Diridon 
Station Area be affordable to the low income is reached, 
particularly given the legal restrictions on inclusionary 
housing. Impact fees seem to be a promising develop-
ment, but several stakeholders have pointed out these 
are often minimal and difficult to use effectively. One 
stakeholder felt a “value capture” scenario, wherein 
part of the increased value of upzoned land is given to 
the city to invest in affordable housing, is probably the 
best way to go. That stakeholder felt that, before any 
zoning is changed in the Diridon Station area, there 
should be either a citywide or urban village-specific 
public benefits zoning policy implemented. As invest-
ment continues flowing into the Diridon Station area, 
these and similar policies may be the only way to avoid 
continued displacement.
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macarthur
Chapter 6: Accessibility and 
Investment in North Oakland
56
Introduction
The current economic and real estate market boom 
in San Francisco and Silicon Valley have produced 
profound ramifications for neighboring Bay Area cities, 
contributing to a regional crisis of housing availability 
and affordability that has resulted in marked demo-
graphic shifts. With its close proximity to San Fran-
cisco and transit accessibility via the BART system, 
the City of Oakland has been deeply impacted by this 
phenomenon, which emerged as many of Oakland’s 
institutions and residents endeavored to recover from 
the Great Recession of 2008. Many residents, com-
munity organizations, and city leaders have expressed 
concern over residential displacement, anxious that as 
San Francisco becomes increasingly unaffordable, its 
residents will move to Oakland and extend a ripple ef-
fect of gentrification throughout the East Bay. 
The MacArthur Station Area (Figure 6.1), which in-
cludes the neighborhoods known as Longfellow (part 
of North Oakland), Hoover-Foster (part of West Oak-
land), Temescal, Pill Hill, and Koreatown-Northgate 
(KONO), exemplifies the nexus of these regional and 
macroeconomic trends. Centrally located among the 
five residential neighborhoods is the MacArthur BART 
Station, a major transit hub for the Bay Area with an 
average of 8,826 people exiting at the station on a typ-
ical weekday (BART 2015).  Since its construction in 
1972, the station has played a defining role in the ar-
ea’s development. Staff at the community-based orga-
nization Causa Justa :: Just Cause (CJJC) explain that 
“the gentrifying pressures on this area rest fundamen-
tally on the neighborhood’s connectivity, its access to 
major freeways, a BART transfer station, and the 1 and 
57 bus lines. The transportation connections become 
even more important as San Francisco’s workforce 
moves east, seeking cheaper rents” (CJJC 2014).1
16 This study evaluated the susceptibility of Bay Area census 
tracts to gentrification based on an index of factors that influ-
enced gentrification in the 1990s.  Among the top factors includ-
ed in the index are the availability of recreational and/or youth 
facilities, availability of public space, percent of workers taking 
transit, and percent of dwelling units with three or more cars. 
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Figure 6.1: MacArthur Area Neighborhoods 
by Census Tract
Divided by the major freeways of I-580 and CA-24 
(Grove-Shafter Freeway), the five neighborhoods—
each with its own unique history and demographic 
profile—have responded differently to the housing 
crisis, as measured by various indicators of change. 
However, as a whole, the MacArthur area’s proximity 
to retail corridors, historically affluent neighborhoods 
like Piedmont and Rockridge, and transit-oriented de-
velopment (TOD) have made its neighborhoods par-
ticularly appealing to both homebuyers and renters 
from outside the vicinity. A 2009 Center for Commu-
nity Innovation study classified the Temescal, Pill Hill, 
and Koreatown-Northgate neighborhoods as highly 
susceptible to gentrification and the Longfellow and 
Hoover-Foster neighborhoods as moderately suscep-
tible (Chapple 2009).16
MacArthur’s development potential has been fac-
tored into official city and regional plans, as indicated 
by the area’s designation as a Priority Development 
Area (PDA) in Plan Bay Area, the region’s long-range 
plan for transit-oriented development (ABAG and MTC 
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2013).172Under Plan Bay Area, the City of Oakland 
is expected to absorb a major portion of the region’s 
population growth and housing demand in future de-
cades, with a projected 30 percent growth in housing 
units (51,000 units) by 2040—the third-largest overall 
increase after San Jose and San Francisco (ABAG & 
MTC 2013). The majority of the city’s growth is expect-
ed to occur within Oakland’s six Planned PDAs. 
Total households in MacArthur PDA are expected to 
increase by 40 percent, reaching an estimated 13,410 
by 2040. The vision for this area centers on the MacAr-
thur Transit Village, a mixed-use development expect-
ed to house 1,000 new residents over the next decade 
and provide 42,000 square feet of retail space (DCRP 
Transportation Studio 2014). The Transit Village in-
cludes plans for an affordable housing development 
with 90 income-restricted units (MacArthur Station 
2014). In implementing its vision for a “vibrant hub of 
transit, housing, shopping and recreation that reduc-
es dependency [on] vehicles by placing new residents 
near both transit and employment opportunities,” the 
City plans to improve streetscapes, build a new BART 
plaza, and support the development of “abundant 
housing choices” (ABAG & MTC 2012, 10). Planning 
efforts for the Transit Village were initiated in 1993, and 
construction finally began in 2011 (Alameda County 
Transportation Commission 2010, MacArthur Station 
2014). 
Much of the transit-oriented development planned for 
the MacArthur area and surrounding PDAs has em-
phasized economic development in commercial dis-
tricts. Initially under the authority of the Oakland Rede-
velopment Agency known as CEDA (Community and 
Economic Development Agency), the City’s efforts 
in this area have included the Broadway/MacArthur/
San Pablo Redevelopment Plan, the Broadway-Valdez 
Specific Plan and support for the Temescal/Telegraph 
and Koreatown-Northgate Business Improvement Dis-
tricts (BIDs). These and other related initiatives have 
spurred much public advocacy and debate regarding 
affordable housing, livability and gentrification in Oak-
land that we discuss later in this report.
The impact of these economic development strate-
gies, which are part of confluence of multiple poten-
17 The MacArthur Transit Village PDA overlaps with much of the 
case study area, encompassing tracts 4010, 4011, 4012, and 
the northern half of 4013. Tract 4014 is included in the West 
Oakland PDA, and the southern portion of Tract 4013 is included 
in the Downtown PDA.
tially gentrifying forces, remains challenging to parse. 
This case study endeavors to understand the specific 
impact of many of these factors on the MacArthur area 
neighborhoods’ susceptibility to gentrification and dis-
placement.183
Neighborhood 
Historical Context
The neighborhoods within the MacArthur Station 
Area reflect a long history of residential segregation 
along racial lines, with persisting impacts that shape 
their built environment today. The “radically unequal 
patterns of capital investment” (Self 2005, 136) from 
the 1940s onward throughout Oakland have not only 
informed demographic differences among the MacAr-
thur neighborhoods, but also disparate levels of vul-
nerability to residential displacement. 
The racial divide between African American and White 
residents became institutionalized as Oakland’s Afri-
can American population grew during the World War 
II era. Between 1950 and 1960, the city’s African 
American population nearly doubled, from 55,778 to 
100,000, as many migrated to the Bay Area in search 
of work (Self 2005, 160). Many of the available jobs 
were near the port in West Oakland, the city’s industri-
al center. As a result, this neighborhood became one 
of Oakland’s largest concentrations of African Ameri-
can residents. 
By the end of World War II, the boundary between Af-
rican American and White residents stood at 36th and 
Grove (later renamed Martin Luther King, Jr. Boule-
vard) Streets, a product of institutionalized discrimina-
tory practices such as redlining, which made it “nearly 
impossible for African Americans to purchase homes 
and establish businesses east of Telegraph” (Norman 
2006, 8). Across this entrenched boundary, Temescal, 
Longfellow, Rockridge and other neighborhoods of 
North Oakland, were home to Italian, Portuguese, and 
Irish immigrant families (Norman 2006, 91). 
These neighborhood-based divides were promptly 
disrupted in the 1960s with the construction of the 
Grove-Shafter Freeway (CA-24) and other urban re-
18 While the Temescal neighborhood is made up of Tracts 4011 
and 4012, for the purpose of this study, these are analyzed sep-
arately as distinct halves of the same geographic neighborhood 
(distinguished as Temescal to the west and Temescal-Broadway 
to the east) to illustrate differing trends within each tract.
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newal projects, which cut through the area and ul-
timately catalyzed decades of economic decline 
through the 1980s (Norman 2006, 78). Aside from the 
many whose homes were demolished to make way for 
the freeway, hundreds of others left the area as the 
construction project “decimated entire commercial dis-
tricts” of long-established local businesses and com-
pletely transformed the culture and community of af-
fected neighborhoods (Norman 2006, 68). 
This, coupled with WWII veterans who decided to re-
settle in the suburbs using their federal housing subsi-
dies upon return, drove an exodus of White residents 
from the area. With this drastic change, the racial 
boundary became no longer relevant. As the Italian, 
Portuguese and Irish communities moved out, Afri-
can American residents began to move into the North 
Oakland neighborhoods that were formerly inaccessi-
ble (Norman 2006). By the 1980s, the MacArthur area 
was predominantly African American. 
The combination of national trends of deindustrial-
ization, urban renewal, and White flight during the 
decades after World War II left a profound impact on 
Oakland and its African American residents. As White 
households left the city for surrounding suburbs, “in-
vestment and taxable wealth left the city” (Self 2005, 
136). The industrial jobs that much of the African Amer-
ican community had relied on began to disappear as 
the nation shifted toward a service-oriented economy. 
Between 1990 and 2000, poverty rates rose significant-
ly in all MacArthur neighborhoods except Temescal. 
Crime also became a pressing concern. Amidst lower 
residential property values, Temescal, Pill Hill and Ko-
reatown-Northgate saw an influx of Korean, Ethiopian 
and Eritrean residents and businesses, while the share 
of  African American families declined (Norman 2006). 
Following this, real estate prices in these areas east of 
the Grove-Shafter freeway began to rise, marking the 
onset of gentrification in the Temescal and Broadway 
neighborhoods. After 2000, merchant-initiated efforts 
such as the establishment of the Temescal/Telegraph 
Business Improvement District and government-led 
plans such as the Broadway-MacArthur-San Pablo 
Redevelopment Plan, Broadway-Valdez Specific Plan, 
and Telegraph Streetscape Improvements Project 
sought to advance economic development primarily in 
the neighborhoods east of the Grove-Shafter Freeway. 
While real estate prices and median income rose in 
portions of Temescal, other MacArthur neighbor-
hoods, particularly Hoover-Foster, continue to struggle 
with higher poverty, unemployment, and crime rates 
(Ostler 2007). These issues have correlated with one 
of Oakland’s highest rates of vacancy and “occupied 
blight,” a term used by the City of Oakland Building 
Services Department that refers to “interior habitabili-
ty issues that are generally derived from tenant com-
plaints, as well as structural defects or failures” that 
may have significant implications for residents’ health 
(Urban Strategies Council 2014).195 4
These challenges in Hoover-Foster, considered in 
comparison to trajectory of Temescal, illustrate the 
range of neighborhood differences within the MacAr-
thur area. With an eye toward these differences as well 
as the context of disparate impacts of institutionalized 
racism across the MacArthur neighborhoods, the fol-
lowing section examines the demographic changes 
within MacArthur since 1980.
Demographic Changes 
US Census data shows that the MacArthur area pop-
ulation increased 12% from 1980 to 2013, though 
growth was not consistent among the neighborhood 
tracts over this thirty-year period. From 1980 to 1990, 
the study area saw a 3% increase overall – from 17,722 
people to 20,092 people – with the most rapid growth 
occurring in Pill Hill and Koreatown-Northgate. By 
2000, growth in Hoover-Foster peaked, and by 2013 
the neighborhood population had decreased to 4,340 
people (from 4,738 in 2000). Population in Longfellow 
also decreased between 2000 and 2013. Meanwhile, 
the Pill Hill and Koreatown-Northgate neighborhood 
saw a large increase in population between 2000 and 
2013. This uneven change, which may be related to 
the recession and foreclosure crisis from 2007 and 
2011, or even a decrease in household size associat-
ed with gentrification, is explored further below. 
Racial and Ethnic Changes
Reflecting the broader trend of demographic change 
throughout Oakland, the MacArthur area experienced 
a major decrease in the number of African American 
residents since 1980. As shown in Figure 6.2, in 1980, 
over 64 percent of the study area was home to Af-
rican-American households while the White popula-
tion made up 25% of residents. By 2013, the African 
American population had fallen to 34% while the White 
population climbed to 34%. The total decrease in the 
African American population between 1980 and 2013 
19 Examples of “occupied blight” include damaged structures, 
plumbing or electrical problems, and the presence of debris or 
mold (Urban Strategies Council 2014). 
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Figure 6.2: MacArthur Area Population by 
Race/Ethnicity, 1980-2013.
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 
2009-2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
Figure 6.3: MacArthur Area African-American Popula-
tion by Neighborhood, 1980-2013.
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 
2009-2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
Figure 6.4: MacArthur Occupied Housing Units by 
Tenure, 1980-2013.
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 
2009-2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
Figure 6.5: Macarthur Station Area Homeowners by 
Race/Ethnicity, 1980-2013
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 
2009-2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
equaled 4,829 individuals – a drastic 42% reduction 
that corresponds with a 32% increase in the White 
population during the same period. Figure 6.3 shows 
that the sharpest declines in number of African Ameri-
can residents occurred in Longfellow and Hoover-Fos-
ter, which together accounted for 4,030 – or 83 per-
cent – of African American residents who moved out 
during the thirty year period. 
While the MacArthur area has housed far more rent-
ers than homeowners (Figure 6.4) the rates of both 
homeownership and tenancy among African American 
households further illustrate the stark declines among 
African American households by tenure (Figures 6.5 
and 6.6). Since the 1990s, the share of White home-
owners has more than doubled. By 2013, 41 percent 
of owner-occupied units across all five neighborhoods 
were owned by White householders while 35 percent 
were owned by African American householders – a 
marked decrease from 1990, when African American 
households comprised 64 percent of the area’s home-
owner population. Similarly, the share of African Amer-
ican households fell for the renter population, from 62 
percent in 1980 to 38 percent in 2013. Though the 
share of African American homeowners has more se-
verely declined than the share of the African American 
renters, the overall number of African American renter 
households lost was nearly triple the number of home-
owner households lost for the same period.
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Figure 6.6: Macarthur Station Area Renters by 
Race/Ethnicity, 1980-2013 
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 
2009-2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
From 2000 to 2010, most of the decrease among the 
African American population occurred among resi-
dents under the age of 44, with even greater decreas-
es among the youth population, which suggests that 
the population change can be attributed to African 
American families, rather than senior citizens, leaving 
the area (Figures 6.7 and 6.8). 
Nonetheless, individual neighborhoods show an un-
even distribution of these outcomes. For example, in 
Hoover-Foster, 42 percent of adults in 1980 had not 
completed high school. This rate held at about 40 per-
cent through 2000, until dropping sharply to 26 per-
cent by 2013. Despite this decrease, Hoover-Foster 
had the highest percentage among the MacArthur 
neighborhoods.
Education, Income, and Poverty
Along with dramatic changes in population demo-
graphics, the MacArthur area saw an increase in ed-
ucational attainment over the 30 year period. In 1980, 
14 percent of residents had a college degree; this in-
creased to 38 percent in 2013 (Figure 6.9).
Figure 6.9: MacArthur Educational Attainment, 
1980-2013.
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 
2009-2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
Figures 6.7 and 6.8: MacArthur Area Non-Hispanic 
White and Black/African American Populations by 
Age, 2000 and 2010
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Figure 6.10: MacArthur Median Household Income, 
1980-2013 (in 2010 dollars).
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 
2009-2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
Figure 6.11: MacArthur Median Household Income by 
Neighborhood, 1980-2013 (in 2010 dollars).
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 
2009-2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
Nonetheless, individual neighborhoods show an un-
even distribution of these outcomes. For example, in 
Hoover-Foster, 42 percent of adults in 1980 had not 
completed high school. This rate held at about 40 per-
cent through 2000, until dropping sharply to 26 per-
cent by 2013. Despite this decrease, Hoover-Foster 
had the highest percentage among the MacArthur 
neighborhoods of adults that had not completed a 
high school education. Conversely, Temescal/Broad-
way began 1980 with 22 percent of its residents not 
graduating high school. That percentage decreased to 
8 percent in 2000, and then 4 percent in 2013. More-
over, only 16 percent of Hoover-Foster’s population 
in 2013 had earned a college degree or higher, com-
pared to 52 percent of Temescal and 56 percent of 
Temescal-Broadway. 
College graduation rates in Koreatown-Northgate and 
Longfellow lag behind Temescal and Temescal-Broad-
way, but their increase has been as rapid. Kore-
atown-Northgate’s college educated population more 
than doubled— from 12 percent in 1980 to 33 percent 
in 2013. Similarly, Longfellow’s college-educated pop-
ulation went from 7 percent in 1980 to 34 percent in 
2013. 
Coupled with major shifts in the MacArthur area’s ra-
cial/ethnic demographics, these data suggest that the 
30 year changes in educational attainment are due to 
a higher level of education among newcomers in spe-
cific neighborhoods. 
The area’s median household income also changed 
significantly within the time period, rising nearly 25 
percent between 1980 and 2009-2013 (Figure 6.10). 
However, when disaggregated by neighborhood, me-
dian household income rose modestly in Longfellow 
and Pill Hill/Koreatown-Northgate, and dropped in 
Hoover-Foster. Much of the growth is limited to both 
Temescal tracts, indicating a trend of gentrification in 
the neighborhood that has gone on for some time.
As a whole, the MacArthur area has seen little fluctua-
tion in poverty rates since 1980, although the number 
of impoverished residents has declined substantially 
since the poverty rate spiked in 2000 (Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1: MacArthur Area Poverty Rate, 
1980 to 2009-2013
Year Total Residents % of Population
1980 4664 27%
1990 4606 26%
2000 6217 32%
2009-2013 5159 26%
Table 6.2: Poverty Rate by Neighborhood, 
1980 to 2009-2013
Neighborhood 1980 1990 2000 2009 
-2013
Longfellow 29% 29% 31% 25%
Temescal 25% 17% 20% 15%
Temescal/ Broad-
way
19% 18% 11% 10%
Pill Hill/ KONO 30% 27% 40% 33%
Hoover- Foster 30% 34% 50% 40%
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But as with household income, disaggregated figures 
show that the Longfellow and Hoover-Foster neighbor-
hoods west of CA-24 have seen consistently higher 
rates of poverty at the neighborhood scale. As the in-
come gap between neighborhoods within the MacAr-
thur area increases, areas with disproportionately high 
poverty rates may be particularly vulnerable to resi-
dential displacement. 
Recent data for Hoover-Foster may be indicative 
of such a circumstance. Between 2000 and 2010, 
Hoover-Foster experienced a major drop in its poverty 
rate – from 50 to 27 percent (2,365 to 918 individuals) 
– that was unparalleled among other neighborhoods in 
the area.20 Such a stark change, combined with a pop-
ulation decrease of 424 (the only population decrease 
in MacArthur for this decade) suggests that a signifi-
cant portion of Hoover-Foster’s population below the 
poverty line may have been displaced between 2000 
and 2013. This change is explored further in the fol-
lowing section.
Residential Displacement 
among Homeowners 
The story told by demographic and socio-economic 
trends in Hoover-Foster contribute to a larger picture 
of the severe impacts of the Great Recession and 
foreclosure crisis on the MacArthur area and Oak-
land overall, with over 10,000 properties foreclosed 
citywide between 2007 and 2011 (Urban Strategies 
Council 2012). 
Between 2006 and 2014, 195 properties (2.3 percent) 
were foreclosed within the case study area. Of the 195, 
67 percent occurred west of the Grove-Shafter freeway 
in Longfellow and Hoover-Foster (Figure 6.12). This is 
equivalent to an approximate 2.5 percent foreclosure 
rate in Longfellow and 5.0 percent in Hoover-Foster. 
These neighborhoods, which as previously detailed, 
have historically been home to the highest concentra-
tions of African American households in the MacArthur 
area, correspond with nationwide reports that show 
high-risk lending practices by banks and subsequent 
foreclosures have disproportionately impacted the Af-
rican American community (Housing and Economic 
Rights Advocates 2007). 
20 ACS 5-year estimates show that Hoover-Foster’s poverty rate 
between 2009 and 2013 was 40 percent, suggesting that it rose 
back to levels comparable to 1990 after a drop in 2010.
Figure 6.12: 2006-2014 MacArthur Foreclosures by 
Neighborhood
Source: Open Oakland 2014
Figure 6.13: Number of African American Owner-
Occupied Households by Neighborhood, 1980-2013. 
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 
2009-2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
However, a closer look at the numbers of African Amer-
ican owner-occupied units shows that the decrease 
in African American homeownership began decades 
prior to the Great Recession. The largest decreases 
occurring between 1990 and 2000 for both Longfellow 
and Hoover-Foster, with the downward trend continu-
ing more gradually through the height of the foreclo-
sure crisis. This initial decrease corresponds with an 
increase in mortgage-burdened households between 
1980 and 1990 (Figure 6.14). Mortgage-burden rates 
for 2013, which reached 78 percent in Hoover-Foster, 
demonstrate the extent of the housing affordability cri-
sis after the Great Recession.
Center for Community Innovation, University of California, Berkeley MacArthur Area Case Study 63
Figure 6.14: Percent of Mortgage-Burdened House-
holds in Longfellow and Hoover-Foster, 1980-2013. 
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 
2009-2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
Fueled by the real estate market, outside investment 
and “flipping” properties have become commonplace 
in the tracts of West Oakland closest to transit, accord-
ing to local real estate agents. The Urban Strategies 
Council produced a report in 2011 quantifying the lev-
el of investment on foreclosed properties throughout 
Oakland. According to the report, 81 percent of the 
homes sold in Oakland between 2007 and 2011 were 
to banks or other financial institutions. Of these, 42 per-
cent were sold to investors looking to “flip” the homes 
for a profit, where 93 percent of homes acquired by 
investors were located in flatland neighborhoods like 
Hoover-Foster – the same neighborhoods targeted by 
sub-prime lenders before the foreclosure crisis (Urban 
Strategies Council 2011).
Such transactions have contributed to the rapid 
change of these neighborhoods. Sales data from the 
Alameda County Assessor’s Office shows that the 
prevalence of flipping corresponds with hot real estate 
markets of the dot com boom at the turn of the century 
and the over-heated market prior to the housing crisis, 
with most incidences occurring within Longfellow and 
Hoover-Foster.21 Furthermore, Hoover-Foster’s vacan-
cy rate spiked to 27 percent in 2010 from 11 percent 
in 2000, making it the highest in the area and near-
ly double the vacancy rate of MacArthur as a whole 
(14 percent).22 This may be indicative of the turnover 
that occurs with flips, as new owners evict current res-
idents and allow units to remain vacant while waiting 
for property values to increase.
 
2
21 A parcel was classified as flipped if assessor data showed that 
it changed ownership more than once in a two-year period.
On the other hand, between 2000 and 2013, the num-
ber of owner-occupied units in the MacArthur area in-
creased from 22 to 26 percent. This could indicate a 
change in the mix of housing offered in the area due to 
a combination of conversion to owner-occupied units 
due to owner- move-in, condo conversion of multi-unit 
buildings, and new construction.23 3
While flips have been more prevalent in the neigh-
borhoods west of the Grove-Shafter Freeway, sales 
prices have been highest in Temescal and Temes-
cal-Broadway (Figure 6.15). The architectural char-
acter of Temescal’s housing stock may play a role in 
the area’s desirability. 70 percent of the housing stock 
in the study area was built before 1949. These older 
homes tend to be bought and renovated by middle- 
and high-income earners as they migrate into older 
urban environments. Therefore, the presence of these 
architectural types within the housing stock – crafts-
mans, Victorians, and pre-war bungalows – may it-
self be an indicator of risk for gentrification. Housing 
in the Pill Hill/Koreatown-Northgate area tends to be 
slightly newer in comparison to the other tracts, with 
58  percent built before 1949, whereas housing in the 
Temescal-Broadway area tends to be older, with 80% 
of housing built before 1949. This indicates a strong 
vulnerability to gentrification, realized in the 1980s and 
1990s. 
Figure 6.15: Median sales price per square foot for 
single family units in in MacArthur by 
Neighborhood, 1989 – 2014
Source: Dataquick (2014)
22 Five-year estimates from the American Community Survey 
indicate that the vacancy rate has since decreased, with a 19 
percent vacancy rate between 2009 and 2013. 
23 Since 2000, approximately 500 new units have been con-
structed, with the majority (52 percent) built in Pill Hill/Kore-
atown-Northgate (Dataquick). 
Center for Community Innovation, University of California, Berkeley MacArthur Area Case Study 64
Figure 6.16: Percent of Rent-Burdened Households in 
MacArthur by Neighborhood, 1980 to 2009-2013. 
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 
2009-2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
Loss of Affordable 
Rental Units
The decreased share of renter-occupied units raises 
concern about the vulnerability of MacArthur’s renter 
population, which comprised approximately 74 per-
cent of the total units in 2013. Similar to homeowners, 
by 2013 over half of renter households were spending 
over 30 percent of their income on housing, making 
the majority of the population susceptible to displace-
ment (Figure 6.16). 
The increase in rent-burdened households corre-
sponds with an increase in median rent in all 5 neigh-
borhoods. Adjusted for inflation, average rent in the 
study area tracts rose from $520 per month in 1980 to 
just over $1,000 by 2013 (in 2010 dollars). According to 
Zillow.com, the 2014 median rent for zip code 94609, 
which makes up the central majority of the study area, 
was $1,876, indicating a steep rise in rents in recent 
years.24 As depicted in Figure 6.17, rental prices in-
creased nominally between 1990 and 2000 but rose 
significantly by 2013, with the highest median rent in 
the Temescal-Broadway neighborhood. While rents 
in Longfellow, Pill Hill & Koreatown-Northgate and 
Hoover-Foster were comparable in in 1990 and 2000, 
by 2013, the median rents in Longfellow and Pill-Hill 
& Koreatown-Northgate surpassed Hoover-Foster’s. 4
24 Zillow data provides information on the price of rental units 
that are currently on the market, rather than for all units in an 
area.
Figure 6.17: Change in Median Rent by 
Neighborhood, 1980-2013. 
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 
2009-2013 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates
By measuring the median contract rent in each neigh-
borhood against average household income, CJJC 
analyzed potential rent gaps to understand housing 
pressures and potential movement of high-income 
newcomers to the area. This analysis reveals the larg-
est differences between average monthly income and 
median rent are generally among the northern-most 
portions of Longfellow, Temescal and Temescal-Broad-
way (CJJC, 2014). For example, one block group in 
Temescal-Broadway has a median contract rent of 
$1,404 and a median monthly income of $7,416, 
yielding a rent gap of $6,013. This difference suggests 
more affluent households are pricing out lower-income 
households and potentially driving up prices of for-
merly “naturally affordable” units. Moreover, areas with 
large rent gaps may indicate greater redevelopment 
and profit potential for landlords, which would trig-
ger further gentrification (Smith 1979). CJJC’s anal-
ysis suggests that the Longfellow neighborhood may 
be especially vulnerable within this context, with rent 
gaps on some blocks between $3,500 and $4,700. 
Subsidized Housing
These rent increases throughout the MacArthur area 
pose major challenges for families who rely on hous-
ing choice vouchers to afford housing. With public 
housing authorities generally only able to set a max-
imum payment standard for Section 8 property own-
ers at 120 percent of fair market rent (HUD Housing 
Choice Voucher Program Guidebook 2001), landlords 
Center for Community Innovation, University of California, Berkeley MacArthur Area Case Study 65
can often earn a larger profit by renting their units to 
non-voucher holders in the private market. Moreover, 
due to the lengthy waitlist, households may wait sev-
eral years before they can receive Section 8 assis-
tance.255
With the challenges related to voucher-based subsi-
dies, other subsidized units such as public housing 
and inclusionary units built with Low Income Housing 
Tax Credits (LIHTC) are important to preserving af-
fordability in MacArthur and Oakland overall. Current-
ly, nearly all of the MacArthur area’s 611 subsidized 
housing units across 10 separate developments are 
located in the Pill Hill & Koreatown-Northgate and 
Hoover-Foster neighborhoods; in contrast, only 6 units 
are located in Longfellow, and none exist in Temescal 
(CHPC 2014). Approximately one half (328) of the to-
tal are designated as senior housing (CHPC 2014). 
This may contribute to the relatively stable population 
numbers of senior citizens between 2000 and 2013. 
Due to the elimination of funding for local redevelop-
ment agencies statewide, affordable housing develop-
ment projects have become even more challenging to 
finance in Oakland. Previously, the City’s Community 
and Economic Development Agency (CEDA) awarded 
approximately $20 million per year in funding to devel-
op affordable housing throughout the city, but in 2014, 
its successor agency’s funding pool had shrunk to $3 
million (Musiker 2015).  
However, archived CEDA reports on the Broadway/
MacArthur/San Pablo Project Area that covered por-
tions of Temescal/Temescal-Broadway and Pill Hill 
show that Redevelopment Agency funds were not 
used to build a single unit of affordable housing be-
tween 2000 and 2009. All of the 373 units built within 
this time period did not have income restrictions. In 
order to meet redevelopment requirements for the pro-
duction of 56 low and moderate income and 23 very 
low-income units for the 2000-2009 compliance peri-
25 The Oakland Housing Authority’s Section 8 Housing Choice 
Voucher waitlist was last opened in 2011 (Oakland Housing 
Authority, 2013).  At the end of fiscal year 2011, there were 
10,007 households on the general (tenant-based subsidy) wait 
list. These households were chosen by lottery among the over 
55,000 households who applied to be on the wait list (Oakland 
Local 2013). OHA reported that at the end of FY 2011, there was 
a combined total of 26,362 households on all wait lists for public 
housing, Section 8 and other mixed finance subsidized housing 
in the city (Oakland Housing Authority 2011).
od, the City constructed two developments, with a to-
tal of 203 affordable units, outside of the Project Area 
(City of Oakland 2009, 14).26
CEDA’s dissolution also disrupted the implementation 
of Redevelopment Area plans, including those for the 
MacArthur Transit Village and others within the Broad-
way/MacArthur/San Pablo Project Area. With an ex-
panding need for below market rate units, these issues 
further exacerbate mounting market pressures on the 
existing housing stock.
Commercial Gentrification
Another marker of increased market pressure is 
change in surrounding commercial districts. Changes 
in the commercial environment of gentrifying neighbor-
hoods have been seen as both an instigator and con-
sequence of residential demographic change (Chap-
ple and Jacobus 2009). Researchers have shown that 
retail and commercial amenities signal to middle class 
residents that a low-income neighborhood is changing, 
consequently attracting new residents (Brown-Saraci-
no 2004). On the other side, others have shown how 
shifting buying power and cultural preferences of new 
residents in gentrifying neighborhoods may influence 
the mix of retail in nearby commercial corridors (Chap-
ple and Jacobus 2009). Many scholars believe that 
commercial gentrification results in the disappearance 
of small, mom-and-pop stores and the arrival of bou-
tiques, chains or commercial establishments that do 
not serve the needs of the existing, low income resi-
dents (Zukin et al. 2009). In its analysis of the MacAr-
thur neighborhoods, CJJC notes that commercial 
development in major retail nodes—both within the 
MacArthur area, such as the Temescal/Telegraph Cor-
ridor, and outside of it, such as Bay Street and other 
retail centers in Emeryville—has played a role in defin-
ing neighborhood change (CJJC 2014).  6
Temescal/Telegraph Corridor
Centrally located within the case study area, the Te-
mescal/Telegraph retail corridor may be a key “gentri-
fying pressure” on the MacArthur area as a whole, with 
26 These two developments, Fox Courts and Jack London Gate-
way, also fall outside of the case study area. California Redevel-
opment Law credited the City with one unit toward its afford-
able housing production requirement for every two units built 
outside of the Project Area (City of Oakland 2009, 14).
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the greatest vulnerability in neighborhoods west of the 
Grove-Shafter Freeway (CJJC 2014). The Temescal/
Telegraph Corridor, which consists of a six-block strip 
of small locally owned businesses along Telegraph Av-
enue, runs through some of the most affluent neigh-
borhoods in the MacArthur area that have gentrified 
in recent decades (CJJC 2014). With the support of 
the Temescal Business Improvement District, the “hip” 
and “cool” neighborhood strip boasts signs touting its 
restaurants, shopping, and authentic local flavor. While 
the neighborhood was once home to Italian, then Afri-
can, and then Korean immigrants, it is now a predom-
inantly White, middle to upper middle class hotspot. 
National media has described the neighborhood as 
“Oakland’s answer to San Francisco’s Mission District 
and the city of Berkeley drawing a mix of yuppies and 
plaid-wearing hipsters” (Woo 2009), and the “hippest 
part of Oakland” (Haber 2014).
To understand patterns of change among the Corridor’s 
business mix, we evaluated data on commercial es-
tablishments from the National Employment Time-Se-
ries Database (NETS), which provided information on 
sales and number of establishments for businesses by 
North American Industrial Classification System (NA-
ICS) code (Walls & Associates 2013). We categorized 
each business as either local-serving or region-serv-
ing based on its NAICS code, following a method used 
by Koebel and Chapple and Jacobus which classifies 
specific business types as most likely to serve local 
market areas (Koebel 2002; Chapple and Jacobus 
2009). These types—which include grocery and food 
product stores, restaurants, financial institutions, sa-
lons and barbershops, and laundromats—are detailed 
in the table below.
Additionally, data gathered through ground-truthing 
was used to compare current businesses and busi-
nesses that existed in 2007, which were inventoried as 
part of the 2007 Temescal/Telegraph Merchant Survey 
(Munektyo, Simundza, and Chapple 2007).277
As the neighborhood’s desirability has increased since 
2000, the Temescal/Telegraph Corridor has undergone 
27 The date of this survey poses a limitation to this methodology, 
as the Temescal district’s commercial revitalization began prior 
to 2007. Many of the businesses that can be considered part of 
this revitalization (because they were established after 2005) 
were already in place by 2007 and are classified here as having 
not been replaced. Thus, this analysis only captures a partial 
extent of the changes since associated with the present wave of 
commercial revitalization.  
significant change. Of the 224 commercial parcels 
along the Corridor, 49 percent turned over between 
2007 and 2014. Twenty-five percent of the businesses 
replaced by 2014 were retail businesses, and anoth-
er 17 percent were restaurants or food service estab-
lishments. The greatest amount of change in business 
type occurred among service establishments, with 35 
percent replaced by 2014. 
Nearly all local-serving businesses that have turned 
over were replaced by new local-serving establish-
ments. NETS data show that in fact, the ratio of re-
gional to local-serving businesses has remained fairly 
consistent over time (Figure 6.18). However, certain 
names of new businesses suggest that, while they 
may still be local-serving, they cater to a new local 
demographic—one that differs from the clientele of 
replaced businesses. For example, several African/
African American hair salons and barber shops28 are 
among the replaced businesses, which reflects the 
decline in African American residents throughout the 
MacArthur Area.
Table 6.3: ‘Local-serving’ Business Types
 
NAICS code Business type
444130 Hardware Stores 
445110 Supermarkets and Other Grocery (except Convenience) Stores 
445120 Convenience Stores 
445210 Meat Markets 
445220 Fish and Seafood Markets 
445230 Fruit and Vegetable Markets 
445291 Baked Goods Stores 
445292 Confectionery and Nut Stores 
445299 All Other Specialty Food Stores 
445310 Beer, Wine, and Liquor Stores 
446110 Pharmacies and Drug Stores 
451212 News Dealers and Newsstands 
522120 Savings Institutions 
522130 Credit Unions 
522190 Other Depository Credit Intermediation 
522291 Consumer Lending 
722330 Mobile Food Services
722410 Drinking Places (Alcoholic Beverages) 
722511 Full-Service Restaurants 
722513 Limited-Service Restaurants 
722514 Cafeterias, Grill Buffets, and Buffets 
722515 Snack and Nonalcoholic Beverage Bars 
812111 Barber Shops 
812112 Beauty Salons 
812113 Nail Salons 
812310 Coin-Operated Laundries and Drycleaners 
812320 Drycleaning and Laundry Services (except Coin-Operated) 
28 Among these are ADOM Hair Braiding, Hair Extraordinaire, 
Ebony Men, My Sista My Brotha Beauty Salon, Destiny 2000 and 
Madingo Braids.
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Figure 6.18: Number of Business Establishments, 
Temescal/Telegraph Corridor, 2000-2011. 
Source: National Employment Time Series Dataset
Figure 6.19: Average Sales per Establishment, 
Temescal/Telegraph Corridor, 2000-2011.
Source: National Employment Time Series Dataset
However, this data also reveals that regional-serving 
businesses have generated much more revenue per 
establishment than local-serving businesses since at 
least 2000. Furthermore, average sales per establish-
ment have fluctuated greatly over time—and resulted 
in an overall decrease since 2000—for region-serv-
ing businesses, while staying fairly consistent for lo-
cal-serving businesses (Figure 6.19). Thus, despite 
the relatively even distribution in the number of local 
and regional-serving businesses, the Corridor’s busi-
ness patterns appear to be susceptible to changes in 
regional consumer preferences and spending power.
Business Improvement Districts and City of 
Oakland Planning Efforts
Changes along the Corridor correlate with the found-
ing of the Temescal/Telegraph Business Improvement 
District (BID) in 2005. The BID notes in its 2015 Man-
agement Plan that sales tax revenues within its bound-
aries have risen 32 percent within the past 10 years, 
despite an overall 4 percent decline in citywide sales 
tax revenues (New City America 2014). It attributes 
this success as well as the “new identity” of the Temes-
cal commercial district to the organization’s physical 
improvement and marketing activities, which have in-
cluded installation of pedestrian street lights and pole 
banners, sidewalk sweeping and graffiti abatement, 
underwriting of several public events and street fairs, 
and coordination of social media marketing (New City 
America 2014). 
The Temescal/Telegraph Corridor’s evolution can pro-
vide insight into the future of surrounding residential 
areas as well as nearby commercial districts. With 
the Temescal district’s revitalization viewed as a mod-
el of positive economic development, business and 
commercial property owners in Koreatown-Northgate 
(KONO) followed a similar path by forming their own 
BID (called a Community Benefit District) in 2007 and 
engaging heavily in marketing efforts that brand KONO 
as “the neighborhood that defines the new Oakland,” 
and an “up and coming community that has become 
the ‘unofficial’ hub of arts and culture in the Bay Area.” 
This identity is reflected in the Broadway-Valdez Dis-
trict Specific Plan (BVDSP), which envisions the area 
as a “new, re-imagined 21st Century neighborhood” 
that emphasizes destination retail (City of Oakland 
2014). 
Adopted in 2014 after a six-year planning process 
that started with funding from CEDA, the BVDSP in-
cludes a vision for development along Telegraph Av-
enue and Broadway in the form of housing projects, 
complete streets transportation plans, and retail up-
grades. Among the planned new establishments is a 
development called “the Shops at 30th and Broadway,” 
which will be anchored by a higher-end Sprouts Farm-
er’s Market grocery store. The image and target de-
mographic of this development stand in contrast to a 
Grocery Outlet Bargain Market located just across the 
street that has served the community for much longer. 
The developer’s online marketing materials explicitly 
demonstrate its intention of catering its retail toward 
affluent residents by including an income map that 
shows “major access to and from Piedmont and the 
Oakland Hills” (Lockehouse & Portfolio Development 
Partners, LLC 2012).
This development is guided by the City of Oakland’s 
“Retail Enhancement Strategy,” which was first devel-
oped in 2008 to address the issue of retail gaps and 
leakage, which leads to the loss of potential sales tax 
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revenue from resident purchases made in neighboring 
municipalities (Conley Consulting Group 2008). With 
this plan guiding citywide development projects, in-
cluding the MacArthur Transit Village, the implications 
of commercial gentrification on neighborhood change 
are important to consider.  
Development interest in the Broadway-Valdez corridor 
has recently taken off; a January 2015 article in the 
San Francisco business times states that “The area… 
is attracting big interest in the way of mixed-use proj-
ects. Applications have been pouring in since the 
city finalized its specific plan for the transit-rich area” 
(Azevedo 2015). A private developer of a mixed use 
project that was the first to receive entitlements under 
the BVDSP states that this 435-unit development will 
target supporting medical staff and millennials who 
can’t afford San Francisco rents” as tenants (Azevedo 
2015).
As demand for real estate in the Broadway-Valdez 
area grows, it is likely that market rate development 
will quickly outpace subsidized housing development 
and leave few viable opportunity sites available to 
affordable housing developers. City institutions and 
community-based organizations continue to grapple 
with the question of how to effectively manage neigh-
borhood change in order to support inclusive econom-
ic development and prevent displacement. Early drafts 
of the BVDSP focused primarily on sales tax revenue 
generation and failed to directly address affordable 
housing needs in the plan area (Wampler 2015). In 
2008, a coalition of community groups known as the 
Better Broadway Coalition launched a campaign to 
ensure that the Broadway-Valdez Specific Plan in-
cluded strong affordable housing measures and goals 
(Great Communities Collaborative 2014). The coalition 
also pushed for economic development strategies that 
would benefit residents through local hiring and living 
wage policies (Wampler 2015). 
As a result of this advocacy, the adopted plan includes 
a target of 15 percent of new homes to be affordable 
for low- and moderate-income households as well as 
language on anti-displacement strategies and work-
force housing (City of Oakland 2014). 
While the plan includes a stated policy to “explore the 
formulation and adoption of a comprehensive citywide 
affordable housing policy that addresses concerns 
from all constituents,” it remains vague in terms of ac-
tions that the City will commit to in order to preserve 
affordability in the area (City of Oakland 2014). Thus, 
implementation of the Broadway Valdez Specific Plan 
may provide a crucial leverage point for resident and 
community engagement. Organizations involved with 
the Better Broadway Coalition have called for an af-
fordable housing impact fee that would contribute to 
a sustained source of funding for affordable housing 
production and preservation in Oakland. The City has 
embarked on a nexus study to explore the specifics of 
a possible impact fee, but further advocacy is needed 
(Wampler 2015).
Conclusion
With major revitalization projects slated for central lo-
cations within MacArthur, the area’s desirability will 
likely continue to increase, placing further strain on the 
housing stock and continuing to drive change block-
by-block. The implications of this change on low-in-
come residents must be considered pre-emptively, so 
as to not exacerbate the existing affordability crisis. 
While MacArthur has passed the peak of the latest 
foreclosure crisis, many residents remain vulnerable 
to displacement, and the full impact of the foreclosures 
is yet to be determined as properties continue to rap-
idly change hands and sales prices climb. The data 
points to increasing severity of the affordability crisis, 
with continuously rising rents and a tremendous jump 
in rates of housing burden. 
As discussed throughout this case study, the housing 
affordability crisis’ varied manifestations, whether in 
the form of foreclosures, high vacancy rates and flips, 
or increasing rent gaps and changing retail patterns, 
paint a picture of residential displacement in the vari-
ous MacArthur neighborhoods that may remain an on-
going threat, especially for low-income households. In 
this, MacArthur is not an exception, but an example of 
trends throughout the rest of Oakland. These current 
housing dynamics in MacArthur are born of a long his-
tory of institutionalized racial discrimination, with the 
most notable impact on the area’s African American 
residents. Any efforts to achieve equitable develop-
ment must take this history into account.
As much of the region’s challenges are actively debat-
ed and addressed in MacArthur, changes in the area 
provide an opportunity for advocates, researchers, 
community leaders, and government officials to inform 
regional solutions through careful tracking of MacAr-
thur’s ongoing neighborhood change and evaluation of 
tested anti-displacement strategies.
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concord
Chapter 7: Signs of Speculation 
in the Monument Corridor
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Introduction
Located in the heart of Contra Costa County, the City 
of Concord was primarily settled in the decades fol-
lowing World War II. Returning veterans viewed the 
small-town feel and verdant land that expanded to the 
foothills of Mount Diablo as a desirable and inexpen-
sive place to settle. As its population grew exponential-
ly over the next several decades, the land was quickly 
consumed by suburban single-family homes. In 2010, 
approximately 175,600 people resided in the City of 
Concord.
The city continuously prioritized policies that promoted 
auto-dependency, accommodating its growing popu-
lation by facilitating access between housing sub-
divisions and the highway through the expansion of 
thoroughfares and widening of streets. Though BART 
opened its Downtown Concord station in 1973, it has 
largely remained underutilized. The city’s development 
of office parks downtown was instead paired with the 
dedication of funds for the construction of parking ga-
rages around the periphery of the commercial corridor 
(Dymond, 2000). 
The city failed to link the BART station to its commer-
cial and residential nodes (Waterhouse, 1973). Office 
tenants began to leave Concord in the 1980s, and 
the once booming downtown now holds empty office 
buildings and underutilized storefronts. Without other 
incentives to attract new residents or visitors to the city, 
Concord has watched its neighbors in the region pros-
per, while its own tax base lags behind and its popu-
lation growth stagnates. Between 2002 and 2011, the 
number of jobs located in the city has decreased by 
9.6 percent, from 49,465 to 44,717 (US Census Bu-
reau, 2014). 
Despite these economic development challenges, 
Concord real estate has grown more desirable in re-
cent years, with housing prices on the rise since the 
2007-2011 recession and new development through-
out the city. In 2012, the Association of Bay Area Gov-
ernments (ABAG) and the Metropolitan Transporta-
tion Commission (MTC) designated about 620 acres 
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around the Downtown BART station as a priority de-
velopment area (PDA). PDAs are eligible to receive 
funding that encourage transit oriented development 
(TOD) and infill housing. As a result, Concord has 
been working to craft a new Downtown Specific Plan 
that will implement strategies to promote new down-
town investment (City of Concord, 2014). At the heart 
of the plan is the Downtown Concord BART station, 
which the city envisions will be the vehicle to attract 
new economic activity to Concord. To this effect, the 
city has created a half-mile buffer around the BART 
station, where it plans to improve pedestrian access 
and intensify land uses to create an environment con-
ducive to attracting new residents, jobs, and business-
es to its core. In particular, Concord officials hope that 
by promoting housing density within the PDA the city 
will attract a new demographic to Concord, enabling it 
to spur economic growth and to join its neighbors to 
share in the prosperity of the Bay Area region. 
With an increase in available resources for develop-
ment, interest in downtown Concord is growing, spur-
ring concern among affordable housing advocates. 
The Bay Area has seen a steady rise in rents for the 
past three years with Contra Costa County experienc-
ing an 8% increase since the second quarter of 2011 
(Carey, 2014). While TOD and infill housing develop-
ment often seeks to address affordability issues, tran-
 
Figure 7.1: One of the many partially occupied office 
buildings in Downtown Concord
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sit-development induced residential displacement can 
be a potential impact. The Monument neighborhood 
is one area of particular concern. A 3.8 square mile 
area largely bounded by I-242 and Monument Boule-
vard, a central city artery that easily connects the high-
way to the downtown (Figure 7.2), this predominantly 
low-income, Latino neighborhood may be vulnerable 
to residential displacement. This case study analyzes 
the demographic and housing characteristics of the 
Monument over three decades to determine the po-
tential impact of investment on neighborhood change 
and residential displacement. 
The Monument Community
The Monument neighborhood makes up 12% of the 
total area and is the most populated region in the city 
of Concord. The 2009-2013 American Community 
Survey provides an estimate of around 24,000 resi-
dents. Since 1980 this figure has increased by 67% 
(see Appendix A).  Despite this huge jump, this number 
is largely considered to be an underestimated figure. 
Monument Impact estimates a figure closer to 37,000 
residents. The discrepancy can likely be attributed to 
the large number of undocumented residents, a pop-
ulation that typically remains undercounted in Census 
due to fear that providing information to the Census 
Bureau may alert Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment (Monument Impact, 2014). 
The majority of the immigrant population are from 
Mexico and Central America and tend to have lower 
educational attainment and income than the rest of 
the Concord population. Forty three percent of Mon-
ument residents were born abroad are non-natural-
ized. This figure differs greatly from the city of Concord 
where only fourteen percent of the total population is 
non-naturalized foreign born. This high foreign born 
demographic in the Monument may explain the weak 
political power of this community expressed in some 
stakeholder interviews. 
Since 1980, the Monument neighborhood has seen a 
huge racial and ethnic demographic shift. The White 
population has steadily declined over this period of 
three decades while the Latino population has experi-
enced considerable growth (See Figure 7.4). In 2010 
Latinos comprised 63 percent of the population while 
Figure 7.2: Map of the Monument study area
Figure 7.3: Percentage of Native and Foreign born, 
2009-2013. 
Source: American Community Survey 2009-2013
 
Figure 7.4: Residential Racial and Ethnic 
Composition, Monument, 1980 to 2009-2013.
Source: U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 
American Community Survey 2009-2013.
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Whites only accounted for 20 percent. This is nearly 
the inverse of the city’s racial and ethnic distribution, 
which in 2013 consisted of 51 percent of Whites and 
31 percent of Latinos (See Appendix). 
Educational attainment in the Monument has not seen 
major increases in the college-educated population, 
which is another marker of gentrification (See Appen-
dix). This may indicate that large-scale displacement 
has not yet occurred. However, this neighborhood 
contains many precursors associated with gentrified 
neighborhoods. For instance, the high percentage of 
ethnic minorities in the Monument increases residen-
tial susceptibility to displacement. This is true even 
when accounting for income (Newman & Wyly, 2006). 
Additionally, from 2000 to 2013 nonfamily households 
increased from 37% to 52% of total households, an-
other marker of gentrification. Finally, residents in the 
Monument are significantly poorer than the rest of the 
city. In 2013 the Monument had a poverty rate of 23% 
-- over twice the poverty rate of the city, which stood 
at 9% (See Appendix). Median incomes in the Monu-
ment declined between 2000 and 2013 by 22 percent 
(Figure 7.5).291
With increasing costs of rent, the gap between income 
and median rents has widened at a rapid rate. The me-
dian gross rent increased by 15 percent when adjust-
ed for inflation, from $948 in 2000 to $1,167 in 2013. 
As a result of these trends, the percentage of rent-bur-
dened households in the Monument has grown as 
well. In 2000, 49 percent of households were rent-bur-
dened, meaning the household paid 30 percent or 
more of their income on rent (Figure 7.6).30 Already a 
high figure, by 2013 60 percent of households suffer 
from rent- burden.
29 Average, rather than median, income are reported for 1980. 
Even though the rate of overburdened households 
increased between 2000 and 2013, Census data ap-
pears to show that there was a decline in the number of 
renter- and owner-occupied units that are overcrowd-
ed (See Appendix). Stakeholders who work closely 
with community residents, however, tell a different 
story. Several different stakeholders have recounted a 
similar narrative about overcrowding in the Monument. 
According to them, it is not uncommon for multiple 
families to live under the same roof. In some shared 
apartments, families sleep in separate bedrooms, but 
according to one stakeholder, it is also not uncommon 
for families or single adults to share rooms or occupy 
living room spaces to cope with rising housing costs. 2
Since 1980, tenure split has remained constant in the 
Monument and in Concord overall (see Appendix). The 
tenure split is drastically different, between the two 
areas, however. As seen in Figure 7.7, 81% of Mon-
ument residents rent while only 39% of residents in 
Concord rent. Renters are at greater risk of displace-
30 Average, rather than median, rents are reported for 1980.
Figure 7.5: Median Household Income, Monument & 
Concord, 1980 to 2009-2013 (In Constant 2010 Dollars)
Source: U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); Ameri-
can Community Survey 2009-2013
Figure 7.6: Housing Cost Burden in the Monument, 
1980 to 2009-2013
Source: U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); Ameri-
can Community Survey 2009-2013
Figure 7.7: Occupied Units by Tenure, Monument vs. 
Concord, 2009-2013
Source: American Community Survey 2009-2013
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ment than homeowners, especially since Concord has 
few tenant protections, making Monument residents 
very vulnerable to displacement pressures.
Vacancy in the Monument has increased dramatically 
from 2000 to 2013, jumping from 3% to 9% over the 13 
years (Table 7.1).  The higher vacancy rate is likely due 
to the housing crisis and recession of 2008. Concord’s 
vacancy rate is much lower, at 6.5% in 2013. A higher 
vacancy rate can signify disinvestment in the Monu-
ment, which can ultimately lead to gentrification. Land-
lords may prefer to leave units empty instead of deal-
ing with maintenance or until the market rebounds. In 
turn, developers can purchase land/buildings cheaply 
and still make an acceptable profit after the cost of 
rehabilitation (Smith, 1979). The fact that Concord’s 
vacancy rate in 2013 was much lower suggests that 
the Monument residents may be faced with this type 
of disinvestment.
An analysis of foreclosure data collected from the 
height of the housing crisis revealed that like much 
of California, Concord and the Monument community 
were impacted by the decline of the housing market 
and the economic recession. Using the 2000 and 2010 
average of owner-occupied units as proxies to esti-
mate the rate of units in foreclosure, we found the rate 
of foreclosure in the Monument was almost four times 
greater than the rate of foreclosure in Concord. While 
a 23% foreclosure rate in the Monument is a very 
large figure, it is likely a conservative estimate. The 
three years only represent a snapshot of the housing 
crisis that arguably lasted at least five to seven years 
or more when considering the lingering effects of the 
economic recession.
The Housing Market 
Heats Up
Stakeholders have indicated that evictions due to fore-
closure are no longer a problem, but without mecha-
nisms in place to safeguard against rent spikes and to 
protect tenants against unfair evictions, tenants’ resi-
dential stability is tenuous, at best. Homebuyers and 
investors that have acquired foreclosed properties in 
the Monument paid rock-bottom prices; but values are 
rapidly beginning to recover. Concord’s home values 
experienced an 8.6% increase in home value from 
2013 (Zillow, 2014). According to RealtyTrac, the es-
timated monthly mortgage payment in the Monument 
is $1,079, while the average rent for a three-bedroom 
house is $1,740. A stakeholder from a service organi-
zation confirmed that it is increasingly becoming com-
monplace for residents to pay upwards of $1,500 for a 
small, rundown apartment in the Monument.
Aside from growing rents, Monument residents face 
hurtles to owning a home as homeownership is being 
catered to attract a younger and wealthier demograph-
ic. A news article published by SFGate in February 
2014 entitled “Oakland, Concord among top cities to 
flip to hipsters,” highlights Concord as a desired lo-
cation for “home flipping,” whereby a homebuyer pur-
chases a property with no intent to occupy it (Erwert, 
2014). Instead, the objective is to resell the property 
quickly, and at a higher price than what was originally 
paid for it. The article goes on to provide a four-step 
“how-to” info-graphic, attributed to RealtyTrac that ex-
plains the process:
1. Identify hot hipster housing market with good 
profit on flip.
2. Find foreclosure homes or other bargain buys.
3. Rehab to hipster tastes.
4. List + market the home. Close the deal.
Monument’s zip code, 94520, is specifically listed with-
in the top 10 hipster housing markets with good returns 
Table 7.1: Monument, Housing Units & Vacancy Rate
Year Total 
Housing 
Units
Vacant Units Vacancy 
rates
1980 7285 392 5%
1990 7623 467 6%
2000 8133 257 3%
2009- 2013 8729  816 9%
Source: U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014);
 American Community Survey 2009-2013
Table 7.2: Rate of Foreclosure, Monument vs. Concord
Area Average 
Owner-
Occupied 
Units (2000 
& 2010)
Foreclosed 
Homes 
(2006-2009)
Rate of 
Foreclosure
Monument 1,848 421 23%
Concord 41,834 2,402 6%
Source: U.S. Census 2000 & 2010, American Community Survey 
2006-2010, Zillow 2014.
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on flips. This is not surprising considering the neigh-
borhood’s high foreclosure rate. As a methodology, the 
article explains how RealtyTrac filtered zip codes by 
15 percent of the population with an age group of 25 
to 34 and where 15 percent take public transit or walk 
to work. Finally, if the median home prices that are no 
more than five times the median income of the neigh-
borhood and at least 10 homes have flipped in 2013, 
the zip code is considered prime for hipster flipping.
With steep declines in the average sales prices for 
both single family and multi-family residential proper-
ties in 2008 (Figures 7.8 and 7.9), Monument’s hous-
ing market became extremely advantageous for real 
estate investors and developers. The area’s profit op-
portunity has increasingly drawn their attention, and 
prominent markers of change, such as two newly con-
structed high-rise apartment buildings, can be found 
throughout the neighborhood.
Figure 7.8: City and County Sales Price per 
Square Foot, 1988-2012
Source: Zillow 2014.
Figure 7.9: Monument Average Sales Price per 
Square Foot, 1990 to 2013
Source: Dataquick 2014.
Figure 7.10: Average Rent per Square Foot, 
Monument vs. Concord, 2010 to 2013
Source: Zillow 2014.
Investment for the New, 
Neglect for the Old
Many of the post-recession housing opportunities are 
advertised for a wealthier population coming from 
neighboring cities. Low-income residents living in dis-
invested communities, such as those in the Monument, 
are unlikely to reap the benefits. The discrepancy be-
tween investment for outsiders and disinvestment in 
current residents is highlighted through stakeholder 
interviews. A landlord who owns a large apartment 
complex on the edge of the neighborhood spoke with-
out qualms about their intention to continually mark-up 
rents. While this developer certainly warrants competi-
tive rates in return for their investment into the property, 
they are also not bashful about their motivations and 
interests. Even though they believe BART in downtown 
Concord to be a “waste of money,” they do not hesitate 
to use their complex’s proximity to BART as a mar-
keting tool, aiming to “cater to the laptop crowd” that 
commutes via BART to work in San Francisco. Though 
the complex is located within the Monument communi-
ty, this developer has willfully dissociated the complex 
from the Monument, and they proudly describe how 
they “got rid of… the 99% Latino” population that for-
merly lived in the complex. Ultimately, they plan to con-
vert the units into condominiums and sell them once 
the market picks up again. 
This developer’s intention demonstrates the potential 
for neighborhood change in the Monument commu-
nity, moving towards more expensive rental housing 
and catering to a more highly educated, higher wage 
earning demographic. Their comments reveal the im-
bedded racial tensions of residential displacement as-
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sociated with gentrification. As developers, real estate 
agents and other actors cater to the younger, affluent 
White population, communities of color are either dis-
placed or excluded from the benefits of an improving 
neighborhood. 
Meanwhile, as rents are increasing the quality of life 
is not necessarily improving. Interviews revealed a se-
vere bed bug infestation that plagues the multi-family 
units where low-income residents live. 
According to a stakeholder interviewed from a tenants’ 
rights advocacy organization, the bed bug infestation 
has been a problem in the Monument for almost two 
years. The City’s reluctance to address the issue, they 
believe, stems from a refusal to acknowledge it as a 
public health concern, placing responsibility on indi-
vidual landlords while simultaneously refusing to hold 
them accountable through citations. Several stake-
holders have mentioned that tenants in the Monument 
do not feel well represented by local elected officials. 
Pushed by the continued backing from a tenants’ rights 
advocacy organization, the City of Concord enacted a 
bed bug policy in late March of 2014 acknowledging 
bed bugs as a nuisance and enabling code enforce-
ment to issue citations to landlords who refuse to mit-
igate the bed bug issue in their buildings (Bed Bug 
Response Pilot Program, March 2014). Still, because 
code enforcement is managed by the local police de-
partment, many tenants who are undocumented im-
migrants and unfamiliar with their legal rights, remain 
fearful about drawing attention to themselves. They 
fear deportation or that unsanctioned living conditions 
like overcrowding, if discovered, will lead to eviction. 
Even when residents have brought issues to property 
managers, community organizations have also found 
that managers often fail to raise these concerns with 
the property owners, effectively serving as a “cover” 
for the owners who do not comply with housing codes. 
In other cases, residents have decided to move out, 
feeling that it is the only means of dealing with an is-
sue.  
Neglect of Monument housing is coupled with the fact 
that Concord does not have any tenant protection pol-
icies in place. The city has no rent stabilization policy 
nor do they have a just cause eviction ordinance. In 
addition, there is also no system in place at the city 
level to track evictions in Concord. Without these and 
other tenant protections, it will be difficult for residents 
to take advantage of this new Bed Bug policy. 
Because of the area’s profit potential and desire of de-
velopers to bring in new residents who will pay higher 
rents, some stakeholders see the combination of ne-
glect and lack of tenant protections as a means for 
property owners to intentionally push current residents 
out.
Challenges to Affordable 
Housing Production
Like the rest of the Bay Area, there has not been 
enough new housing production in Concord to meet 
the needs of current and potential residents. From 
2007-2014, very few units have been built in Concord 
and of these units, almost all are above moderate-in-
come housing (Housing Element, 2010). Concord has 
fallen short of its regional housing needs allocation 
(RHNA) for 2007-2014. In addition, there is recognition 
that there is a shortage of very low- and low-income 
housing units in Concord. While there are currently 
1,031 subsidized housing units in the Monument—a 
significant increase since 1980 (Figure 7.12)—the 
need for more affordable housing units persists.  
Figure 7.12: Subsidized Housing Units in the 
Monument, 1980 to 2010
Source: California Housing Partnership Corporation 2014
Figure 7.11: A Luxury Apartment Complex Located in 
Downtown Concord
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In the 2010 Housing Element plan, the city conducted 
an analysis of the previous plan from 2003 and found 
that despite the land available for affordable housing, 
the city did not produce enough units in the very low-, 
low-, and moderate-income categories. Concord only 
produced 35 percent of its RHNA for these three cat-
egories (Housing Element, 2010). Additionally, 80% of 
units counted towards the RHNA were rehabilitation of 
old units and not new housing. However, in the same 
time frame, the City did produce more than twice the 
amount required for above-moderate income housing 
units.
The City of Concord has policies that have been put in 
place recently in order to encourage development. The 
Concord housing element includes two overlay zones 
for Concord - an affordable housing overlay zone and 
a transit station overlay district. The transit station 
overlay district has only been in effect since August 
2012 and was created to promote increased residen-
tial density and commercial activity within a half-mile 
of the perimeter of the Downtown Concord BART 
station. The development code for the transit station 
overlay district specifies that the maximum density of 
the base district can be increased up to 25 percent for 
residential projects.
As a result of efforts from prominent housing advocacy 
organizations in the East Bay, the Concord 2010 Hous-
ing Element included an affordable housing overlay 
zone. This overlay zone was put in place to incentivize 
affording housing development and to encourage af-
fordable housing developers to build developments in 
areas of Concord where multifamily residential hous-
ing is permitted. The city has since shifted to an Afford-
able Housing Incentive Program, which was adopted 
as part of the City’s Development Code update in 
2012 (Ryan 2015). This program allows for additional 
incentives for projects that include affordable units and 
allows for additional density bonuses. Under the eligi-
bility guidelines for this program, a rental project must 
have at least 40% affordable units - at least 20% must 
be affordable to very low-income households while 
at least another 20% must be affordable to very low 
or low-income households (Housing Element, 2010). 
While no affordable units have been built in the overlay 
zone yet, staff from Concord’s Community and Eco-
nomic Development Department note that the City has 
experienced recent interest from developers since its 
Downtown Specific Plan was adopted in June 2014.
Aside from the affordable housing incentive program, 
the zoning code outlines the parameters for the inclu-
sionary housing ordinance and the density bonus pro-
gram. Under the inclusionary housing ordinance both 
rental and ownership projects are required to include 
10% of low-income housing or 6% of very low-income 
housing. If eligible, developers have the option of pay-
ing in-lieu fees instead of providing inclusionary units 
in a project. These fees go into a city general fund ded-
icated to affordable housing and can also be used for 
administering affordable housing programs. To mitigate 
the financial impacts of the inclusionary housing ordi-
nance, the City may grant the following incentives for 
affordable housing development: financial assistance, 
density bonus, and expedited application processing.
Despite having policies in place to promote housing 
production, a very low supply of affordable housing 
is being built in Concord. Staff report that no units 
have been added to development projects through the 
density bonus ordinance, which was adopted in 2012 
(Ryan 2015). The lack of affordable housing construc-
tion, however, is in line with overall construction trends; 
approximately only 10 infill residential units have been 
built in Concord since 2012 (Ryan 2015).
Even if housing production starts to pick up in Down-
town Concord, the City’s desperation for any kind of 
development may result in acquiescence to the pref-
erences of developers who may opt to exclude af-
fordable housing from the development, despite the 
incentive measures in place. Second, there is a per-
ception that Concord is “naturally affordable” due to 
the lower rental costs in Concord compared to other 
parts of the Bay Area such as San Francisco. Accord-
ing to a City staff member, Concord has plenty of the 
“affordable” housing products and what it is missing is 
the “market-rate type of product.” The language in the 
2010 Housing Element reflects this view despite evi-
dence that the “naturally affordable” housing may be 
at risk of moving into this higher market rate category. 
A key finding of the housing needs analysis was that 
“Housing cost has become more affordable compared 
to three or four years ago, during the peak of the San 
Francisco Bay Area housing boom” (Housing Element, 
2010). The city concludes this despite the fact that real 
income has gone down since 2000 and housing-bur-
den as increased.
There is a discrepancy among city officials between 
the acknowledged low supply of affordable housing 
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in Concord and what the city really wants, which is 
more economic development and housing, especially 
market-rate housing. According to one city stakehold-
er, Concord wants the downtown area to be a “robust 
economic engine that operates 24/7 with residents 
living there and enjoying the amenities of downtown”. 
This requires drawing in new residents who can afford 
to live in these potential market-rate developments 
and who would want the type of lifestyle that would 
require a downtown to be bustling 24/7. Lastly, even 
though these affordable housing incentive polices are 
incorporated into the city’s housing element and devel-
opment code, which gives them more authority, stake-
holders expressed concern that the local city govern-
ment lacks the political will to address the affordable 
housing situation.
Conclusion
For a long time, Monument residents lacked a voice 
and weren’t included in the city’s decision-making pro-
cess. These issues have largely been influenced by the 
demographic characteristics of Monument residents, 
which discourage them from interacting with local of-
ficials. Despite these challenges, there is a growing 
grassroots movement in Concord demanding protec-
tion for residents in the Monument. Community-based 
organizations such as Monument Impact have made 
significant strides in building residents’ capacity to ad-
vocate for themselves and fostering a culture of civic 
engagement through leadership development pro-
grams, neighborhood action teams, and a range of 
skills-building workshops. A tenants’ rights advocacy 
organization is currently trying to “create a culture of 
fighting back” and “build a tenants’ rights movement” 
in Concord. 
For a community that has historically been afraid to 
speak up about injustices, strengthening the advoca-
cy and organizing capacity of these residents is the 
first step to building a stronger voice for Monument 
residents. Monument residents and organizations that 
serve them were not an integral part of the Downtown 
Concord planning process due to the disconnect be-
tween development in downtown and its implications 
for Monument residents. 
The data shows that Monument residents have many 
characteristics of neighborhoods at risk of gentrifica-
tion including a large ethnic minority population and a 
very high renter population. Residents suffer from ex-
tremely high rent burden and the neighborhood suffers 
from a high vacancy rate, a potential indicator of dis-
investment. Developers are capitalizing on the impact 
of the housing crisis through “home flipping” strategies 
meant to attract a white, young, and wealthier popu-
lation. 
Multiple stakeholders who were interviewed as part 
of this case study expressed that the diversity of res-
idents is one of the city’s key strengths. In recent de-
cades, the Monument has served as a point of arrival 
for immigrants to the Bay area that search for better 
opportunities. Like so many of its neighbors in the re-
gion, the loss of affordable housing in Concord and 
especially in the Monument is threatening to funda-
mentally change the character of the city and displace 
residents who already have limited access to housing 
choices.
Concord is at a critical juncture where it can alter its 
trajectory by electing to protect its most vulnerable 
community. If Concord officials truly value diversity, 
they will safeguard measures to allow all residents to 
prosper from the economic growth that results from 
the downtown plan.
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Introduction
Redwood City is on a path toward immense change. 
Located on the southeastern edge of the San Fran-
cisco Peninsula in the affluent San Mateo County, the 
city of more than 75,000 residents is currently the site 
of an intense economic development scheme. The 
foremost goal behind this effort is to put to rest the 
old moniker “Deadwood City,” which has been used 
over the past several decades by locals to character-
ize the moribund downtown area. With revitalization, 
city officials envision their downtown as a new hub for 
entertainment and commerce in the region and as a 
home to affluent residents (The Downtown Precise 
Plan 2011). This vision, however, is not necessarily in 
harmony with Redwood City’s historic role as a home 
for low- and middle-income families on the Peninsula. 
As city officials try to insert their town into the thriving 
Silicon Valley economy, policies are needed to ensure 
that its current low- and moderate-income residents 
receive some of the benefits of development and are 
still able to afford to live there as the cost of living ris-
es. This case study explores provisions for affordable 
housing in the current development scheme in Red-
wood City to assess potential displacement pressures.
We begin with an overview of Redwood City today, 
placing a particular focus on the history and potential 
future of development in the downtown area. We next 
turn to the downtown development plan and examine 
the issues it will create in terms of displacement. We 
then review the affordable housing policies currently 
in place and evaluate the types of jobs that are likely 
to be created as the city grows. We find a need for af-
fordable housing construction to accommodate future 
increases in the low-wage workforce. Redwood City 
risks displacing and excluding low-income earners if it 
does not put in place stronger supports for affordable 
housing construction. 
Geography
To understand the potential for displacement associ-
ated with economic development in Redwood City, we 
analyzed the changes in the downtown area relative 
to the local and regional context. We studied eight 
census tracts: 6102.2, the downtown area as defined 
by the city in its Downtown Precise Plan (DTPP), and 
the immediate surrounding tracts 6100, 6101, 6102.1, 
6102.2, 6102.3, 6105, 6107, and 6109. These tracts 
were chosen because of their proximity of the Caltrain 
station, the focal point of development. One census 
tract (6105) includes a portion of the unincorporated 
North Fair Oaks neighborhood, a low-income area.
Demographic Profile
As Redwood City strategically attracts wealthy employ-
ers, employees, and developers to its downtown, the 
surrounding neighborhoods may become vulnerable 
to being displaced from what is now one of the most 
affordable cities on the Peninsula. The high proportion 
of minority residents exacerbates this vulnerability, as 
language barriers, racism, and discrimination lead to 
weaker representation in city politics.
Income and Poverty
Redwood City’s median household income in 2013 
was $79,419, compared with $88,202 for San Mateo 
County. This figure, though, obscures the larger income 
discrepancy between Redwood City and neighboring 
communities like Atherton. Of the 20 incorporated cit-
ies in San Mateo County, Redwood City has one of the 
lowest median income levels (“Social Explorer” 2014). 
The Redwood City Caltrain station may be considered 
an emblem of the city’s efforts to tap into the regional 
economy: The biggest income gap between two neigh-
boring Caltrain stations less than three miles apart 
occurs between Redwood City and Atherton, with a 
median income of $193,000 (Green 2013). 
There are also significant income disparities among 
Redwood City’s neighborhoods. Figure 8.1 shows each 
tract’s median income in 2013. There are lower-income 
communities immediately surrounding downtown and 
to its southeast in the Stambaugh Heller and Redwood 
Village neighborhoods, and much wealthier Oak Knoll/
Edgewood neighborhoods to the northwest and in the 
hills. Seven out of eight of our study tracts have aver-
age incomes below the city median.
In addition, the poverty rates differ substantially be-
tween the study area and San Mateo County, and be-
tween the tracts, as shown in Table 8.1. Poverty rates 
have risen between 1980 and 2013 in six of the eight 
tracts in all but two tracts, 6100 and 6101, which have 
historically been more affluent than other tracts in the 
study area. It is also worth noting the sharp rise in pov-
erty rates in Tracts 6102.3 and 6109 in the last ten 
years between 2000 and 2013.
Population and Family Changes
The study area has seen significant population 
growth overall from 1980 to 2013, however, much of 
Figure 8.1: Median Household Income Levels in 
Study Tracts, 2013
Source: 2009-2013 American Community Survey
this growth took place between 1980 and 1990, as 
shown in Table 8.2. Since 1990, population growth has 
slowed down substantially. Redwood City downtown 
growth was much higher than the county’s as a whole 
between 1980 and 1990. In the last decade the study 
area’s population declined while the county’s growth 
continued but at a slower pace. It is worth noting that 
not all of the areas in and around downtown grew at 
the same rate. The areas on the east side of El Camino 
Real Road, a relatively dense area with residential du-
plex, multi-family homes and commercial strips, grew 
much more quickly that areas on the west side of it.
Since 1980, the majority of households in the study 
area have been families, as shown in Figure 8.2. The 
ratio of family to non-family households has increased.
Table 8.2: Population, 1980 – 2013
Redwood City San Mateo County
Year Total Change 
(%)
Total Change 
(%)
1980 25,668 -- 587,289 --
1990 31,950 24% 649,623 11%
2000 35,831 12% 707,161 9%
2013 37,564 5% 729,543 3%
Percent 
change 
1980 - 
2013
-- 46% -- 24%
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics 2014); American 
Community Survey 2009-2013
Table 8.1: Poverty Rates in Redwood City Tracts compared to San Mateo County, 1980-2013
1980 1990 2000 2013 Percent change 
1980-2013
Percent change 
2000-2013
San Mateo 6% 6% 6% 8% 2% 2%
Study tracts 
average
10% 13% 9% 14% 4% 5%
6100 6% 5% 4% 2% -4% -2%
6101 15% 6% 7% 4% -11% -3%
6102.1 14% 17% 13% 20% 6% 7%
6102.2 14% 16% 8% 17% 3% 9%
6102.3 14% 17% 6% 25% 11% 19%
6105 9% 20% 16% 24% 15% 8%
6107 9% 10% 8% 10% 1% 2%
6109 10% 4% 14% 6% 10%
Source: US Census, 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics 2014); American Community Survey 2009-2013
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Figure 8.2: Total Households in Redwood City, 
1980 – 2013
Source: Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); American  
Community Survey 2009-2013
Race and Ethnicity
Income disparities mirror racial demographics. The 
population of Latino residents in these eight census 
tracts has increased overall from 26% to 60% of the 
total from 1980 to 2013, but these changes vary sig-
nificantly by tract, with Latino residents overrepresent-
ed in lower income tracts. In keeping with this trend, 
these lower income tracts have a higher proportion of 
minority residents compared to the city as a whole, 
where just 40% are Latino. In particular, it is worth not-
ing that a high proportion of Latino families live in the 
North Fair Oaks neighborhood adjacent to Redwood 
City. This area contains some older homes on smaller 
lots and many older apartment buildings. At the same 
time, the area is providing flexible space for business-
es, including new technologies and light industrial 
uses. It has a concentration of low-income people 
and, depending on how Redwood City’s development 
progresses, could face displacement pressures in the 
future as a result. There have been significant chang-
es in the study area’s racial composition from 1980 to 
2013, as shown in Figure 8.3, as the percentage of 
Hispanic and Latino population has increased steadily, 
while the White population has fallen. The proportions 
of Asian and Black populations have remained fairly 
constant over the four decades. 
Housing
The housing stock in the study area has grown by ap-
proximately 1,000 units between 1980 and 2013, as 
shown in Table 8.3. This represents a 9% increase, 
which is relatively low especially when considering the 
46% population increase during the same time period. 
The vacancy rate has remained low overall.
Table 8.3: Redwood City Housing Units and 
Vacancies, 1980-2013
Year Total Housing 
Units
Vacant 
Units
Vacancy 
Rate
1980 11,541 367 3%
1990 11,980 554 5%
2000 12,117 258 2%
2009-2013 12,585 633 5%
Source: U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics 2014); American 
Community Survey 2009-2013
Figure 8.3: Redwood City Race/Ethnicity by Percent, 1980 – 2013
Source: Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); American Community Survey 2009-2013
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Figure 8.4: Housing Tenure in Redwood City, 
1980-2013
Source: U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics 2014); American 
Community Survey 2009-2013
Redwood City Study Area 
San Mateo County 
 
Figure 8.5: Median Rent, 1980-2013
Source: U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010 (Geolytics 2014), 
U.S. Census 2013 ACS 5-year estimates
The study area has many more renters than owners 
(Figure 8.4), which makes the residents here more 
susceptible to displacement.
Costs for Renters and Owners
Both the study area and San Mateo County as a whole 
have seen a steady increase in rents over time, except 
for the period 2000-2010 when rents declined due, as 
shown in Figure 8.5. By 2013, the median rental price 
in the study area had risen above the pre-recession 
level, increasing faster than the county as a whole. 
Rising housing costs that are comparatively low com-
pared to the surrounding area may indicate suscepti-
bility to gentrification.
While the Downtown area has historically had a low-
er housing cost compared to the County overall, this 
is changing given new construction there, with rents 
starting at $4,000 and up, according to a stakeholder. 
Households in Downtown face significant housing cost 
burdens, defined as paying 35% or more of income 
towards housing costs. Figure 8.6 shows a substantial 
proportion of households in the study area bear heavy 
housing cost burdens, particularly rental households. 
Both mortgage and rent burdens have climbed since 
1980 but increased more sharply between 2000 and 
2013. By 2013, 59% of households in the study area 
were rent burdened.
Overcrowding
In 2000, over 40% of households in the study area 
reported “overcrowding” or “extreme overcrowding”. 
However, overcrowding decreased over the following 
decade with 17% of households being overcrowded 
and 11% reporting extreme overcrowding in 2010, 
and the trend continued into 2013, as shown in Fig-
ure 8.7. The level of overcrowding in the study area in 
2013 is similar to that of Redwood City as reported in 
the Housing Element 2015-2023 draft report. Despite 
this progress, Redwood City still has a higher num-
bers of overcrowded rental homes than elsewhere in 
the county and overcrowding remains a key concern 
(Housing Element 2015-2023, September 2014).
Figure 8.6: Redwood City Percentage of Housing Units 
with Rent or Mortgage Burdens, 1980-2013
Source: U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics 2014); American 
Community Survey 2009-2013
Figure 8.7: Redwood City Overcrowding by Percentage 
of Housing Units, 2000, 2010 and 2013
Source: U.S. Census 2000 (Geolytics 2014); American Community 
Survey 2006-2010 and 2009-2013
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Home Ownership
Overall, sale prices have trended upward between 
1988 and 2014, with the spike and decrease of the 
housing bubble evident in the mid-2000s (Figure 8.8 
and Figure 8.9). This trend could increase the risk of 
displacement of low-income residents.
Trajectory of Change
The Downtown Precise Plan 
The downtown area has seen an especially severe de-
cline in income, which poises it for reinvestment. While 
the census tract that encompasses Redwood City’s 
downtown has historically housed few residents there 
are plans to substantially increase the housing supply 
through market rate development. This raises ques-
Figure 8.8: Median Sale Price per Square Foot – Multi-Family Properties 
Source: Dataquick; “Bay Area” includes all tracts in the 9-county area)
Figure 8.9: Median Sale Price Per Square Foot - Single Family Homes 
Source: Dataquick; “Bay Area” includes all tracts in the 9-county area)
tions about how residents in surrounding low-income 
census tracts will fare as the economy shifts to keep 
pace with the surrounding boom.
Adopted in 2011, the Downtown Precise Plan (DTPP) 
is the guiding framework for the economic revitaliza-
tion of Redwood City. It introduces a number of in-
centives intended to jumpstart activity by reducing re-
strictions on development. For example, “among the 
most important elements of the DTPP was the imple-
mentation of Form-Based codes and By-Right Zon-
ing. Many building entitlements in the DTPP area now 
come through administrative approvals in an amazing 
6 month or less,” according to a stakeholder. Local offi-
cials hope that an influx of investment dollars will make 
Redwood City desirable to the high-tech sector in Sil-
icon Valley. The strong transportation connectivity via 
Caltrain, the Dumbarton Bridge, and El Camino Real 
makes it an especially ripe location. 
Center for Community Innovation, University of California, Berkeley Redwood City Case Study 84
The DTPP is centered on bolstering commercial life 
downtown and bringing restaurants, shops, and hous-
ing that supports the lifestyle of these workers, com-
mon characteristics of transit-oriented development 
(TOD). This strategy will be enhanced by Redwood 
City’s history as the oldest city on the Peninsula, which 
has endowed it with art deco theaters and other piec-
es of historic architecture. If the DTPP is successful, 
more people will be able to live and work in the area 
and more families will want to take trips downtown.
What does the DTPP look like? Here it bears repeating 
that local officials want to do away with the “Deadwood 
City” title. The enthusiasm around this rebranding is 
evident in the film noir produced by Mayor Jeffrey Gee 
and pictured below in which they bury a plaque in-
scribed with “Deadwood City” in the foundation of a 
new building (City of Redwood City 2014a). They will 
do whatever they can to avoid scaring off developers 
with burdensome restrictions and to attract higher-in-
come households with disposable income to support 
a new consumer economy downtown. Conversations 
with stakeholders revealed that the strategy of devel-
opment could be characterized as a “trickle down” ap-
proach in which the presence of higher income res-
idents is believed to benefit lower income residents. 
The DTPP thus justifies overriding regulations or re-
strictions that apply to the rest of the city. By doing so, 
the DTPP creates a zone of exception in the down-
town area where policies that are meant to address 
social concerns of the municipality as a whole will be 
weakened to incentivize development. For example, 
density and zoning restrictions have been removed or 
minimized in the DTPP, nullifying the effect of a den-
sity bonus ordinance that is intended to incentivize af-
fordable housing. The plan adopts a form-based code, 
privileging a New Urbanism aesthetic that will support 
nightlife and fine dining.
Figure 8.10: Redwood City 2014 State of the City Mov-
ie: “Where is Deadwood City?”
Importantly, there is very little housing downtown, 
about 830 units, according to the 2010 Census. Our 
review shows that about 240 of these units are afford-
able but this high proportion reflects the fact that these 
units were erected under Redevelopment and that 
they were built downtown at a time when no one else 
wanted to live there (San Mateo County Department of 
Housing 2012). With new development, Redwood City 
is hoping that at least 2,500 units will be constructed 
downtown. There are already about 1,300 units slated 
for construction in the vicinity, though not one appears 
guaranteed to be affordable. In fact, almost all of them 
are described as luxury. Additionally the plan calls for 
500,000 square feet of office space, 300,000 square 
feet of which have already been built (City of Redwood 
City 2014b). 
Considering all of the above, the availability of afford-
able housing is an ongoing concern among residents 
in Redwood City. Housing advocates and community 
organizers are wary that that development downtown 
will increase unaffordability, and there are signs that 
this is already happening. Community service provid-
ers report that many lower income families are strug-
gling to afford to stay in their homes, doubling up with 
extended families and passing down real estate be-
tween generations because purchasing new homes 
are not within reach. Maintaining ownership in this way 
is one anti-displacement strategy that is being em-
ployed by residents, but Redwood City is an increas-
ingly renter-dominated market. As the population in-
creases and the economy shifts to attract a regional 
market, tenant protections and subsidized affordable 
housing development is critical to maintaining the af-
fordability of Redwood City for middle and low income 
people on the Peninsula.
While there have been few recorded instances of di-
rect displacement related to development in downtown 
given its small population size, there is a risk of poten-
tial exclusionary displacement in the future in that low 
income residents will not be able to move into the area. 
Community organizations are responding by preemp-
tively putting in place measures to protect against the 
displacement that is likely to occur.
Weak Provisions for Affordability
A lack of affordable housing in the context of Redwood 
City’s current growth trajectory will contribute to dis-
placement pressures. However, even now there is a 
shortage of housing to accommodate downtown work-
ers. The short supply will put pressure on the prices 
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of existing units downtown, which is likely to create 
spillover demand in adjacent neighborhoods and push 
rent upwards. The neighborhoods adjacent to down-
town are currently accessible to low-income earners, 
but this will change as rents rise. While affordable 
housing is frequently cited as a key concern in the 
City’s general plan, there are no policies explicitly driv-
ing its construction. Furthermore, the DTPP makes no 
provision to include affordable housing, and there are 
no mechanisms in place to extract revenue for afford-
able housing from profitable ventures in the downtown 
core.  
The city has already seen a significant spike in hous-
ing development since 2011, the year that Redevelop-
ment was dissolved and the DTPP was adopted. With-
in the following two years, 1,172 residential units were 
built, all of them market rate (McKeag 2013). Follow-
ing the dissolution of Redevelopment, Redwood City 
community organizations have pushed the city council 
to pass an inclusionary housing ordinance to harness 
some of the gains of development for the city’s low in-
come population and ensure that 15% of all new units 
are below market rate. The city council has repeatedly 
struck down this ordinance on the basis of the Palm-
er v. City of Los Angeles decision, a court ruling that 
severely undermined the power of California cities to 
mandate affordable housing development for rental 
development. Palmer ruled that inclusionary housing 
mandates violate the 1995 Costa-Hawkins Act, which 
guarantees a landlord’s right to set the initial rental 
rate of proprietary units, thereby disallowing inclusion-
ary zoning in market rate rental developments (it does 
not apply to inclusionary ownership units). Anecdotal-
ly, interviews suggest the city council is generally un-
cooperative on passing affordable housing legislation 
because of fear that any regulation will be harmful to 
economic development goals. Other cities are using 
impact or other fees to work within the new policy land-
scape.
Reviewing the General Plan’s Housing Element, fif-
teen of the twenty-four implementation goals relate to 
affordable housing. Of these programs, inclusionary 
zoning, a commercial linkage fee, or a housing impact 
fee have the greatest potential to bring new affordable 
units to the city alongside market rate development. 
The Redwood City Planning Department was respon-
sible for completing a nexus study on the potential for a 
commercial linkage fee to provide funds for affordable 
housing to the city by 2011 (Housing Element 2009), 
but this study has not been initiated. However, in 2014 
the city agreed to participate in a countywide nexus 
study, which will serve as the basis for a development 
impact fee to be considered. Unfortunately there is no 
guarantee that a fee will be implemented. At public 
meetings, community members have expressed sup-
port for exacting fees on developers (Redwood City 
2015- 2022 Housing Element Update Workshop #1 
2013).
The city is currently in the process of updating its hous-
ing element for 2015-2023, and inclusionary housing 
remains a key debate. 21 Elements, a coalition of 21 
Peninsula governments undertaking a planning align-
ment process, has recently reported on Redwood 
City’s progress towards the housing goals that are 
delineated in its housing element. While the housing 
element sets quantified goals for affordable housing 
development and identifies the parties responsible for 
investigating progressive policy opportunities, few of 
these specific goals have been met. While Redwood 
City prides itself on having met its Regional Housing 
Needs Allocation land allocation, the record of afford-
able housing construction is lacking. In fact, while the 
housing element committed the city to providing subsi-
dies for affordable housing downtown and along major 
corridors, no subsidy was allocated in 2012. Additional 
policies to support low-income housing include, on the 
production side, flexible zoning for “alternative” hous-
ing models, a revision of development standards for 
secondary units, and a program to provide assistance 
to first time homebuyers who may eventually “move 
up” into market rate housing. The city also distributes 
funds to support rehabilitation of some low income 
housing for both renters and owners. These actions 
are important, but they are insufficient in the face of a 
rapidly changing housing market.
One new policy, the framework to which was recent-
ly approved by City Council, is a Community Benefits 
program for Redwood City that would require develop-
ers to contribute towards “specific benefits or ameni-
ties…as part of their future development projects” (City 
of Redwood City 2015). The city has held community 
workshops where, in combination with an online poll, 
residents’ general preferences for community benefits 
were identified, with affordable housing emerging as 
the top priority (Redwood City 2015). Going forward, 
specific guidelines the city intends to update the Plan-
ning Commission and City Council at a hearing, after 
which a project schedule will be created (City of Red-
wood City 2015). Moving forward the City will develop 
a specific plan for implementation of the framework, 
which may include updating development fees and 
requirements, on-site community improvement incen-
tives, and establishment of a community fund.
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Jobs-Housing Mismatch
A lack of mechanisms to promote the construction 
of affordable housing downtown will be particularly 
problematic if Redwood City’s economic development 
strategy succeeds, given the types of jobs that will like-
ly be created. An increase in restaurants, shops, and 
entertainment venues will bring many low-wage jobs. 
Without an adequate housing supply for those who 
will hold these jobs, the New Urbanism principles of 
walkability, diversity, and sustainability that are guiding 
development downtown will be negated as more work-
ers commute by car. Likewise, the carbon emissions 
that are saved by transit-oriented development will be 
offset by any increased traffic on the roadways.
To evaluate the degree to which job creation in down-
town Redwood City will affect demand for affordable 
housing, we projected the number of low-wage work-
ers who will choose to live downtown by 2025. The 
results show that at least 296 new affordable units in 
the downtown alone will need to be constructed to ac-
commodate the low-wage workforce.
Our analysis began with an estimation of job growth in 
Redwood City in the next 10 years, based on employ-
ment forecasts for each city in the region from the As-
sociation of Bay Area Governments (ABAG). In a 2009 
report, ABAG predicted that Redwood City would add 
more than 12,000 jobs between 2010 and 2025. The 
majority of this growth was expected to occur among 
financial services and professional jobs, but all indus-
tries other than agriculture were expected to experi-
ence double-digit growth.
For the purposes of this study, we narrowed the ABAG 
projections to the downtown area. We used the Census 
Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-Household (LEHD) 
data, which contains information about the types of 
jobs found within a specified area, to evaluate the in-
dustry composition downtown. 
As Table 8.4 shows, about 2,754 new jobs are expect-
ed downtown. Not all new employees will live down-
town. Some will choose to stay at their current homes 
and commute to work. To account for place of resi-
dence, the projections were further narrowed so that 
they show the share of the workforce that will opt to 
live near where they work. Three scenarios were cre-
ated for this figure: one based on the current share of 
downtown employees who live downtown (0.4%); an-
other using the current share of Redwood City employ-
ees who live in Redwood City (8.8%); and a third us-
ing a survey of Californians’ living preferences (25%) 
(Nelson 2011). Table 8.5 contains the results. The first 
and second scenarios are clearly too low, and cannot 
account for imminent growth. The third scenario bet-
ter accounts for the preferences of Californians, one-
third of whom said they would pay more to be able 
to walk to where they work, a portion that was even 
higher among low-income earners. To account for 25% 
of new workers opting to live downtown, new units for 
688 workers will be needed.
Table 8.4: Projected Job Growth in Downtown Redwood City from 2010 to 2025 by Industry 
Industry Change in 
Employment from 2010 
to 2025
Share of Redwood City 
Jobs Located Downtown 
in 2011
Projected Jobs 
Downtown by 2025
Agriculture and Natural Resources 0 0.16 0
Manufacturing, Wholesale and 
Transportation
1440 0.16 230
Retail 1250 0.25 307
Financial and Professional Services 4610 0.1 479
Health, Educational and 
Recreational Service
2670 0.31 820
Other Jobs 2460 0.37 919
Total 12430 0.22 2754
Source: ABAG; U.S. Census Bureau
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Table 8.5: Scenarios for New Employees Living in Downtown Redwood City by 2025
Industry Projected Jobs 
Downtown by 2025
Scenario 1 (0.4%) Scenario 2 (8.8%) Scenario 3 (25%)
Agriculture and Natural Resources 0 0 0 0
Manufacturing, Wholesale and 
Transportation
230 1 20 57
Retail 307 1 27 77
Financial and Professional Services 479 2 42 120
Health, Educational and 
Recreational Service
820 3 72 205
Other Jobs 919 4 81 230
Total 2754 11 242 688
Source: ABAG; U.S. Census Bureau
Table 8.6: Projections of Low-Wage Employees Living in Downtown Redwood City by 2025
Industry Employed Living 
Downtown by 2025
in Scenario 1
Employed Living 
Downtown by 2025 
in Scenario 2
Employed Living 
Downtown by 2025 
in Scenario 3
Retail Trade 1 29 77
Educational Services 0 4 12
Arts, Entertainment, and 
Recreation
3 59 166
Accommodation and Food 
Services
0 2 7
Other Services (excluding 
Public Administration)
1 12 33
Total 5 106 296
Source: ABAG; U.S. Census Bureau; California Department of Housing and Community Development; 
California Regional Economies Employment Data
Finally, we used the California Regional Economies 
Employment Data, which contains average annual 
wages in San Mateo County at the detailed industry 
level, to determine which of these anticipated jobs 
would be low wage. The industries were broken down 
into more granular categories and the share of each 
located downtown was again calculated using LEHD 
data. Annual household wage for a family of three was 
imputed by multiplying the average annual wage by the 
numbers of jobs per household (1.5). All jobs paying 
less than 80% of the median household income for a 
family of three in San Mateo County in 2014 ($81,450) 
were designated low income. Forty-four percent of all 
jobs projected downtown will be low-income.
The results, shown in Table 8.6, indicate that affordable 
units to house 296 low-wage workers may be needed 
downtown. This projection makes up about 12% of the 
2,500 units desired as part of the DTPP, which is close 
to the 15% allocation that would have been required 
under redevelopment. It would also account for about 
26% of the city’s Regional Housing Needs Allocation 
(RHNA) of low-income housing for 2014 to 2022.
It is important to note that these figures represent a 
floor of needed affordable units in downtown for sev-
eral reasons. The wages are imputed from San Ma-
teo County averages, which are likely to be skewed 
by high-income earners elsewhere in the county. Sim-
ilarly, because the county cost of living is high, even 
those who earn above “low-income” wages will likely 
struggle to afford housing. Additionally, if economic de-
velopment is successful in Redwood City, more jobs 
may be created than are currently forecast. The city’s 
strategy specifically targets the low-wage retail, arts 
and entertainment, and food industries, which means 
these industries may also experience outsized growth, 
thus boosting demand for affordable housing
In light of these projections, the absence of policies to 
ensure that any affordable units are built in downtown 
Redwood City poses a problem. 
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Conclusion
Should the city succeed in its economic development 
goals, there will be a mismatch between housing 
supply and job growth that goes against the core of 
sustainable development. As our analysis has shown, 
there are no mechanisms in the DTPP to mitigate this 
imbalance. Despite a stated commitment to develop-
ing an affordable city, these sentiments lack substan-
tiation in action. Stronger legal provisions are needed 
to make these commitments enforceable. 
Affordable housing provisions elsewhere in the city are 
not sufficient to protect low-income residents against 
displacement pressures, or to ensure that new low-
wage workers are able to reside close to their place of 
employment. An increasingly unaffordable downtown 
commercial center will not serve the needs of lower 
income community members, and continue to exclude 
these residents from the benefits of economic growth. 
On its current path, Redwood City runs the risk of be-
coming increasingly segregated and inaccessible to 
the workers who will form that foundation of its new 
economy.
While affordable housing is critical, the jobs/housing 
analysis that we present also highlights the need to 
address low wages. In the wealthy Peninsula, weak 
earnings among workers who provide essential ser-
vices occupations challenge their ability to meet basic 
needs. Along with housing policies, city governments 
in the region should consider adopting other policies 
such as living wage or other asset building strategies 
to ensure that all inhabitants share in the region’s 
prosperity.
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An Immigrant Gateway in San Rafael at Risk
Case Study on Gentrification and Displacement Pressures 
in the Canal Neighborhood of San Rafael, CA
Introduction
The Canal neighborhood is a dense, Latin American 
ethnic enclave in San Rafael, CA where most house-
holds are low-income (a quarter of families fall below 
the poverty level) and 71% of residents have only a 
high school degree or less. The area has grown over 
the last 20 years, largely due to immigration: Hispanics 
have increased from 47% of the population in 1990 
to 80% in 2013. But housing stock has not grown as 
quickly, owing to how built out the neighborhood is 
already. This, along with high rents, has resulted in 
significant overcrowding in this majority-renter com-
munity, where most renter households pay more than 
a third of their income on rent. On top of all this, it is 
located in the highly affluent Marin County and is in 
a desirable water-front location. Taken together, these 
aspects of the neighborhood put it at a high risk for 
displacement should gentrification reach into the area 
in future years. Gentrification may well occur here, giv-
en its close proximity to the planned site of the down-
town San Rafael station for the forthcoming SMART 
train, which will connect Marin and Sonoma counties. 
However, community stakeholders interviewed did not 
anticipate such gentrification reaching Canal for some 
time.
In this neighborhood profile, we outline demographic, 
housing, and other data on the Canal neighborhood 
to show its vulnerability to future gentrification and 
displacement. The case study area (the census tracts 
1122.01 and 1122.02) are outlined in dark blue, with 
an area map for perspective.
Historical Context and 
Current Resident Concerns
Originally developed in the 1950s, Canal’s growth 
has been defined by immigration, first from Vietnam 
and later from Latin American countries including El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico (Marin Grassroots 
2014). It was one of the first communities in Marin that 
was receptive to African-American renters in the late 
1970s, primarily due to growth in the Section 8 vouch-
er program. Today, the area stands out in white, afflu-
ent Marin County as a pocket of low-income people of 
color. The Canal is a place where low-income work-
ers can afford to live close to their jobs; 51% of Canal 
residents work within 10 miles of their home (Marin 
Grassroots 2014; U.S. Census Bureau LEHD Ori-
gin-Destination Employment Statistics). Recently, new 
development has included the Al Boro Community 
Center and an expansion of Pickleweed Park. Another 
major development was the opening of a full-service 
grocery store, Mi Pueblo, a major addition to a neigh-
borhood that previously lacked such a store. A new 
County Health & Wellness Campus has also opened 
(Marin Grassroots 2014). 
The Canal area is unique in Marin County. Besides its 
racial and socioeconomic characteristics being quite 
different from the county overall, it is also unusual in 
maintaining a stock of market-rate affordable housing; 
there are many multi-family rental buildings clustered 
together in the neighborhood. Responding to what one 
stakeholder called a “terrible slumlord situation” in Ca-
nal, the City, starting in 1998, stepped up its code 
Tract 1122.01 
Tract 1122.02 
Figure 9.1: Canal Area of San Rafael
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enforcement and encouraged the sale of many build-
ings to non-profit developers. This has brought some 
stability to the neighborhood. While one interviewee 
believes private developers are “more responsible” 
than before, perhaps inspired by non-profit developers’ 
good management practices, others disagree.
A recent community-directed report, “Building Safe 
Communities through Strong Partnerships in the Ca-
nal” asserts that public safety is the chief challenge 
in the neighborhood, with “one out of five residents 
surveyed [saying] they were a direct victim of crime 
including gang violence, armed assault, theft, and do-
mestic violence” (Voces Del Canal et al. 2014). Com-
pounding this perception are other factors, such as the 
mistrust of the police, poor neighborhood conditions, 
and violence. Police are physically present in the com-
munity but, according to the report, not focused on 
residents’ most concerning issues. Poor neighborhood 
conditions include “inadequate street lighting,” “lack of 
signage and safe pedestrian walkways,” and lack of 
“neighborhood cleanliness.” Other concerns included 
poor educational resources and highly limited “family 
economic mobility” (Voces Del Canal et al. 2014).
Overcrowding: A Major 
Concern in Canal
The population in Canal increased by 50% between 
1990 and 2013 (Table 9.1). This growth was accom-
panied by a less dramatic increase in the number of 
households, meaning the average household size in-
creased. The proportion of households that are fam-
ilies, and that are families with children, has also in-
creased since 1990.
This population increase has not been accompanied 
by a commensurate increase in the stock of housing. 
In fact, there appears to have been very little devel-
opment of new units in the past 10 years, according 
to Census data (which shows an increase in only 90 
units between 2000 and 2013) and stakeholders (Ta-
ble 9.2). Vacancies are minimal.
New immigrants, who may lack social capital and 
sufficient income to live elsewhere, turn to this en-
clave, where they may find friends or relatives from 
their home countries, according to one stakeholder. 
Presumably, landlords are aware of the highly limited 
housing stock and the limited resources of residents, 
and so charge rent accordingly; to afford these rents, 
many residents pack into units, resulting in significant 
overcrowding. 
An overcrowded unit is defined as one with more than 
1 person per room (which includes bedrooms and liv-
ing rooms, but not kitchens or bathrooms). Overcrowd-
ing is a significant issue for the Canal Area, particu-
larly in rental units, with 51% of rented units and 14% 
of owner-occupied units experiencing overcrowding 
(Table 9.3).
Table 9.1: Change in Population and 
Households in Canal
Year Total 
Popula-
tion
Total 
House-
holds
Average 
Number 
of 
People 
per 
House-
hold
Percent 
of 
House-
holds 
Families
Percent of 
House-
holds 
Families 
with 
Children
1990 7,972 2,700 2.95 60% 36%
2000 11,679 2,978 3.92 71% 52%
2013 11,884 2,993 3.97 74% 55%
Source: US Census, 1990, 2000; American Community Survey 
2009-2013
Table 9.2: Housing Supply and Vacancies 
in Canal, 1990-2013
Year Housing Units Vacancies
Units % Change Units % Change
1990 2,782 - 102 -
2000 3,053 10% 56 -45%
2013 3,132 2% 139 109%
Source: US Census 1990, 2000; American Community Survey 
2009-2013
Table 9.3: Overcrowding in Canal, 1990-2013
Year Rented Units Owner-
Occupied Units
1990 32% 5%
2000 62 % 12%
2013 51% 14%
Source: US Census 1990, 2000; American Community Survey 
2009-2013.
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Based on interviews with local stakeholders, over-
crowding in this area exacerbates several other com-
munity and quality of life issues. It is not uncommon 
for three or four families to live in one unit, each family 
living in one bedroom, with as many as “eight or more 
persons” in a two-bedroom apartment (Marin Grass-
roots 2014). In addition to health risks, this introduces 
a safety risk for children as there may be unfamiliar 
people invited into their home. In addition, students in 
overcrowded homes have little space to do homework. 
Overcrowding also leads to a parking capacity prob-
lem, since many residents need a car to get to work 
(as detailed below). It has also led to community con-
flicts between Canal residents and nearby higher-in-
come residents who complain when Canal residents 
park on their streets, according to a stakeholder. In-
deed, in the morning, there is major traffic getting out 
of the neighborhood, which is partially related to limit-
ed street access.
Finally, “many of these apartments have environmental 
health issues but, because of many barriers, tenants 
often don’t report these problems” (Marin Grassroots 
2014). In the earlier-discussed community-directed 
report, residents recommended “safer and adequate 
housing, via better code enforcement and public hous-
ing services,” indicating poorly-maintained housing as 
an ongoing concern (Voces Del Canal et al. 2014).
Resident Profile
Over the last 20 years, Canal’s Hispanic population 
has grown dramatically, from nearly 3,800 people 
in 1990 to about 9,400 in 2013; meanwhile, whites, 
blacks, and Asians have decreased their proportion 
(Figure 9.2).
Of the Hispanic residents, most are Guatemalan, Mex-
ican, and, to a smaller extent, Salvadoran (Table 9.4). 
The Canal Area has consistently been an immigrant-re-
ceiving neighborhood, largely due to economic or civil 
strife in their home countries, according to one stake-
holder. The proportions of foreign-born residents and 
residents who speak a language other than English at 
home have increased between 1990 and 2013 (Table 
9.5). The number of recent immigrants remain high in-
dicating that the neighborhood is still functioning as a 
gateway.
Figure 9.2: Population in Canal by Race/Ethnicity 
(1990-2013)
Source: US Census 1990, 2000; American Community Survey 
2009-2013.
Table 9.4: Hispanic: Countries of Origin in 
Canal, 2013
Country of Origin Number of 
People
Percent of 
Hispanic 
Residents
Guatemalan 3,442 37%
Mexican 4,172 44%
Salvadoran 897 10%
All Other Hispanic 894 10%
Source: American Community Survey 2009-2013.
Table 9.5: Canal Hosts a Large Immigrant Presence
Year Foriegn Born 
Count
Percent
Foreign Born
Number 
Immigrated in 
last 10 years
Percent 
Immigrated in 
last 10 years
Percent
Language other 
than English 
spoken at home
Percent
 Limited 
English 
Proficiency
1990 4188 53% 3319 42% 51% 29%
2000 7452 64% 5169 44% 70% 39%
2013 7160 60% 4333 36% 74% 54%
Source: US Census 1990, 2000; American Community Survey 2009-2013
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According to stakeholder interviews, the Asian and 
Pacific Islander population in the 1980s was large-
ly made up of Vietnamese immigrants with refugee 
status after the Vietnam War. Over time however, the 
grown children from these families have largely moved 
away from the area. The current Vietnamese popula-
tion is small and tends to be elderly.
Consistent with this influx of immigration, over the 
past three decades the area has experienced a gen-
eral downward trend in the educational attainment of 
its residents (Figure 9.3). According to the 2009-2013 
American Community Survey, 64% of US-born resi-
dents age 25 and older had only a high school degree 
or less, compared with 78% of foreign-born; therefore, 
the immigration patterns may be at least partially re-
sponsible for this downward trend in educational at-
tainment. 
With lowering educational attainment has come a de-
crease in median household income, which dropped 
sharply in 2009-2013 (Table 9.6).
The distribution of family income in Canal does not 
seem to follow any pattern, as seen in Figure 9.4. 
Over half of families earn less than $35,000, reinforc-
ing the fact that the neighborhood is a low-income one. 
However, 17% of families earn more than $75,000, 
indicating a contingent of wealthier households, too. 
These households appear to be clustered in a large 
single-family development on the far west side of the 
area, which contains mostly single-family homes right 
along the canal.
With such low and declining incomes, it is no surprise 
that many families live in poverty. The percentage of 
families below the poverty level grew: from 20% in 
1990 to 25% in 2013. Figure 9.5 shows the number of 
families in poverty over the same time frame.
Finally, unemployment has increased in Canal and, as 
of 2009-2013, was 12.2%--much higher than in Marin 
County overall (Figure 9.6). According to a stakehold-
er, because many of the residents in the Canal Area 
are undocumented immigrants, economic mobility has 
been a challenge as they try to “stay under the radar.” 
Community members believe that the major driver of 
any change in the local economy or the local housing 
market will be immigration reform.
Figure 9.3: Educational Attainment of Population over 
25, Canal, 1990-2013
Source: US Census 1990, 2000; American Community 
Survey 2013
Table 9.6: Median Household Income, Canal, 
1990-2012, 2013 (2013 constant $)
Year Median Household Income
1990 $  57,469.08
2000 $  54,924.75
2013 $  43,448.50
Source: US Census 1990, 2000; American Community Survey 
2009-2013.
Figure 9.4: Income Distribution of Families, Canal, 2013, in 2013 $
Source: 2009-2013 American Community Survey
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Figure 9.5: Number of Families in Poverty, 1990-2013
Source: US Census 1990, 2000; American Community Survey 
2009-2013.
Figure 9.6: Unemployment, Canal vs. Marin County, 
1990-2013
Source: US Census 1990, 2000; American Community Survey 
2009-2013.
Housing Patterns
The housing stock in the Canal is in “bad shape” and 
owned by “a lot of landlords who are not that scrupu-
lous…part of the reason why it’s affordable is that it’s 
really awful housing stock,” according to a stakeholder 
we interviewed. The area is essentially built out and 
is one of the most densely developed areas in Marin 
County. This makes building more affordable housing 
a challenge. Additionally, another stakeholder com-
mented that the area has been down-zoned: develop-
ers would not be able to build at the same density as 
existing buildings, which limits the appeal of the neigh-
borhood to developers seeking profit. Plus, within San 
Rafael, there are always concerns about traffic impact. 
Together, these features limit developers’ ability to tear 
down buildings and build more densely, making it far 
easier to renovate existing structures.
Marin County is notorious for having exclusionary pol-
icies and practices, including “strict zoning ordinanc-
es; restrictions on high-density, multi-family housing; 
insufficient outreach to non-English speakers; preda-
tory lending practices; and negative stereotypes about 
low-income residents with Section 8 vouchers” (Green 
n.d.). In 2011, these came to a head when the county 
entered into a Voluntary Compliance Agreement with 
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) after it became clear the county was not 
in accordance with fair housing laws, civil rights laws, 
and had not updated its main fair housing document in 
seven years, two more than is allowed (Rachel Dorn-
helm 2011). The county’s people of color are largely 
concentrated in the Canal area and Marin City, which 
was also cited in the HUD agreement.
Most housing units in Canal are rented—over 75%—
meaning residents would be particularly vulnerable to 
displacement if market pressures begin to mount (Ta-
ble 9.7).
Median rent has increased slightly over the past 20 
years, from about $1,200 to nearly $1,350 (Table 9.8). 
However, over this same period, the proportion of rent-
ers who are cost-burdened has risen, reaching 71% in 
2009-2013 (Table 9.9). Residents are considered rent 
or mortgage burdened if their monthly housing costs 
exceed 30% of their gross monthly income. One stake-
holder believes that an influx of residents to Marin 
County paired with a stagnant housing stock is driving 
up rent; since incomes have actually decreased, resi-
dents’ housing cost burdens have increased.
Table 9.7: Tenure in Canal, 1990-2013
Year Total Occupied Units Rented Units Owner-Occupied Units
Number Number Percent Number Percent
1990 2,680 2,128 79% 552 21%
2000 2,997 2,206 74% 791 26%
2013 2,993 2,348 78% 645 22%
Source: US Census 1990, 2000; American Community Survey 2009-2013.
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Table 9.8: Median Rent, Canal, 1990-2013, in 2013 $
Year Median Rent
1990  $         1,215.74
2000  $         1,243.35
2013  $         1,342.00 
Source: US Census 1990, 2000; American Community Survey 
2009-2013.
Table 9.9: Percent of Renters that are Housing 
Cost Burdened, Canal
Year % Cost Burdened 
Renter
% Cost Burdened 
Owner-Occupier
1990 58% 54%
2000 53% 61%
2013 71% 44%
Cost Burdened defined as paying more than 30% of income on 
housing costs. Source: US Census 1990, 2000; American 
Community Survey 2009-2013
Canal experiences higher turnover than the county 
overall, though turnover has decreased over time: In 
2013, 22% of Canal residents had moved in within the 
last three years. In 1990, 79% of Canal residents had 
moved within the last five years, compared with 52% 
in Marin County.
Public and Affordable 
Housing
The Canal neighborhood does not have any public 
housing, but it is host to two senior projects (combined 
35 units) and four additional affordable buildings with 
116 units total, plus 200 housing choice voucher hold-
ers who live in the area (California Housing Partner-
ship Corporation 2015; BRIDGE Housing, n.d.; De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development 2014). 
Several homeless shelters are located in the Canal 
area that serve people from all over the county, ac-
cording to a stakeholder.
 
In the early 2000s, responding to the problems with 
rental housing stock in Canal, the city initiated a re-
development process that, for one developer, result-
ed in two rehabilitations, for a total of 66 units. The 
apartments feature wall-to-wall carpeting at both, gas 
stoves in one building, decks or patios on some units, 
and a swimming pool, courtyard, and community room 
at one site (BRIDGE Housing, n.d.; BRIDGE Housing, 
n.d.). There were only enough funds available at the 
time to renovate these two sites.
Another stakeholder believes that the lack of afford-
able housing units is the biggest issue facing Marin 
County today. However, there is much opposition to 
affordable housing in the county from both the politi-
cal right and left; many people believe that the pres-
ence of low-income residents will drive down their own 
property values.
Home Ownership
Canal has seen more variability in the number of prop-
erty sales each year than Marin County as a whole, 
with spikes in 2004 and 2009 (Figure 9.7). Overall, 
though, very few homes are sold each year in Canal.
Home sale price-per-square-foot in Canal followed the 
trends of the Marin County and the whole Bay Area 
and was lower than both, showing once again its sta-
tus as a relatively affordable neighborhood in Marin 
County (Figure 9.8 and Figure 9.9).
Condo Conversions
In the 1990s, there were a small number of changes 
from rental units to condominiums along the water in 
the Canal Area. A stakeholder made clear that these 
were not condominium conversions; instead, the build-
ings, when developed in the 1970s, had been built as 
condominiums, but were difficult to sell, so they were 
rented until the 1990s when they began selling them 
as condominiums. Another stakeholder believed the 
buildings that experienced this trend were primari-
ly 1-2 story walk-up buildings, as opposed to larger 
apartment buildings. This was small in scale, and one 
stakeholder believes it did not result in much displace-
ment. A representative of the city believed that no true 
condominium conversion had occurred in San Rafael 
in the last 20 years.
Local stakeholders do not envision displacement due 
to condo conversions to be a significant issue any time 
in the near future. This is in part because of the city’s 
strict condominium regulations—conversions are not 
allowed unless the citywide vacancy rate is higher than 
5%, and even then, the city “doesn’t make it easy” to 
convert, according to a stakeholder. A second reason 
this stakeholder does not believe condominium con-
versions, or gentrification more generally, will come 
to Canal anytime soon is the strong reputation of the 
area as overcrowded, for immigrants, and “a place to 
start, but not a place to aspire to.” 
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Figure 9.7: Number of Homes Sold: Canal
Source: Dataquick (2014)
Figure 9.8 Median Sales Price (per square foot) for Multi-Family Residential Properties
Source: Dataquick (2014)
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Figure 9.9 Median Sales Price (per square foot) for Single-Family Residential Properties
Source: Dataquick (2014)
Employment and 
Transportation Patterns
Most employed residents of the Canal neighborhood 
work in Marin County, with nearly 24% working in San 
Rafael (Table 9.10). A majority of residents work within 
10 miles of their home (Table 9.11). Together, these 
data indicate that residents are unlikely to benefit 
much from the SMART train, since it would be unlikely 
to service their place of employment. Additionally, resi-
dents may still need to take buses or go for a long walk 
to get to the train station.
A higher portion of Canal residents take transporta-
tion, bike, or walk to work compared to in San Rafael 
and Marin County (Table 9.12). However, while transit 
within the area—for example, to downtown San Rafa-
el—may be adequate, 76% of residents work outside 
of San Rafael, which requires either multiple bus rides 
or a car.
Table 9.10: Places of Employment for Workers 
Who Live in Canal, 2011
Place of Employment Percent of Workers
San Rafael 24.0%
Elsewhere in Marin County 27.7%
San Francisco 19.9%
Alameda County 8.0%
Contra Costa County 5.4%
San Mateo County 5.0%
Sonoma County 4.0%
Santa Clara County 2.9%
Napa County 0.8%
Solano County 0.8%
All Other Locations 0.8%
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, OnTheMap Application and LEHD 
Origin-Destination Employment Statistics (Beginning of Quarter 
Employment, 2nd Quarter of 2011).
Center for Community Innovation, University of California, Berkeley      Canal Neighborhood Case Study 99
Table 9.11: Distance to Place of Employment for 
Workers Who Live in Canal, 2011
Distance from Home Block to 
Work Block
Percent of Workers
Less than 10 miles 50.8%
10 to 24 miles 33.9%
25 to 50 miles 13.2%
Greater than 50 miles 2.1%
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, OnTheMap Application and LEHD 
Origin-Destination Employment Statistics (Beginning of Quarter 
Employment, 2nd Quarter of 2011).
Table 9.12: Mode of Commute to Work, 1990-2013
Area: Year Percent 
Private 
Auto
Percent 
Public 
Trans-
portation
Percent 
Bike or 
Walk
Canal: 1990 74% 18% 6%
Canal: 2000 65% 23% 9%
Canal: 2013 68% 17% 11%
San Rafael: 2013 84% 10% 5%
Marin County: 2013 79% 12% 7%
Source: US Census 1990, 2000; American Community Survey 
2009-2013. Percent are of workers 16 and older who do not work 
at home; some respondents chose other options, so the figures 
will not add to 100%. 
In terms of getting around more generally, it is hard to 
get around on foot in the Canal neighborhood, given 
its position with water on one side and a highway on 
the other. However, many residents still choose to walk 
instead of taking the bus, given its price of $2.25. The 
city has tried to widen sidewalks and build a bridge 
over the canal in a strategic location to better accom-
modate these walkers, but funding has been difficult 
to secure.
Conclusion
When the SMART train station opens in San Rafael, 
the Canal area will be at risk of gentrification. One 
stakeholder believed that the area could become a 
preferred housing location for employees of Silicon 
Valley, resulting in gentrification and displacement. 
Several others, however, thought change would be 
slow to come to Canal. Even so, Canal’s limited area 
to develop new housing, high renter rate, high levels of 
poverty, low incomes, and lack of affordable housing 
put it potentially at risk for displacement.
The high density of Latino residents is a potential 
strength of the community; organizing is easier than 
in other areas where members of these communities 
are farther spread out, such as Novato. Plus, many are 
from the same countries—and often towns in those 
countries. A report on the Canal that involved com-
munity members, “surfaced untapped agency and ex-
pertise among hundreds of Canal residents who have 
vocalized their desire to be genuinely and actively en-
gaged in changing the conditions of their community” 
(Voces Del Canal et al. 2014). This expertise could be 
leveraged, in partnership with local agencies as the re-
port suggests, to respond to displacement pressures 
in the future.
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Introduction
East Palo Alto (EPA) is located on the San Francisco 
Peninsula in the heart of Silicon Valley. It is a small city 
with a population of about 29,000, bordered by the af-
fluent cities of Palo Alto and Menlo Park. A young city, 
EPA was incorporated in 1983 despite the claims from 
critics that the city could not generate enough revenue 
to sustain itself. Peninsula Interfaith Action (PIA), the 
community partner informing this case study, notes 
that incorporation was intended to ensure that as a 
community of color, EPA would be led by people of 
color (SFO/PIA, 2014). Incorporation prevailed despite 
numerous lawsuits from special interest groups seek-
ing to frustrate the process, and East Palo Altans have 
great pride in their rich history of community activism 
and their struggle to achieve self-determination, as 
highlighted in multiple interviews with longtime resi-
dents. 
EPA has long served as a pocket of affordability for 
low-income households who might otherwise be ex-
cluded from the affluent region. The city has consis-
tently enacted policies in favor of affordable housing, 
as discussed below. Yet residents, advocates and 
even City officials remain concerned with housing af-
fordability and residential displacement. City staff and 
advocates alike emphasized that the economic reces-
sion and foreclosure crisis greatly impacted EPA, and 
as with communities across the nation, many African 
American and Latino homeowners lost their homes, 
stripping them of their wealth. Now, as the Silicon 
Valley job market booms, and with so little affordable 
housing available in the region, housing pressures are 
intensifying for low and middle-income households in 
EPA. The city also faces very specific affordable hous-
ing stressors related to the consolidated ownership 
of much of its multifamily rental housing stock. This 
case study examines the trajectory of demographic 
and housing change within EPA, along with relevant 
policy frameworks and the city’s relationship to hous-
ing in the broader Silicon Valley. This report seeks to 
contextualize and explain susceptibility to residential 
displacement in EPA in the face of these pressures. 
Local Policy Context 
 
Strong protections for renters and support for afford-
able housing are a crucial aspect of the city’s iden-
tity. As one interviewee active in the incorporation 
movement put it, “part of our political history is that we 
became a city and the first ordinance was to freeze 
the rents, [because] in the county there was nothing 
in place [to protect renters].” This rent freeze was im-
posed until the City Council could pass more compre-
hensive legislation. Since the passage of the 1988 Or-
dinance to Stabilize Rents and Establish Good Cause 
Evictions, the Council has gone on to pass a host of 
policies for the construction and preservation of afford-
able housing.
The 1988 ordinance was updated in 2010 to further 
protect tenants from arbitrary evictions and rent hikes. 
The city enacted a Below Market Rate Inclusionary 
Housing Program in 2002, requiring that at least 20% 
of residential units in all new buildings be made avail-
able to households making between 30% and 80% 
of the area median income. This program was under-
mined by legal challenges to inclusionary housing at 
the state level, but the City Council has now unani-
mously endorsed a housing impact fee for new market 
rate developments in order to fund low-income hous-
ing (Dremann, 2014).  A Condominium Conversion Or-
dinance allows the city to deny conversion “upon lack 
of reasonable alternative housing opportunities” and 
to impose an affordable housing mitigation fee to par-
tially offset the loss of affordable housing (City of East 
Palo Alto, 2012). Additionally, the city recently eased 
parking and setback restrictions on secondary dwell-
ing units (City of East Palo Alto, 2014). Finally, in Au-
gust of 2014 the City passed a Tenant Protection Ordi-
nance which provides various protections for tenants 
including the right to organize, protection from discrim-
ination, and relocation support (Kadvany, 2014). Yet 
despite this relatively robust suite of policies, this case 
study shows that East Palo Alto’s residents continue to 
experience housing pressure, some of which is in fact 
out of the City’s control. 
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Demographic Change 
and Susceptibility to 
Displacement
East Palo Alto has experienced major population 
growth and demographic shifts since the 1980s. The 
city sits in southern San Mateo County, and as shown 
in Table 10.1, from 1980 to 2013 East Palo Alto’s pop-
ulation grew by 75% while San Mateo County’s grew 
by 24%. 
Population growth reflects an increase in household 
size along with an increase in the number of house-
holds, although household size appears to have lev-
eled off and actually decreased since 2000. Communi-
ty members have asserted that that decrease in family 
size may not reflect empirical trends, but may be due to 
data collection errors regarding recent immigrants and 
families that may be living together. Average house-
hold size in the city and county are shown in Table 
10.2, with about 4.2 people per household in East Palo 
Alto in 2013, compared to 2.8 in San Mateo County. 
As shown in Figure 10.1, 73% of these households 
were family households in 2013, growing from 60% in 
1980 and peaking in 2000 at 86%.
Table 10.1: Total Population in East Palo Alto (EPA) 
and San Mateo County (SMC), 1980-2013
Year EPA SMC
1980 16,934 587,289
1990 22,090 649,623
2000 27,503 707,161
2009-2013 29,637 729,543
Percent change 
1980-2013
75% 24%
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 
2009-2013 (ACS 2009-2013)
Table 10.2: Average Household Size in East Palo Alto 
and San Mateo County, 1980-2013
Year EPA SMC
1980 2.8 2.58
1990 3.39 2.63
2000 4.2 2.74
2009-2013 4.24 2.8
Source: U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014);
2009-2013 (ACS 2009-2013)
Figure 10.1: Total Households in East Palo Alto, 
1980-2013
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014);
2009-2013 (ACS 2009-2013)
East Palo Alto is also a distinctly “young” city in com-
parison to the County – the median age is 28, com-
pared to a County median age of 39 (Raimi & Associ-
ates, 2014). 
East Palo Alto’s population growth is largely due to an 
influx of Latino residents, who in 2013 accounted for 
60% of the population. Many of these residents are 
immigrants, and 75% of the foreign born population 
were not US citizens in 2013. Several stakeholders 
discussed the ways that undocumented immigration 
status can compound housing vulnerability, an issue 
discussed further below.
The city has also seen a significant decline of its his-
toric African-American community: as shown in Figure 
10.2, African-Americans made up 55% of the city’s 
population in 1980 but just 15% in 2013. This reflects a 
decrease both in the percentage and absolute number 
of African American residents.  Over this 33-year peri-
od the city also saw a decline in White residents, and 
an increase in Asian and Pacific Islander residents.31 
These changes were especially notable from 1980 to 
1990 and then from 1990 to 2000. 
The racial demographics of EPA are notably different 
from San Mateo County, which has a majority White 
and Asian Pacific Islander population, shown in Figure 
10.3 for 2010.
One interviewee, a longtime resident active in city pol-
itics, attributed the out-migration of African Americans 
from EPA in part to the Savings and Loan Crisis of 
the 1980s and the crack-cocaine epidemic, which fu-
eled high rates of violent crime in the city. According 
31 Census data for non-Hispanic American Indian, Asian, Native 
Hawaiian, Pacific Islanders, and Other races is combined for 
1980.
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to PIA, many long-time residents are concerned about 
the loss of African American residents and see rising 
housing costs as a potential cause (SFO/PIA, 2014).2
The city’s dramatic population growth may be attribut-
ed to EPA’s access to job opportunities as well as the 
limited affordable housing opportunities in San Ma-
teo County. Many residents who have moved to EPA 
within the past 5 to 15 years have done so because 
they get a job nearby, often with Stanford University in 
neighboring Palo Alto, which employs a large number 
of janitors and food service workers (SFO/PIA, 2014). 
Residents have also arrived in the city after being dis-
placed from neighboring jurisdictions, or because the 
relatively low cost of homes in EPA provided an op-
portunity for families to purchase homes in the region 
(SFO/PIA, 2014).
32 We use the 2010 Census data here instead of the 2009-2013 
ACS because of the small sample size and resultant uncertainty 
in ACS. 
Figure 10.2: East Palo Alto Race/Ethnicity by 
Percent, 1980 - 201032
Source: U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010 (Geolytics, 2014)
Figure 10.3: San Mateo County Race/Ethnicity 
by Percent, 2010
Source: U.S. Census 2010 (Geolytics, 2014)
The loss of African American population is indicative 
of one type of displacement, although it does not ap-
pear that this displacement was driven by processes 
of gentrification. The city does possess several key 
economic and housing characteristics associated with 
high susceptibility to displacement. For examples, in-
comes in East Palo Alto have long been significantly 
lower than in San Mateo County. As shown in Figure 
10.4, real incomes have actually decreased in EPA 
since 1990.
While housing costs are lower than in San Mateo 
County and nearby cities, EPA households face sig 
nificant housing cost burdens, which in this case study 
is defined as paying 35% or more of income towards 
housing costs. Figure 10.5 shows that mortgage bur-
dens have climbed steadily since 1980, and that while 
rent burdens dipped in 2000 with rising incomes, in 
2009-2013 the vast majority of EPA renter households 
paid 35% or more of their incomes towards their rent.
Figure 10.4: Median Household Income for East Palo 
Alto and San Mateo County, 1980-2009-2013, 
shown in 2010 dollars333
Source: U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 
American Community Survey 2009-2013
Figure 10.5: East Palo Alto % of Housing Units with 
Rent and Mortgage Burdens, 1980– 2009-2013
Source: U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 
American Community Survey 2009-2013
33 Average, rather than median, rents are reported for 1980
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According to the California Employment Development 
Department, the annual income needed in San Mateo 
County to rent a two-bedroom fair market apartment 
is $71,800, a significantly higher figure than EPA’s es-
timated $52,000 average income in 2006-2010 (He-
pler, 2014a). Census data shows that median rent has 
climbed slowly but steadily from 1980 to 2006-2010, 
from about $883 a month in 1980 to $1,654 a month 
in 2009-2013 (in 2013 dollars.) However, more recent 
data collected from Craigslist in 2013 for the San Ma-
teo Countywide Housing Element update shows sig-
nificantly higher average rental prices, particularly for 
apartments with enough bedrooms to accommodate 
families. This is likely in part because occupied rent 
controlled units are not reflected in the Craigslist data.
As Figure 10.6 shows, these rents are still much lower 
than in San Mateo County – East Palo Alto in fact of-
fers some of the most affordable rents anywhere in the 
county. Home sale prices are also considerably lower 
than in San Mateo County, having recovered slower 
than the rest of the county after a very sharp decline 
during the recession, as shown in Figure 10.7.  From 
2012 to quarter 1 of 2014, prices rose by 50% in East 
Palo Alto, compared to 30% in San Mateo County.
Rising housing costs that are comparatively low to the 
surrounding area may indicate susceptibility to - or 
very early stages – of gentrification and potential dis-
placement as housing pressures mount, households 
may increasingly turn to EPA in search of more afford-
able housing options.
One method East Palo Altans use to cope with high 
housing costs burdens is by living with family members 
or renting out rooms in their homes, as indicated by the 
high percentage of overcrowded units. About 23% of 
housing units were overcrowded in 2009-2013.344How-
ever, overcrowding appears to have decreased from 
2000, when about 41% of units were overcrowded, as 
shown in Figure 10.8. The reasons for this decrease 
are unclear, considering that incomes decreased 
while housing cost burdens increased during this time. 
This may be related to underreporting, high vacancies 
during the census, or uncertainty in the ACS data from 
2009-2013. 
34 Overcrowding is defined as having more than one person per 
room.
Figure 10.6: East Palo Alto and San Mateo County 
Average Rents, 2013
Source:sfbay.craigslist.org (County of San Mateo, n.d.-b)
Figure 10.7: East Palo Alto and San Mateo County 
Median Sales Price per Square Foot for Single Family 
Homes, 2005-2014
Source: Dataquick Inc (2014)
Figure 10.8: East Palo Alto Overcrowding by Percent-
age of Housing Units, 2000 and 2009-2013
Source: U.S. Census 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); American Community 
Survey 2009-2013
Center for Community Innovation, University of California, Berkeley East Palo Alto Case Study 105
In addition to doubling or tripling up, the tight hous-
ing market has also led to unpermitted conversion of 
garages into living quarters. In response to potentially 
unsafe living condition, and to community organizing, 
East Palo Alto recently passed an ordinance updating 
regulations for secondary dwelling units, which will be 
discussed in further detail below (City of East Palo Alto 
Office of the City Manager, 2014).
The total number of housing units in East Palo Alto 
has grown since 1980, as shown in Table 10.3.  Va-
cancies were fairly low in 1980 and 1990, and very low 
in 2000, but increased to about 7% in 2009-2013. This 
likely reflects a high number of vacancies in the city’s 
multifamily rental housing stock, much of which was 
in consolidated foreclosure proceeding at the time, 
which is discussed further below. Data from the United 
States Postal Service shows that vacancies in the last 
quarter of 2013 had returned to 2000 levels, at 1.4% 
(United States Postal Service, 2014). This comparison 
implies that the high vacancy rates during the 2009-
35 Table 10.3 uses U.S. Census data downloaded from American 
Factfinder for 2000 and 2010 for rather than from Geolytics, be-
cause the Geolytics data for the number of units showed a ma-
jor decrease in the number of units from 1990 to 2000, which 
appeared implausible in comparison to other data sources. 
Table 10.3: East Palo Alto Housing Units & Vacancies
Year Total Housing 
Units
Vacant 
Units 
Vacancy 
Rate 
1980 6649 300 4.5%
1990 7256 386 5.3%
2000 7441 120 1.6%
2009-2013 8166 572 7.0%
Source: U.S. Census 1980, 1990 (Geolytics, 2014); U.S. Census 
200035,  ACS 2009-2013
Table 10.4: Occupied Housing Units Where 
Householder Moved In Within Past Year
Year # of units Share of total units
1980 2136 34%
1990 1864 27%
2000 1066 16%
2009-2013* 1340 15%
Source: U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000 (Geolytics, 2014); 
American Community Survey 2009-2013
*2009-2013 data is reported as population, not households. This 
is an approximation of households based on 4,340 people who 
moved in the last year divided by the average household size for 
EPA of 3.24
2013 period were an anomaly and that housing avail-
ability is now relatively restricted in a tighter market.
The majority of East Palo Alto residents are renters, 
and housing tenure split has changed very little over 
the past 30 years. From 2009-2013, 61% of house-
holds in EPA rented rather than owning their homes. 
This is nearly the inverse of San Mateo County, where 
nearly 60% of households were owners from 2009-
2013. Examining tenure by race in Figure 10.9 shows 
that as Whites and African Americans have left East 
Palo Alto, the share of renters for these groups has 
decreased. However, as the city has gained Latino 
residents, the growth in Latino renters has outpaced 
the growth in Latino homeowners. 
Finally, there is significant residential mobility in East 
Palo Alto. As shown Table 10.4 shows, about a quar-
ter of households moved into their units approximate-
ly within the last several years according to the most 
recent Census data. This is a notable increase since 
2000, perhaps owing to housing instability related to 
the recession. An increase in recent arrivals could 
indicate processes of gentrification, though in East 
Palo Alto it may rather be reflective of frequent moves 
among low-income households. It is important to note 
that this data does not include information on where 
households moved from, thus some of these house-
holds may have moved within East Palo Alto.
Figure 10.9: East Palo Alto Tenure by Race/Ethnicity, 
1980 – 2010
Source: U.S. Census 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010 (Geolytics, 2014)
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The Westside and the 
Threat of Eviction
The neighborhood known in East Palo Alto as the 
Westside is located in the southwestern part of the city, 
separated from the rest of EPA by Highway 101. The 
Westside is highlighted in Figure 10.10, using census 
tract 6121 as a proxy, which shows that the area con-
tains the majority of the city’s multifamily rental housing 
stock. In the city overall, single family detached homes 
make up over 53% of total units, while apartment 
buildings with 5 or more units comprise about 35% of 
housing units. On the Westside, by comparison, 72% 
of housing units are in apartment buildings with 5 or 
more units. In 2014 this neighborhood was home to 
22% of the population while comprising just 8% of city 
land. Unsurprisingly, it is home to a greater proportion 
of renters than the city overall: 82% of housing units 
are occupied by renters.   
Over half of the city’s rent controlled units are located 
on the Westside, the majority of which are owned by 
a singular landlord, Equity Residential (EQR). Due to 
the unique characteristics of this neighborhood, and 
the housing pressures faced by residents, the city is 
currently drafting an Area Plan for the Westside Area 
along with its General Plan update. A coalition of local 
and regional CBOs, including SFOP/PIA, are work-
ing to ensure that this Area Plan reflects the needs 
of low-income households and includes protections 
against displacement. 
In recent years, housing issues on the Westside have 
required major attention from the city, and led to signif-
icant instability for Westside residents. In 2008, Page 
Mill Properties, the former owner of the multifamily 
housing stock now owned by EQR, was involved in 
approximately eleven lawsuits with the city. Just a year 
after Page Mill Properties began purchasing buildings 
in the Westside in 2006, tenants began complaining 
of harassment and steep rent hikes (Berstein-Wax, 
2010). In 2007 the company evicted 71 people. In 
2008 another 99 people were evicted, an eviction rate 
7.5 times greater than that of the rest of San Mateo 
County (Berstein-Wax, 2009). When Page Mill de-
faulted on its loans and went into foreclosure in 2009, 
Wells Fargo took over the properties. The bank then 
sold the foreclosed portfolio to EQR, the largest pub-
licly traded landlord in the United States, in December 
of 2011. After this acquisition, Equity Residential now 
owns about half of the city’s apartments, two-thirds of 
its rent controlled apartments and 15% of the total low-
rent apartments in the County. 
The sale to EQR occurred despite objections from 
both residents and the city, who were both wary of the 
impacts of such a large percentage of the city’s hous-
ing being owned by a single firm. Suspicion only grew 
as the company issued 706 three-day eviction notic-
es in the first 6 months of managing the apartments 
(LeVine, 2014). Tenant organizers see the excessive 
use of three-day notices as a form of harassment. Ac-
cording to an interview with a local service provider, 
tenants often receive three-day notices on the 2nd of 
the month. This is despite the fact that rental leases 
generally state that late fees will not be charged until 
the 4th or 5th of the month. Many tenants live pay-
check to paycheck, and with previous landlords some 
had become accustomed to paying their rent in the 
middle of the month, on the 10th or the 15th. The tran-
sition to EQR’s aggressive use of 3-day notices is es-
pecially challenging for these tenants.  
After the East Palo Alto Rent Stabilization Board pub-
licized the figures on Equity’s issuance of three-day 
notices, EQR ceased reporting these to the Board, 
asserting that they only need to report unlawful de-
tainers, or actual eviction notices (LeVine, 2014). Fig-
ure 10.11 shows monthly unlawful detainers issued in 
East Palo Alto in 2012 and 2013, showing that the ma-
jority of unlawful detainers are issued by EQR. Figure 10.10: The Westside and Residential Unit 
Density in East Palo Alto
Source: Association of Bay Area Governments Parcel Shapefile 
(ABAG, 2014)
Center for Community Innovation, University of California, Berkeley East Palo Alto Case Study 107
Figure 10.11: Unlawful Detainers Issued in East Palo 
Alto in 2012 and 2013
Source: East Palo Alto Rent Stabilization Board (City of East Palo 
Alto Rent Stabilization Board, 2014)
Figure 10.12: Official Evictions Reported by the 
San Mateo County Sheriff
Source: San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office 
(San Mateo County Sherriff’s Office, 2014)
It is unclear however, how many of the eviction no-
tices issued actually led to households leaving their 
apartments, and available sources of data are limited 
in this regard. Official evictions in EPA as recorded by 
the San Mateo County Sheriff’s office, shown in Fig-
ure 10.12, only reflect instances in which the sheriff 
was called in to evict a tenant. This data does not re-
flect households that many have chosen to leave after 
receiving a notice, either because they simply could 
not pay their rent or because they were intimidated 
and/or unaware of their rights as tenants. Because of 
such discrepancies, these numbers also do not reflect 
the high number of households evicted by Page Mill 
during their ownership, and zero evictions are shown 
from 2010-2012, despite the fact that Rent Stabiliza-
tion Board data indicates that EQR issued 166 notices 
of unlawful detainer in 2012.
Direct evictions are also not the only pressure that 
residents of EQR apartments experience. The city 
was notified in 2013 that Equity was illegally painting 
curbs red in an effort to reduce parking around their 
buildings (Green, 2013a). Limited parking is already 
a significant problem, as many residents rely on their 
cars to get to work, and households often house sev-
eral working residents. The city is not well served by 
public transit and most residents work outside of EPA. 
While the city put a stop to the curb painting, residents 
have also complained that family members using their 
paid parking spots have had their vehicles towed, and 
in some cases that even cars with permits have been 
towed. Advocates see this manipulation of parking 
supply, a precious commodity in EPA, as another form 
of harassment. 
SFOP/PIA expressed concern over “soft evictions” a 
term used to describe tenants that leave due to this 
type of harassment, whether related to parking, ag-
gressive use of eviction notices, or other issues such 
as lack of maintenance. In response, the City Coun-
cil unanimously passed a new tenant protection or-
dinance April 1, 2014 to protect tenants from ha-
rassment and to further restrict demolitions (LeVine, 
2014). Additionally, the ordinance provides relocation 
benefits for displaced tenants and protection for un-
documented tenants by prohibiting landlords from re-
quiring proof of citizenship. 
Precarious housing for low-income households inter-
sects with race, language and immigration status to 
compound vulnerability. The protections that EPA has 
put in place for undocumented immigrants are not in 
place for residents of neighboring cities, and this is 
yet another reason that renters fear that losing hous-
ing in EPA could mean displacement from the region. 
Furthermore, many low-income renters in EPA, and 
especially on the Westside, are monolingual Spanish 
speakers. 3-day notices are written entirely in English, 
while eviction notices are written primarily in English 
and contain complex legal language, making these 
documents potentially very confusing to residents. A 
legal service provider who works with tenants facing 
eviction in EPA stated that he suspected, though there 
is no concrete evidence for this, that undocumented 
residents are less likely to seek legal aid if they do face 
eviction. Issues of race and institutional racism are 
also at play. This stakeholder also shared an anecdote 
that he felt was indicative of the ways in which Latino 
residents are expected to put up with living conditions 
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that White residents might not: “We had a client that 
was Latino, a man who had lived in Equity apartments 
for a while, and he kept complaining about a problem, 
he kept complaining and it wasn’t getting fixed. And at 
one point, someone in the office at Equity said some-
thing like, ‘You complain as much as the White people. 
You need to stop complaining, because you’re getting 
annoying, you’re just as bad as the White people.’”
Secondary Dwelling Units
As mentioned above, secondary dwelling units (SDUs) 
are a major concern in East Palo Alto. These living 
units are generally converted from garages, base-
ments or sometimes exist as “granny units” separate 
from single-family homes. Both residents and city staff 
have grown increasingly concerned about SDUs due 
to their potential to strain the already limited parking 
supply, and to contribute to unregulated and potential-
ly hazardous living conditions. 
In response to these concerns, and to organizing from 
EPA residents, the City passed an ordinance in May 
2014 easing restrictions on SDUs. This policy change 
adjusted parking requirements to allow tandem park-
ing, and reduced required setbacks for homes with 
SDUs (City of East Palo Alto, 2014). It stopped short 
however, of reducing the required minimum lot size 
for these homes, which advocates had been pushing 
for. The hope, according to City staff and community 
organizers, is that this new ordinance will lead to saf-
er living conditions in SDUs, and also potentially help 
homeowners meet their housing costs through income 
from renters. It is unclear however, whether SDUs will 
have any measurable impact on housing affordability. 
Most SDUs will not be rent controlled if they are add-
ed to single-family homes, although rent control may 
apply if they are added to duplexes or small multi-unit 
buildings (Lagos, 2014). Those landlords who do up-
grade their SDUs to bring them up to code may raise 
rents to cover the costs, while those SDUs that are 
not brought up to code are likely to continue to ex-
ist unregulated. Residents organizing with SFOP/PIA 
continue to push for affordable financing options for 
homeowners that currently lack the means to upgrade 
their units. 
A City Strapped for Cash 
In the face of housing challenges for residents, East 
Palo Alto also faces a budget deficit, and economic 
development is a high priority in the city. In a conversa-
tion with a city official, major commercial development 
projects, including the construction of a Four Seasons 
Hotel and an IKEA, were cited as two major redevel-
opment victories. These developments, completed in 
2003 and 2006 respectively, are not without contro-
versy. The construction of the Four Seasons Hotel re-
quired the demolition of “Whiskey Gulch,” a neighbor-
hood in EPA that had previously housed many liquor 
stores and bars, as well as a number of dilapidated 
residential units, with high crime rates. According to 
SFOP/PIA, members of their organization have com-
plained that hotel security at the Four Seasons has 
asked them to leave the café and other public seating 
area, driving home the sense that the hotel is meant 
for outsider use and not for residents. 
City staff, along with a Council member, recognized in 
interviews that these commercial developments were 
necessary to keep the City financially solvent, but that 
being forced to move was still challenging for those 
residents that were displaced. These residents were 
provided with relocation benefits, and staff stated that 
households were generally able to move to improved 
living conditions in nearby cities like Redwood City and 
San Carlos. While Whiskey Gulch may not have been 
a safe neighborhood, it was also the closest thing that 
the city had to a central downtown area. The city hopes 
to address this issue through the implementation of 
the Ravenswood Specific Plan adopted in 2013. This 
transit oriented development strategy is aimed at re-
developing the Ravenswood District, East Palo Alto’s 
Priority Development Area under Plan Bay Area. The 
plan envisions a new walkable “downtown,” along with 
835 new housing units, including 131 affordable units 
(City of East Palo Alto, 2013). The development of this 
plan included major input from residents through a 
community coalition.
Yet East Palo Alto has been operating at a budget defi-
cit for a number of years as a result of the decrease 
in the City’s property tax revenue due in part to the 
foreclosure crisis. The city has slashed budgets and 
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laid-off a number of government workers in an attempt 
to lower the deficit. Most recently the city considered 
outsourcing its police services in an effort to save 
money. Before incorporation, EPA relied on the Sher-
iff’s County police force. The proposal was short-lived, 
however, as residents and advocates voiced their con-
cerns at a City Council hearing. One of the reasons 
the City incorporated was in response to mistreatment 
from the County government and so residents could 
have a voice in their own affairs (Eslinger, 2014). An 
additional challenge for EPA has been the loss of the 
City’s redevelopment agency in 2012 due to state ac-
tion, which was a key source of funding for the city’s 
affordable housing. 
The city’s deficit is clearly a challenge to affordable 
housing goals. Without funding, it is unclear when the 
Ravenswood plan will be put into action, and a lack 
of money – particularly coupled with the loss of rede-
velopment funds – also stymie attempts to build new 
affordable housing. One local affordable developer 
discussed plans to build below market rate housing for 
seniors, and had assembled the land for the develop-
ment over several years. Yet the City does not yet have 
local funds to commit to the project, which then makes 
it more challenging to secure outside funds (County 
of San Mateo, 2014). Cutbacks at the city could also 
mean a reduced capacity for the city to address tenant 
harassment and other housing issues. 
The Jobs-Housing 
Mismatch
East Palo Alto has used nearly all the policy tools at 
the City’s disposal to preserve and encourage the con-
struction of affordable housing. Yet the city is also sig-
nificantly impacted by housing availability – or the lack 
thereof – outside its borders. As the nation has slowly 
recovered from the recession, the Silicon Valley region 
has continued to produce jobs, but not the housing 
needed to house its workers. And these workers are 
not all highly paid, but include the low wage service 
sector workers that support the region’s famed tech 
industry. 67% of new jobs added from 2008-2018 are 
projected to be in sectors paying $45,000 or less an-
nually, and 47% are projected to pay $25,000 or less. 
(Nguyen & Stivers, 2012)
Jobs-housing unit ratios offer one way to quantify the 
discrepancy between employment and available hous-
ing. One analysis, which did not include East Palo Alto, 
found that neighboring cities such as Menlo Park and 
Palo Alto have among the highest job-housing unit 
ratios in Silicon Valley, at 1.96 and 3.13 respectively 
(Hepler, 2014b). Other research, from the UC Davis 
Center for Regional Change, specifically explores the 
ratio of low wage jobs compared to the availability of 
affordable rental units. In 2011, East Palo Alto had a 
ratio of .98, meaning it had more affordable housing 
units than low wage jobs. Yet was the only incorpo-
rated city in San Mateo County with a ratio below 3.5. 
The majority of other cities in the county had ratios of 
5 or above, indicating that they employed many more 
low wage workers than could affordably rent housing 
within their city limits (Brenner, 2012).
This issue can also be examined through looking at the 
ratio of jobs to employed residents in a given location 
– here a ratio around 1 would be considered balanced. 
As shown in Figure 10.13 this ratio is lower than 1 in 
EPA, but greater than 1 in both Santa Clara and San 
Mateo Counties, and much higher in Palo Alto and 
Menlo Park. With the exception of Menlo Park (where 
the ratio is still very high,) this ratio has been growing 
since 1990, as the region has added jobs more quickly 
than housing for its workers.
Despite this imbalance, which puts pressure on exist-
ing housing supply, many jurisdictions remain resistant 
to building new housing, and particularly to providing 
their fair share of affordable housing. In one particu-
larly stark example of this opposition, after Palo Alto’s 
City Council unanimously approved a new develop-
ment of low-income senior housing and market-rate 
single-family homes in 2013, opponents gathered 
enough signatures to bring the proposed development 
to a vote, where it was subsequently rejected (Green, 
2013b).
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Figure 10.13: Ratio of Jobs to Employed Residents in 
Select Cities and Counties
Source: National Establishment Time Series and US Census.
EPA’s ability to deal with the consequences of other ju-
risdictions’ actions presents a major challenge. Face-
book’s over 1 million square foot Menlo Park expansion 
serves as another example of this tension.  In 2012 the 
City considered suing Facebook over its proposed ex-
pansion and the concomitant environmental impacts 
on neighboring EPA. According to an interview with a 
City staffer, EPA disagreed with Facebook consultants’ 
analysis that the project would have minimal impact. 
EPA argued that Facebook workers would likely put 
additional housing pressure on EPA, considering the 
relative scarcity and high prices of housing in Menlo 
Park, and that the expansion would have significant 
traffic impacts. EPA settled with Facebook. These ne-
gotiations are reminiscent of a recent settlement be-
tween Stanford University and various cities related 
to a hospital expansion project. While Palo Alto and 
Menlo Park received $142 million and $3.9 million re-
spectively in total compensation to mitigate traffic im-
pacts from Stanford, East Palo Alto received a mere 
$200,000 in its settlement with Facebook (Eslinger, 
2011).
While the City of EPA was in negotiations with Face-
book, civil rights law firms Public Advocates Inc. and 
the Public Interest Law Project, took a different ap-
proach, and sued Menlo Park on behalf of Youth Unit-
ed for Community Action (YUCA), Peninsula Interfaith 
Action (PIA), and Urban Habitat (Public Advocates, 
2012). Menlo Park had failed to adopt a housing ele-
ment in over 20 years, and from 1999-2007, the city did 
not grant any building permits for lower income hous-
ing (Ciria-Cruz, 2012). Menlo Park settled the lawsuit 
and agreed to adopt a Housing Element, including a 
commitment to facilitate construction of 2,000 homes 
accessible to very low-, low-, and moderate- income 
households (Ciria-Cruz, 2012). Its first Housing Ele-
ment in decades was adopted in May 2013. Shortly 
after, Palo Alto updated their Housing Element in an 
effort to avoid legal repercussions.
San Mateo County has now taken a forward looking 
approach to the housing crisis, and all 21 jurisdic-
tions within the County have now joined forces for a 
County-Wide Housing Element Update known as 21 
Elements. (County of San Mateo, n.d.-a) One crucial 
aspect of this project is that most participating jurisdic-
tions are also engaging in a Countywide “Grand Nexus” 
study to look at legally defensible impact fees for new 
commercial and residential development that could be 
used to fund affordable housing. This approach will not 
be a cure-all for the housing problems faced by East 
Palo Alto, or for the serious undersupply of housing in 
Silicon Valley overall. For one, the housing sites iden-
tified in Housing Elements are not considered legally 
binding agreements to build the units, and Cities will 
also not be obligated to adopt impact fees based on 
the Grand Nexus study. Furthermore, while EPA is lo-
cated within San Mateo County, it borders Santa Clara 
County and will continue to be impacted by Silicon Val-
ley as a whole. However, the collaborative countywide 
approach of 21 Elements represents an important shift 
towards addressing housing on a more regional scale. 
Conclusion
East Palo Alto is distinctive for its government’s com-
mitment to ensuring the city remains affordable to low 
income households, and for a strong legacy of com-
munity organizing that holds the City government 
accountable to that commitment. While demographic 
data on its own shows few signs of gentrification re-
lated displacement, the experience of residents, activ-
ists, and city staff on the ground, along with the analy-
sis of jobs-housing ratios within the region, shows that 
housing pressure are mounting and pose a serious 
threat to EPA’s affordability. The city is home to many 
low-income households already burdened by their 
housing costs, and vulnerability is compounded for 
undocumented immigrants. With much of EPA’s rent-
al housing owned by a single landlord, tenants face 
aggressive eviction actions, along with other forms of 
harassment. Because so little affordable housing is 
available in surrounding cities, the stakes are high for 
households that leave. Numerous interviewees high-
lighted that households that cannot afford EPA may be 
forced to leave the region altogether, and are relocat-
ing as far as Tracy, Manteca, and the Central Valley.  
Yet there is also great potential for the rich activism 
that led to the city’s founding in 1983 to be a force 
in better, equitable regional planning. A coalition of 
CBOs including SFOP/PIA, YUCA, Community Legal 
Services and Urban Habitat are already deeply en-
gaged in ensuring that the Westside Area Plan offers 
protections for the low-income renters living there. The 
next challenge may be to expand and channel this ac-
tivism towards shaping the regional context that has 
such great impact on EPA.
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Historic African-American Enclave at Risk
Case Study on Gentrification and Displacement Pressures in Marin City, CA
Introduction
Marin City, located north of San Francisco in Marin 
County, is a small, historically African American sub-
urban community. In the following neighborhood pro-
file, we describe the major demographic, housing, and 
commercial changes that have taken place in Marin 
City since 1980. In that time, the area’s population 
has nearly doubled, educational attainment and medi-
an income have risen, and the non-African-American 
population has grown significantly.
Figure 11.1: Case Study Area (Census Tract 1290) in 
green, with vicinity map
The area is host to some of the only public housing 
units in Marin County, and there are concerns in the 
community of losing them. While the area has been 
stable in its housing stock overall, it has experienced 
significant commercial displacement: a popular weekly 
flea market was discontinued in 1996 when a large 
shopping center was developed.
For Marin City, signs of gentrification appear, but 
change has been gradual; the chief concern in this 
community is future displacement due to potential in-
creases in population, interest in redevelopment and 
the continued pressures of being surrounded by afflu-
ent neighbors in one of the most exclusive counties in 
the country.
Geography
Marin City is a small neighborhood north of the San 
Francisco Bay, nestled between the cities of Sausali-
to to the south and Mill Valley to the north, Highway 
101 to the east and the hills of Marin County to the 
west. The entire area is quite small—it is only 1.2 
miles across and can be walked in approximately 15 
minutes. It hosts some high-rise public housing, town-
houses, single-family homes, and a shopping center, 
all with a suburban feel, and views of the Bay.
Marin City is located in Marin County, one of the rich-
est counties in the United States, and is close to San 
Francisco. It is one of the few areas of poverty in Marin 
County, owing largely to its large stock of public and 
subsidized housing. Though the community is unin-
corporated, it does have a Community Services Dis-
trict that “provides public parks and recreation, street 
lighting, and refuse collection services to Marin City 
residents,” as well as leadership on planning- and edu-
cation-related issues (Marin City Community Services 
District 2014).
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Historical Context: 
Waves of Housing and 
Demographic Change
The area now containing Marin City was “originally a 
grassy, crescent-shaped small valley…pastoral farm-
land dotted with oak trees…and a few ridge-top hous-
es. But when the United States entered World War II, 
Marin City was developed to shelter approximately 
6,000 of 20,000 shipyard workers” who worked in Sau-
salito at the Marinship Corporation (Marin Grassroots 
2014). To work on the ships, workers were recruited 
from all over; “many were African-Americans from the 
Midwest and the South. Marinship became known as 
the best-integrated shipyard on the West Coast, with 
women and minorities making up a third of the work-
force” (Marin Grassroots 2014).
One stakeholder described Marin City in the years af-
ter the war (through the 1980s) as “one big house,” or 
“a family”: “There’s only one way into Marin City. You 
saw people regularly and you always had connectiv-
ity.” This tight-knit feeling, especially within the Afri-
can-American community who had come mostly from 
the South, according to the stakeholder, was chal-
lenged by two waves of displacement. The first, in the 
1960s, came when the temporary housing built during 
World War II was torn down. While White families were 
able to relocate nearby in Marin County communities, 
African-Americans were kept from these same hous-
ing options due to restrictive, exclusionary covenants. 
Many eventually relocated back to Marin City, and still 
today the area is one of only a few in Marin County that 
hosts a sizable number of African-American residents.
Around this same time, “pole” houses were built in the 
hills of Marin City and were purchased by mainly Af-
rican-American families. Two large rental complexes 
also opened in the 1960s and were occupied mostly 
by African American families. These homes ensured 
stability in the African-American population through 
the 1980s, when a second wave of displacement 
came. As the people who had bought the pole houses 
in the 1960s aged or passed away, their next-of-kin 
found it difficult to afford purchasing the homes, which 
had increased in value significantly, according to Marin 
Grassroots. As a result, new families bought these 
homes, and these families tended to be White. Addi-
tionally, lower-income and African-American residents 
who became adults in the 1980s, and were readying 
to move out of their family homes found few available 
units in Marin City, and so moved to other places in the 
Bay Area like San Rafael, Novato, and the East Bay, 
according to Marin Grassroots.
In 2005, one of the rental complexes that had opened 
in the 1960s (Oak Knolls) was released from a HUD 
contract that subsidized rents, and the tenants in the 
building became owners, creating a cooperative, ac-
cording to Marin Grassroots. As with the earlier trend 
with “pole” houses in the 1980s, the offspring of resi-
dents who had lived in these units since their opening 
decided to sell them instead of occupying them them-
selves, leading to racial turnover.
Changes in Residents’ 
Education, Economic 
Well-Being, and Racial 
Breakdown
Marin City has had a near-doubling in population and, 
correspondingly, number of households. However, 
there has been minimal change in household size and 
type; average household size is 2.35 and almost 60% 
of households are families. 
Education
Marin City has seen a general upward trend in the 
years of education completed by its residents (Figure 
11.2). The fact that so many residents have moved 
in over the same time period—and that most have 
been white (see below), a generally higher-educated 
group—suggests that most of this trend in educational 
attainment is due to new people moving in, not existing 
residents attaining higher levels of education.
Table 11.1: Change in Population and Households36
Year Total 
Population
Total 
Households
1980 1,366 600
1990 1,636 783
2000 2,502 1098
2013 2,320 988
Source: US Census, 1980, 1990, 2000; American Community 
Survey, 2009-2013
36 Marin Grassroots expressed doubt that the 2013 household 
figure was accurate given their knowledge of the area; given 
the small sample size of the American Community Survey, it’s 
possible that the decline in population and households is due to 
sampling error.
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Figure 11.2: Educational Attainment of Population 
over 25, 1980-2013
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000; American Community 
Survey 2009-2013
Income
Median income increased by nearly 20% between 
1980 and 2000, only to decrease even more dramat-
ically in 2013, which is likely an effect of the reces-
sion (Figure 11.3). From this data, gentrification—in 
the most basic sense of higher-income people moving 
into a traditionally lower-income area—seems to have 
been proceeding gradually since 1980, though it ap-
pears to have slowed in recent years given the recent 
decreases in median income. Incomes in Marin City 
are much lower than Marin County overall.
Even with these changes in median income, the tract 
is still host to many low-income households; nearly a 
quarter of them earn less than $10,000 (Figure 11.4).
Figure 11.3: Median Income, Marin City vs. Marin County, 1980-2013, 2013 $
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000; American Community Survey 2009-2013. Note: Median income not available in 1980; 
average income shown.
Figure 11.4: Income Distribution, by Households, Marin City – 2013, in 2013 $
Source: 2009-2013 American Community Survey
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Table 11.2: Percent of Residents in Poverty, 
1980-2013
Year Percent in Poverty
1980 29%
1990 26%
2000 23%
2013 35%
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000; American Community
Poverty
The percentage of residents living below the poverty 
level has decreased, and probably would have contin-
ued doing so into 2013 if not for the recession (Table 
11.2). Again, given the population increase, this data 
is consistent with gradual gentrification.
Unemployment
The unemployment rate in the area fell sharply from 
1980 to 2000, only to increase in 2013, likely as a re-
sult of the recession (Figure 11.5).37 The city has had 
consistently higher unemployment rates than Marin 
County.
Race/Ethnicity
Marin City’s population—and, especially, Afri-
can-American population—grew in the build up to and 
during World War II (Marin Grassroots 2014). While 
many White families were able to move to other neigh-
borhoods after the war, African-American residents 
remained, holding a solid majority in the area for many 
years; in 1980, 75% of the population was African 
American (Figure 11.6). 
Figure 11.6 also shows the large population growth 
Marin City has experienced in the last 30 years; be-
tween 1980 and 2013, population nearly doubled, 
largely driven by the many Whites, Latinos, and 
Asians who moved in. However, between 2000 and 
2013, many Whites left, and only Asians and Latinos 
increased their numbers; the number of African-Amer-
icans, however was stable. Together, these changes 
have meant that African Americans’ relative share of 
the population has decreased.
37 Local agencies have been using the figure 12.4%. The differ-
ence is likely due to different data sources or years of measure-
ment.
Figure 11.5: Unemployment, Marin City vs. Marin 
County, 1980-2013
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000; American Community 
Survey 2009-2013.Survey 2009-2013.
Figure 11.6: Population by Race/Ethnicity 
(1980 – 2013)382
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000; American Community 
Survey 2009-2013.
Changes in Housing 
Patterns
Slightly more than half of occupied units in Marin City 
are (and have been consistently) located in building 
complexes that contain 5 or more units; a third are 
in buildings with 2-4 units, and the rest single-family 
homes. Marin City’s housing stock grew steadily be-
tween 1980 and 2000. At the same time, the rate of 
new housing construction slowed: in 1980, 42% of the 
housing stock had been recently built (within the previ-
ous 10 years); by 2013, just 8.5% of the housing stock 
had been built since 2000.
38 Note: 2000 was the first year in which survey respondents 
could select multiple racial/ethnicity categories. The jump in the 
Asian category in this year may represent residents who select-
ed multiple categories rather than, for example, White Alone or 
Black Alone in years previous.
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The halt of growth in the housing supply is likely also 
related to the lack of developable land. Because Marin 
County protects large areas of land for conservation 
(see Figure 11.7), which restrict the city’s growth out-
wards, the only open land available for development 
tends to be expensive-to-build sites, such as those 
with steep terrain. Given the opportunity, however, it 
is likely that developers would want to build expensive 
housing here, for both demand and supply reasons: 
there is potential demand for high-priced homes given 
Marin City’s good location and views of the Bay, while 
on the supply side, land is scarce and often hilly, mak-
ing construction more expensive.
Other pressures have halted development, too. Ac-
cording to one stakeholder, a proposed market rate 
residential development in Marin City during the last 
decade drew out much concern and opposition from 
some residents. This particular project was aban-
doned at least in part due to opposition from local 
high-income residents who wanted to protect their 
views. Now, the stakeholder says, few developers are 
looking to develop in the area. This is consistent with 
construction patterns: no new units have been con-
structed since 1998 (Dataquick 2014).
Adding to these development pressures, Marin Coun-
ty is notorious for having exclusionary policies and 
Figure 11.7: Conservation Areas Restrict Marin 
City’s Development
The shaded areas are parks or conservation areas where devel-
opment is not allowed. Marin City is outlined with a dark line.
practices, including “strict zoning ordinances; restric-
tions on high-density, multi-family housing; insufficient 
outreach to non-English speakers; predatory lending 
practices; and negative stereotypes about low-in-
come residents with Section 8 vouchers” (Green n.d.). 
In 2011, these came to a head when the county en-
tered into a Voluntary Compliance Agreement with the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) after “a routine audit showed the county wasn’t 
following fair housing and civil rights laws,” including 
not updating its main fair housing document “since 
1994,” when it is “supposed to get refreshed every five 
years”  (Rachel Dornhelm 2011). People of color in 
Marin County are largely concentrated in the Canal 
area of San Rafael and Marin City, which were both 
cited in the HUD agreement. 
Many Renters, Few Homeowners
Renters hold the vast majority in the area, at 78% 
in 2013 and historically hovering around 75% (Ta-
ble 11.3). This is much higher than Marin County as 
a whole, where, in 2013, renters represented 37% of 
households. 
The income distributions of renters and owners shows 
that renters skew towards lower incomes, while home-
owners skew higher. This is consistent with the fact 
that over half the rental stock in Marin City is subsi-
dized, as discussed below. However, the story is com-
plex: 25% of renters earn more than $50,000 (See Fig-
ure 11.8), while among owners, almost 40% earn less 
than $50,000 (See Figure 11.9).
Note that the renter and owner data sets should not 
be compared directly; the renter and owner estimates 
for most income categories are not statistically signifi-
cantly different, owing to the large margins of error. 
However, it is possible to see a trend in income distri-
bution within each group from this data, and while that 
trend is roughly in line with the community narrative, 
the nuance is important.
Table 11.3: Tenure in Marin City, 1980-2013
Year Rented Owner-Occupied Total
Number Percent Number Percent
1980 492 73% 178 27% 670
1990 592 72% 230 28% 822
2000 846 76% 274 24% 1120
2013 769 78% 219 22% 988
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000; American Community 
Survey, 2009-2013
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Public Housing
As noted above, a large portion of the area’s rental 
housing stock consists of public housing units oper-
ated by the Marin Housing Authority. Golden Gate 
Village holds 292 units and housed 698 residents in 
2010—nearly a third of the city’s population (Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development 2014a). 
Marin City is also home to three additional subsidized 
housing projects. Combined with Golden Gate Village, 
Marin City has a total of 604 subsidized units—over 
half its rental stock—that house approximately 1277 
residents (54% of the total population).391
Table 11.4: Public and Subsidized Housing 
in Marin City
Units Residents
Public Housing 292 698
Housing Choice 
Vouchers
123 256
Multi-Family Other 54 99
Source: Department of Housing and Urban Development ( 2014a)
39 Note that this figure is higher than the total of the figures in 
Table 11.4, since the number of residents housed at the Ridge-
way Apartments and Doreatha Mitchell Apartments were not 
publicly available. The number of residents in these buildings 
were estimated based on the total number of subsidized units, 
a 94% occupancy rate, and a conservative estimate of 2 people 
per unit average. Data Source: HUD. 
Stakeholders have many fears about losing this pub-
lic housing stock. These are based on several factors. 
First, the public housing has unfriendly policies that 
have been systematically displacing long-term resi-
dents. For example, “eviction notices are given to res-
idents who don’t pay their rent by the third of every 
month, when most recipients of social security haven’t 
received their payments yet” (Marin Grassroots 2014). 
Another example concerns resident evictions, a prob-
lem that came to a head in a 2012 class action lawsuit 
in which tenants alleged “some tenants at the Golden 
Gate Village [public housing]…had their rent [attached 
with] charges such as maintenance, utility, late, and 
legal fees which were often disputed by the tenants or 
not permitted by their public housing lease,” including 
the costs of repairs that “were not caused by the resi-
dent” (Mark Prado 2012).
A third policy sought to encourage student school at-
tendance by evicting tenants “if their children failed to 
attend school” (Nels Johnson 2013). The policy was 
proposed in 2013 but canceled in favor of a “voluntary 
program” to boost student enrollment (Nels Johnson 
2013).
Maintenance is another major concern: at a May 2009 
meeting of the Marin Housing Authority Board of Com-
missioners, one supervisor was “drowned out by jeers 
from about 25 Marin City residents, who said they be-
lieved supervisors had neglected repairs at the Gold-
en Gate Village public housing complex as part of a 
Figure 11.8: Proportion of Renter and Owner Households By Income
Source: 2009-2013 American Community Survey
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hidden plan to replace it with more expensive housing” 
(Rob Rogers and Jim Staats 2009). At that time, resi-
dents felt the housing authority had seriously neglect-
ed to make repairs, and the authority acknowledged 
that the complex needs “more than $4 million in imme-
diate repair and over $15 million in other needs over 
time” (Rob Rogers and Jim Staats 2009). 
In the early 2000s Golden Gate Village had been 
falling steadily in its maintenance inspection ratings, 
which are a rating from 0-100. A score below 60 is 
failing. Scores at the complex fell from 70.03 in 2003 
to 59.35 in 2005 to 51.8 in 2006. However, after this it 
ticked back up to 58 in 2009 and 61 2010 (Department 
of Housing and Urban Development 2014b). Some re-
pairs are happening: $905,000 was allocated in 2012 
for “kitchen improvements” and “energy efficiency 
measures” as part of the Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act (Department of Housing and Urban Development 
2011). However, residents’ complaints indicate that a 
much larger scope of repairs is necessary. On a re-
cent visit to the complex, trash was littered around the 
buildings and the driveways were in disrepair.
A resident of the complex and a long-time community 
organizer in the neighborhood described an inherent 
flaw in the building’s design: it sits on a hill on the other 
side of which is the Pacific Ocean. When the fog rolls 
in each morning, it tends to linger on the hill; mildew is 
therefore to be expected from such an arrangement, 
and the resident reports that it is widespread. Besides 
its role in these bad conditions, the placement of the 
building on the hill also adds to residents’ worries that 
it will be demolished in favor of private development, 
since the hill provides nice views of the Bay, and there 
is so little land to develop in Marin City.
Housing Cost Burden
Median rent rose sharply during the 1980s and 1990s, 
from $445 to $1200 by 2000. Though it has held sta-
ble during the last decade, the percentage of rent-bur-
dened households (those whose monthly housing 
costs exceed 35% of their gross monthly income) has 
risen to 64% in 2013 from 27% in 2000 (Figure 11.9). 
Given the stability in rent levels over this time, the rise 
in the number of households who are rent-burdened 
is likely due to the decrease in median income (to 
$34,457 in 2013 from $50,676 in 2000) and increase 
in unemployment (to 18% in 2013 from 4% in 2000). 
This is concerning in terms of displacement pressures 
on low-income renter households.
Figure 11.9: Percent of Renters that are Housing Cost 
Burdened
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000; American Community 
Survey 2009-2013
Note: Cost Burdened defined as paying more than 35% of income 
on housing costs. 
Table 11.5: Number of Housing Units Owned and Rent-
ed by Whites, African-Americans
Year White 
Owned
Black 
Owned
White 
Rented
Black 
Rented
1980 53 93 115 276
1990 143 74 227 317
2000 135 103 336 287
2013 91 107 317 310
Source: US Census 1980, 1990, 2000; American Community 
Survey 2009-2013.
Home Ownership
In the 1970s and 1980s, many single-family homes 
were developed in the hills of Marin City. Referred to 
as pole houses, they traditionally were owned by “old-
er black families” (Marin Grassroots 2014). However, 
in recent years, the homes have turned over—sold 
to higher-income, white families, according to Marin 
Grassroots. Consistent with this change, the number 
of homes owned by African-Americans decreased be-
tween 1980 and 1990; however, it increased again in 
2000 and is currently about the same as it was in 1980 
(Table 11.5).
For low-income renters, purchasing a home has moved 
further out of reach: home sale price per-square-foot 
has followed the trends of the larger Marin County 
area, gradually increasing, with a slight dip from the 
recent housing crash (Figure 11.10). However, since 
this zip code encompasses Sausalito and Muir Beach, 
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limited conclusions can be drawn about housing sale 
prices in Marin City alone. Interviews with local stake-
holders, however, suggest that single-family units in 
this area do sell at high prices. Concurrent with these 
price increases, the percentage of mortgage-bur-
dened households has risen steadily.
The number of homes sold has held steady in Marin 
City, except for a spike in the late 1990s, when a swath 
of townhomes came on the market (Figure 11.11, 
11.12). A current resident remarked that ownership of 
these homes has been stable since their construction, 
with minimal turnover. These figures are not inconsis-
tent with the trends in Marin County overall.
Figure 11.10: Median home sales price per square foot, 1989-2014
Source: Dataquick (2014)
Figure 11.11: Number of Homes Sold: Marin City
Source: Dataquick (2014)
f
Figure 11.12: Townhomes in Marin City
A late 1990s development of townhomes along Terrace Drive in the middle of Marin city. Photo: Mitchell Crispell.
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One stakeholder in the area indicated that ownership 
units in Marin tend to be largely out of reach for low-in-
come and even middle-income families, and, due to 
the high cost of home ownership here, the children of 
low-income families who have worked their way up the 
economic ladder tend to move to other cities in the Bay 
Area in order to buy a home.
Despite a lack of affordable homeownership options in 
Marin City, the community is wary of developing mid-
ranged housing options due to concerns about dis-
placing or marginalizing existing low-income residents. 
This is a current topic of concern for the community. 
Several residents interviewed outside their homes—
one in the hills and others in the center of the city, 
including one who has lived in her home since it was 
built in the late 1990s—remarked that the population 
has been stable in recent years, particularly in terms 
of the owners of townhomes and single-family homes 
on the hill. 
Commercial Changes
Even though it is a small, suburban community, Marin 
City is host to a large commercial center. The changes 
at this site are examples of commercial and cultural 
displacement.
In the 1950s, “residents developed a small-business 
hub in the neighborhood with black-owned stores and 
black service providers” (Marin Grassroots 2014). In 
1980, residents “organized the Marin City Community 
Development Corporation, purchasing in the process 
the last remaining 42 acres of undeveloped Marin City 
property—the ‘bowl’—where a windswept flea market 
took place every weekend for over a decade” (Marin 
Grassroots 2014). But, following growth in the city’s 
housing supply, in 1996 the Gateway Shopping Center 
was developed on the site of the flea market, displac-
ing it despite community protest (Marin Grassroots 
2014).
The change meant a loss in the “entrepreneurship op-
portunities” the flea market provided to local residents, 
and though “some locally-owned small businesses 
received reduced rent in the new shopping center for 
approximately five years,” when it switched to market 
rent they were unable to afford to stay (Marin Grass-
roots 2014). The shopping center has struggled to re-
tain tenants, according to a local resident stakeholder. 
Several stores have come and gone, including a Best 
Buy, and many of the stores are vacant; on a recent 
weekday, most of the shopping center’s vast parking 
lot was empty, though the Starbucks in the middle was 
crowded.
Figure 11.13: The Gateway Shopping Center
The site of the former flea market, on the left side, is now the Gateway Shopping Center, a sea of parking spaces, empty big box stores, 
and a few successful businesses—Outback Steakhouse, CVS, Ross, Starbucks, etc. In the middle-right, the high-rise Golden Gate Village 
public housing buildings are visible, nestled into the hills. Just to the left, out of the frame, is Highway 101 and the bay. 
Photo: Mitchell Crispell.
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The flea market had earned about $1 million per year 
for the Marin City Community Services District (CSD), 
“which supported many after-school and recreational 
programs for local families” (Marin Grassroots 2014). 
Although a community benefits agreement with the 
new shopping center also included a small contribu-
tion (as a percent of revenue) towards the CSD, the 
shopping center has not made money and so, as a re-
sult of the redevelopment, the community lost both its 
flea market and the revenue it earned (Marin Grass-
roots 2014).
As a local community organization writes, “the shop-
ping center was approved as a promising development 
that would create hundreds of jobs for residents, but 
the reality was very different as the limited number of 
jobs created were low-wage ones or demanded high-
er education degrees” (Marin Grassroots 2014). One 
public employee stakeholder remarked that, in an ide-
al world, the community would take ownership of the 
local shopping center such that it can develop better 
opportunities to serve the local residents—something 
along the lines of the former flea market.
Conclusion
Over the last 30 years, Marin City has experienced 
gradual change: population has grown, the proportion 
of African-Americans has decreased, and median in-
come and educational attainment have increased. Yet 
even with these changes, other aspects of the com-
munity—like homeownership—have remained more 
stable. Therefore, current concerns regarding dis-
placement do not appear to be as high of a priority 
compared to other community issues, largely because 
of the unusually large core of public and subsidized 
housing that provide stable homes for many of the 
community’s low-income families. 
But there is a constant fear that these public housing 
units will be lost, given the area’s high land value and 
views of the Bay, as well as recent unfriendly policies 
and deferred maintenance. Residents’ experience with 
the loss of the flea market—which, unlike the current 
shopping center, was successful and provided local 
residents economic opportunity—has primed them for 
the experience of displacement.
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Appendix A. Ground-Truthing Observation Tool
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Appendix B. 
Ground-truthing Results
Chinatown Ground-truthing Results
On December 11, 2014, one researcher from the 
Center for Community Innovation (CCI), along with 
one staff member of CCDC surveyed one block, Block 
3002 in Tract 108 of Chinatown North. On January 15, 
2015, the CCI researcher went back to survey two ad-
ditional blocks, Block 2003 in Tract 113 of Chinatown 
Core and Block 2001 in Tract 110 of Polk Gulch. 
The ground-truthing exercise is meant to provide an 
additional set of data to verify conclusions reached 
through analyzing assessor and Census data40. For 
two variables—land use and number of units—com-
parisons are made on a parcel-by-parcel basis; only 
parcels that appear in both the assessor data set and 
the geographic parcel dataset (Boundary Solutions) 
are used for this comparison. Census data is not pro-
vided on a parcel level, and so includes all households 
surveyed by the Census.
Table B1: Parcel Mismatch Among Datasets
Block and Tract # Parcels in Assessor But 
Not Ground-truth
Block 3002
Tract 108
4 / 47
Block 2001
Tract 110
2 / 49
Block 2003
Tract 113
12 / 66
Table B2: Parcel Characteristics 
Block Median 
Year of 
Construc-
tion
Median 
Year of 
Last Sale
Median Sale 
Price
Median 
Sale 
Price Per 
Square 
Foot
3002 1921 2004 $702,500 $341
2001 1910 2005 $900,000 $441
2003 1963 2004 $665,000 $711
Source: Dataquick, 2014. These figures refer to all parcels in the 
area, including non-residential uses.
Table B3: Sales History of Parcels Sold Since 2007 and 2010
Block Percent Sold 
2007-2014
Percent Sold 
2010-2014
Median sales price 
per square foot if sold 
2007 or later
Median sales price 
per square foot if sold 
2010 or later
3002 31 22 $762,500 $762,500
2001 40 20 $1,325,000 $1,244,000
2003 42 33 $1,074,500 $1,050,000
Source: Dataquick, 2014. These figures refer to all parcels in the area, including non-residential uses.
Table B4: Summary of Parcel Matches and Primary Land Use
Block Primary Land 
Use, based on 
Ground-
truthing data
Percent Land 
Use Matched
Total Number of Units on Block Percent of Parcels 
whose Number of 
Units match 
between 
Assessor Data and 
Visual Observation
Assessor Data – 
Dataquick
Visual 
Observations on 
Ground-
truthing
Census Data: 
Total Housing 
Units – 2010
3002 Multi-family and 
condos
92% 218 211 231 81%
2001 Multi-family mixed 
use and condos
70% 167 163 176 42%
2003 Condos and mixed 
use
93% 150 227 238 89%
Note: Percent Land Use Matched and Percent Units Matched take as their denominator only those parcels for which a land use or num-
ber of units was indicated by both assessor data and ground-truth data
40 Complicating this effort is that the data sets do not have the same set of parcels (Table 1). All data reported from the assessor data 
(Dataquick) includes all parcels in that set; likewise, all data reported from the ground-truthing data collection includes all parcels in 
that set (which is based on parcels from Boundary Solutions).
Center for Community Innovation, University of California, Berkeley  Appendix 133
The Mission Ground-Truthing Results
On November 14, 2014, a researcher with the Center 
for Community Innovation, an organizer at the commu-
nity group PODER, and a consultant with deep knowl-
edge of the area walked through four blocks in the Mis-
sion District, stopping to take notes at each building. 
The blocks that were observed were: Block 3003 in 
Tract 228.01, Block 2000 in Tract 208, Block 1007 in 
Tract 228.03, Block 1004 in Tract 228.03 (Figure B1).
Unmatched Parcels
The ground-truthing exercise is meant to provide an 
additional set of data to verify conclusions reached 
through analyzing assessor and Census data. All data 
reported from the assessor data (Dataquick) includes 
all parcels in that set; likewise, all data reported from 
the ground-truthing data collection includes all parcels 
in that set (which is based on parcels from Boundary 
Solutions geographic dataset). 
Most of the mismatch is not significant enough to skew 
results; however, three areas of discrepancy are sig-
nificant. On Block 3003, 15 of the parcels in the as-
sessor data did not appear in the geographic data set. 
On Block 2000, 29 of the 55 parcels in the assessor 
data did not appear in the geographic data set. Finally, 
on Block 1007, almost all of the parcels from the geo-
graphic data set did not appear in the assessor data. 
This is primarily the result of the Dataquick data miss-
ing over 40 parcels for the building at 3000 23rd St. In 
place of those parcels, it had only one, with many units, 
with a listed use as an apartment building. Likewise for 
the building at 2652 Harrison St; while the building has 
20 parcels/units—condominiums—according to the 
geographic ground-truthing data, it appears with only 
one on the Dataquick data. This is almost definitely a 
glitch in the data or possibly a condo-conversion pro-
cess that happened after 2013. 
Overall Impressions from Ground-Truthing
The uses on the blocks vary: former industrial sites 
share the block with new condominium developments; 
unmaintained townhomes sit next to beautiful, recent-
ly-renovated townhomes; expensive cafes and gro-
cery stores have popped up next to long-open diners. 
Besides these signs of transition, an overt sign of gen-
trification—and community opposition to it—is a sign 
reading “Evictions” pasted below a “STOP” sign, so 
that the message was “STOP Evictions.”
All four blocks are mostly residential, with a mix of 
single-family homes, multi-family rental buildings, 
and condominium buildings, which are usually newer. 
There are a few non-residential uses on each block, 
including some light industry, stores, offices, and one 
church. The structures are mostly older, though there 
are some very new buildings. The neighborhood is di-
Figure B1: Map of Mission District, with census tracts, 
and four Ground-Truthing blocks in green.
Table B5: Parcel Mismatch Among Datasets
Block and 
Census Tract
# assessor 
parcels matched 
to ground-truth 
parcels, of total 
assessor 
parcels
# ground-truth 
parcels matched 
to assessor 
parcels, of total 
ground-truth 
parcels
Block 3003
Tract 228.01
65 / 81 66 / 70
Block 2000
Tract 208
26 / 55 28 / 31
Block 1007
Tract 228.03
12 / 16 12 / 87
Block 1004
Tract 228.03
37 / 41 39 / 39
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verse in terms of socioeconomic status (judging by a 
range of businesses) and race (judging by the signs 
posted in a laundromat and observing pedestrians).
Most homes are classic San Francisco Victorian town-
houses, while there are about a dozen newly mod-
ernized or constructed homes that, for the most part, 
are condominiums as indicated by their parcel num-
bers. There were several instances of buildings that 
had clearly formerly been part of one parcel with one 
owner, but had been split up in recent years to house 
multiple families. We could tell this because a building 
that was once one continuous structure is now host to 
several different parcel numbers. 
Some businesses, due to a low level of maintenance, 
seem oriented towards residents with lower incomes. 
For example, a corner café and legal services office 
fit this description; the latter had signs offering immi-
gration assistance. Other businesses, like a pet store 
and upscale grocery market, are housed in newly-con-
structed buildings or have new, recently-developed in-
teriors. 
After passing one restaurant, the PODER staff mem-
ber remarked that it had been there forever, but was 
now serving both long-time and new residents; busi-
nesses are not used exclusively by either old or new 
residents. This point was made clear when the re-
searcher entered a Laundromat (on 18th Street be-
tween Capp and Van Ness, part of Block 2000 in Cen-
sus Tract 208). On the bulletin board, about 10 flyers 
were posted (see Figure 2). Several seemed oriented 
towards Spanish-speaking residents, such as flyers 
advertising a concert, a dance club, computer ser-
vices, video and photography services, and a room 
for rent. Other signs, in English, advertised Capoiera 
(a Brazilian form of martial arts) classes, a concert, a 
counseling center, and an exhibit on Modernism at the 
deYoung museum. From these flyers alone, it is clear 
this is a mixed neighborhood.
Block-by-Block Analysis
Tables B6 and B7 provide a summary of relevant sec-
ondary data for each block, the case study area, and 
San Francisco overall.
For two variables—land use and number of units—
comparisons are made on a parcel-by-parcel basis; 
only parcels that appear in both data sets are used 
for this comparison (Table B8). For each block, the to-
tal number of units based on three different data sets 
vary widely, as do the listed number of units for each 
parcel. Land uses, on the other hand, match fairly well 
on each block.
Figure B2: Bulletin board inside a Laundromat on 18th 
and Capp Streets
Table B6: Sales History and Assessed Value of Residential Parcels
Block Median Year of 
Construction
Median Year of 
Last Sale
Percent Sold 
2010-2014
Median Sale 
Price
Median Sale 
Price Per 
Square Foot
Assessed Value 
Per Square 
Foot (2013)
3003 1985 2005 29% $578,500 $491 $465
2000 1903 1999 19% $697,500 $256 $205
1007 1933 2004 23% $925,000 $216 $161
100441 1904.5 2007.5 42% $785,000 $366 $221
Mission 1912 2004 20% $585,000 $314 $235
SF 1932 2003 21% $520,000 $337 $277
Source: Dataquick, 2014. These figures refer to all parcels in the area, including non-residential uses.
41 Assessed value would likely be higher if the assessor data included new condominium buildings on the block.
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Table B7: Indicators of Neighborhood Change: Census Data/Demographics
Percentage Change From 2000 - 2010
Block Population Number 
Whites
Number 
Asians
Number His-
panics
Average 
Household 
Size
Number 
of Family 
Households
Number of 
Renter 
Housing 
Units
3003 -5% 14% -22% -11% -13% -12% 72%
2000 -7% -9% -12% -25% -19% -12% 383%
1007 81% 111% 1 to 8 
residents
-28% -46% 7% 3700%
1004 -11% 19% 21% -30% -15% -26% 683%
Mission -5% 16% 7% -21% Not 
available
40% -6%
SF 4% -2% 12% 11% -2% 4% 4%
Source: Decennial Census 2000 and 2010, accessed through NHGIS.
Table B8: Summary of Parcel Matches and Primary Land Use
Block Primary Land 
Use, based on 
Groundtruthing 
data
Percent 
Land Use 
Matched
Total Number of Units on Block Percent of 
Parcels whose 
Number of 
Units match 
between 
Assessor Data 
and Visual 
Observation
Assessor Data 
– 
Dataquick
Visual Obser-
vations on 
Ground-
truthing
Census Data: 
Total Housing 
Units – 2010
3003 Residential: 50% 
condo, 21% 
multi-family
87% 81 134 121 44%
2000 Residential: 42% 
multi-family, rest 
condo and sin-
gle-family
96% 100 85 121 38%
1007 Residential: 
condo, multi-family
71% (denom-
inator is 7)
32 96 78 38% 
(denominator 
is 12)
1004 Residential: 45% 
multi-family, 38% 
condo
86% 106 106 111 32%
Note: Percent Land Use Matched and Percent Units Matched take as their denominator only those parcels for which a land 
use or number of units was indicated by both assessor data and ground-truth data.
Block 3003
This block is changing rapidly, with a very recent me-
dian year of last sale (2005), high percentage sold in 
the last five years (29%), and a median sale price per 
square foot ($491) that is much higher than in the Mis-
sion and San Francisco overall. The buildings on this 
block are very new, with a median year of construc-
tion of 1985, compared to 1912 in the Mission and 
1932 in San Francisco. Between 2000 and 2010, the 
population on this block decreased by 5%; the chang-
es on this block therefore likely have occurred since 
2010, which is consistent with 29% of parcels selling 
between 2010-2014. The demographics of the block 
have changed, though not dramatically: between 2000 
and 2010, there were 14% more whites, 22% fewer 
Asians, and 11% fewer Hispanic residents. 
This block was chosen due to a decrease in the His-
panic population between 2000 and 2010 and a rel-
atively high change in ownership over the last few 
years. It is also located in the northeast quadrant of the 
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Mission and so adds geographic diversity to the blocks 
selected. On the corner of Van Ness and 19th Street, 
there is a small glass manufacturer, evidence of the 
neighborhood’s historic industrial character. Besides 
this industrial building and a small legal services office 
that offered immigration services, the other structures 
are all housing, with a few more multi-family build-
ings than the other blocks surveyed. There was a sign 
about sidewalk repairs on the street. 
The block has several signs of recent investment. 67% 
of the parcels on the block appear “new” or “above av-
erage,” with 21% of all parcels appearing new. Oth-
er signs of investment include: 9 parcels with for-sale 
signs and 57% of parcels had new or maintained paint. 
However, there are also signs of disinvestment, with 
19% of parcels having peeling or fading paint. In ad-
dition, there were some signs of perceived unsafety: 
37% of parcels had metal security doors, 11% had se-
curity alarm signage, and 20% had signs saying “Be-
ware of Dog” or “No Trespassing.”
Overall, the two data sets paint a consistent picture 
of the block: recent investment, new construction, and 
significant turnover. The new construction on the block 
is in line with the high percent of parcels that appear 
“new” visually; the high percent sold in the last five 
years, is in line with the 9 for-sale signs observed. The 
high sale price per square foot aligns with the many 
signs of investment and almost no signs of disorder or 
disinvestment. 
However, the secondary data misses several things, 
mainly the continued perception that the area is not 
safe, evidenced by visual signs like metal security 
doors and cameras. On the other hand, these could 
just be standard for new construction. The secondary 
data also misses the significant public investment on 
the block.
86% of the land uses for parcels identified by the 
ground-truthing exercise matched assessor data42.  
42 Note: Five parcels are listed as “Store/Office Combo” and one 
is listed as “Miscellaneous Commercial” in the assessor data. 
Based on the ground-truthing, buildings containing these first-
floor non-residential uses were identified. However, the specific 
parcel these non-residential uses occupy was impossible to tell 
through the ground-truthing. The 86% matched figure counts 
these parcels as “matched,” since ground-truthing did identify 
a parcel among several within a structure as having a non-resi-
dential use. The percent matching for the other three blocks is 
derived through similar modifications to the ground-truthing 
data.
There was no distinct pattern to the parcels that did 
not match. However, the majority of them did not match 
because the assessor data did not list a use or (for four 
parcels), or no use was listed from the ground-truthing 
exercise; for example, because the building was be-
hind another one and difficult to see. The primary type 
of residential unit on the block is condominiums, with 
50% of parcels. Next was multi-family rental units, with 
21% of parcels, and single-family residences with 13% 
of parcels.
Finally, the assessor data underestimated the total 
number of units on the block significantly—81 com-
pared to 134 based on ground-truthing. Most buildings 
have 4 or fewer units, with two larger condominium 
buildings (16 units and 10 units), according to obser-
vations. The parcel data only matched with observed 
data 30% of the time; almost always, when the parcels’ 
number of units did not match, the assessor data list-
ed fewer units than the ground-truthing revealed. For 
example, a 10-unit building was listed as having only 
1 unit and several 4-unit buildings were listed as only 
2 or 3 units, etc.
Block 2000
This block appears to have experienced the least in-
vestment of the four blocks visited; it has the lowest 
median assessed value per square foot ($205), low-
est percent sold in 2010-2014 (19%), oldest median 
year of last sale (1999), and oldest median year of 
construction (1903), with some of these figures even 
lower than in San Francisco overall. However, between 
2000 and 2010, it experienced a 383% increase in the 
number of rental housing units and a decrease in the 
Hispanic population (25%) around the same level as 
the other blocks.
Like the others, this block was mostly residential. How-
ever, it is also host to a casual Salvadoran restaurant 
and the aforementioned laundromat, a small burger 
fast food restaurant with a parking lot, a corner café, 
and a Korean church. 
The majority of Block 2000’s parcels appeared “aver-
age” or “below average” in their level of maintenance. 
The block had relatively high levels of investment, with 
no litter or debris, little spray paint or graffiti, and few 
signs of disorder. In fact, there were 3 signs discour-
aging disorder on the block. There were, however, 
some signs of disinvestment, with 25% of parcels hav-
ing peeling or fading paint. There were multiple signs 
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of perceived unsafety on the block, including: 47% of 
parcels had a metal security door, 28% of parcels had 
a fence intended for safety, and 25% of parcels had 
security alarm signage.
The two datasets matched in part for this block. In par-
ticular, the lower assessed value, less turnover, and 
less recent construction are consistent with a majority 
of parcels visually “appearing average” or “below av-
erage.” While there are signs of investment from the 
ground-truthing data, they are more the absence of 
disinvestment than the presence of investment, and 
therefore the data are consistent with the assessor 
data. The block does show ones sign of disinvestment: 
25% of parcels had peeling or fading paint. Also, per-
ception of safety appears low, which is not revealed by 
the assessor data.
84% of the land uses for parcels identified by 
ground-truthing matched assessor data, and where 
they did not match, it was usually because there was 
no data on the parcel in the assessor data. Of the 
parcels, 42% are multi-family rental buildings and the 
rest are evenly split between condominiums and sin-
gle-family homes, plus the few stores and the church. 
Most buildings host only one unit, but two buildings 
were larger, with 11 and 12 units respectively, based 
on ground-truthing data. Only 34% of the parcels had 
matching unit numbers in the assessor data.
Block 1007
This block has had many recent sales, with a median 
year of sale of 2004, but not a particularly high medi-
an price per square foot ($216, relative to $314 in the 
Mission overall and $277 in San Francisco overall), in-
dicating turnover, but not necessarily investment; this 
block may be on the cusp of gentrification. The par-
cel-level analysis here is based on only small subset 
of the actual parcels on this block, given error in the 
Dataquick set, so it is difficult to make definitive con-
clusions about it.
Between 2000 and 2010, the block’s overall popu-
lation increased by 81% and its white population in-
creased by 111%—the highest of the four blocks, the 
Mission, and San Francisco. It also lost 28% of its His-
panic residents and experienced the largest decrease 
in average household size (46%), going from 3.26 to 
1.77. This block experienced significant demographic 
change, while residential sales prices were not as ex-
pensive as on other blocks. 
This block was chosen due to a relatively high change 
in ownership over the last few years, according to 
parcel data, demographic change between 2000 and 
2010, and its proximity to Parque Niños Unidos, dis-
cussed below.
Running through the middle of the block is an emp-
ty space where an old train line used to run through 
the neighborhood. In that space, there was trash and 
several trucks parked. On one corner, 23rd and Treat, 
sits a warehouse for a “lighting and grip” company; on 
another corner, 22nd and Harrison, is an abandoned 
industrial warehouse. In front of the former was a food 
truck and several young, Latino men sitting on the cor-
ner hanging out.
The rest of the block was mostly single-family hous-
es on tree-lined streets. Two new condo buildings and 
one apartment building that appeared to be a redevel-
oped warehouse are on the block, too.
Across Treat Avenue from this block is the Parque 
Niños Unidos, a park that PODER fought to get built 
several years ago. The park is nice and well-used. It 
is possible that some of the new development on this 
block is related to the park’s construction.
On Block 1007, the new condominium buildings—
with their large number of parcels—put the percent 
of parcels that appeared “new” at 89%. There were, 
however, signs of perceived unsafety: 28% of parcels 
have fencing for safety purposes, 62% of parcels have 
security alarm signage, 86% of parcels have security 
cameras, and 3 signs discouraging disorder.
It is impossible to legitimately compare the assessor 
data to the ground-truthing data given the huge dis-
crepancy in parcels. However, Census data can be 
compared. It showed a huge increase in rental units, 
but that was not at all evident from the ground-truthing. 
In terms of safety, most parcels had security alarm sig-
nage and cameras because of the condominium build-
ings having these; however, this does not mean that 
residents are concerned about safety, it may just be a 
standard feature of a new condominium building.
V
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The block is primarily residential, although it has sev-
eral buildings that house light industry, retail, or offices 
in addition to its many condominiums and multi-fam-
ily rental housing, plus single-family homes, too. The 
block has 74 parcels that do not appear in the asses-
sor data. These parcels are in three buildings that ap-
pear to be condominiums and brand new. Most build-
ings have fewer than 10 units but three buildings—new 
condominium developments—have 10, 20, and 44, re-
spectively, based on ground-truthing data.
Block 1004
Of the four blocks, this one had the most turnover in 
parcels between 2010-2014, with 42% sold, more than 
twice the figure in the Mission District overall, and the 
most recent median year of last sale, 2007.5. These 
sales also had a median price per square foot, at 
$366, slightly higher than the Mission, at $314. Howev-
er, there does not appear to be much new construction 
on the block, given the median year of construction 
is 1904.5. As with Block 3003, these changes have 
likely happened since 2010, because the population 
decreased by 11% between 2000 and 2010. However, 
over the same period, the block experienced a growth 
in the number of rental housing units. Between 2000 
and 2010, this block experienced the largest decrease 
in the number of Hispanic residents, losing 30%.
This block was chosen due to a relatively high change 
in ownership over the last few years, as well as that it 
was a place where PODER organized against evic-
tions in the early 2000s. This block featured a funky 
little café at the corner of 23rd and Van Ness and a 
brand new pet store. It also had several new structures. 
On Block 1004, the appearance of buildings was a 
spectrum: 35% “new,” 23% “above average,” 28% “av-
erage,” and 10% “below average.” Signs of investment 
include: only 5 parcels had dirty windows, and 23% 
of parcels had new or maintained paint. Nevertheless, 
25% of parcels had peeling or fading paint, 23% of 
parcels had metal security doors and there was graffiti 
on a public sign.
The picture painted by both sets of data for this block 
is that it is right in the middle of changing. Structures’ 
appearance fell across the spectrum, and while many 
parcels have sold recently, the median price per 
square foot was not much higher than in the Mission 
overall, and new construction has been minimal. Each 
data set presents an ambiguous picture, so it is diffi-
cult to compare them.
Broadly, the secondary data sets and ground-truth-
ing data paint similar pictures of change on these 
four blocks. Where the assessor data is ambiguous 
or reveals a mix of forces, as with Block 1004, so 
does the ground-truthing data. On one block (3003), 
the data sets align in terms of the broad story, but the 
ground-truthing takes the narrative deeper and reveals 
continued concerns about safety and significant public 
investment.
Block 1007 provides a cautionary example. On this 
block, the assessor dataset was missing a large num-
ber of parcels, most of them in two new condominium 
buildings. Without ground-truthing the block, we would 
have missed the major impact these buildings have 
on the feel of the street, and their implications for gen-
trification in the area. The block is a good example of 
a place in transition: running through its center there 
is still a relic of the area’s former industrial character, 
there is a warehouse and some older, poorly-main-
tained buildings, and yet at the same time, there are 
several nicer homes, two new condominium buildings, 
and a new, well-used park across the street.
In terms of comparing data sets, unmatched parcels 
was a concern for three of four blocks and the num-
ber of units recorded per parcel usually did not match. 
This could be related to the high incidence of condo-
miniums, and the rapid change in the area. On the 
other hand, land uses consistently matched between 
ground-truthing and assessor data.
San Jose Ground-Truthing Results
On December 13, 2014, a researcher from the Center 
for Community Innovation surveyed three blocks in the 
area: 2015, 2020, and 2021. On January 8, 2015, a 
different researcher from the Center surveyed block 
1007, accompanied by a representative from the San 
Jose Department of Housing and a consultant with 
knowledge of the area.
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Figure B3: Map of Case Study Area and 
Ground-Truthed Blocks
Blocks are highlighted in green on the case study map (right) and 
outlined in black on the zoomed-in map; both feature Diridon 
Station with a red star.
The ground-truthing exercise is meant to provide an 
additional set of data to verify conclusions reached 
through analyzing assessor and Census data. All data 
reported from the assessor data (Dataquick) includes 
all parcels in that set; likewise, all data reported from 
the ground-truthing data collection includes all parcels 
in that set (which is based on parcels from Boundary 
Solutions). For two variables—land use and number of 
units—comparisons are made on a parcel-by-parcel 
basis; only parcels that appear in both data sets are 
used for this comparison. Census data is not provided 
on a parcel level, and so includes all households sur-
veyed by the Census.
On Block 1007, most of the 31 parcels from the as-
sessor data that does not appear in the ground-truth 
data is due to one condominium building whose par-
cels did not appear in the dataset used to perform the 
ground-truthing. Perhaps this building was construct-
ed between 2012 (the last update of the Boundary 
Solutions dataset used for ground-truthing) and 2014. 
Tables 10 and 11 provide a summary of relevant sec-
ondary data for each block, the case study area, and 
San Jose overall.
Table B9: Unmatched Parcels
Block and 
Census Tract
# assessor 
parcels matched 
to ground-truth 
parcels, of total 
assessor 
parcels
# ground-truth 
parcels matched 
to assessor 
parcels, of total 
ground-truth 
parcels
Block 2015
Tract 5003
3 / 37 0 / 36
Block 2020
Tract 5008
8 / 22 0 / 14
Block 2021
Tract 5008
8 / 31 2 / 28
Block 1007
Tract 5019
31 / 93 16 / 78
Source: Dataquick, 2014
Table B10: Sales History and Assessed Value of Parcels
Block Median Year of 
Construction
Median Year of 
Last Sale
Percent Sold 
2010-2014
Median Sale 
Price of Last 
Sale
Median Sale 
Price of Last 
Sale
Assessed 
Value Per 
Square Foot 
(2013)
2015 1907 2002 19% $372,750 $201 $215
2020 1924 1995 0% $300,000 (insufficient data) $37
2021 1915 2004.5 27% $270,000 $213 $226
1007 1948 1999.5 20% $435,000 $339 $157
Diridon Station 2004 2008 37% $450,000 $351 $301
San Jose 1971 2003 22% $390,000 $258 $233
Source: Dataquick, 2014. These figures refer to all parcels in the area, including non-residential uses.
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Table B11: Indicators of Neighborhood Change: Census Data/Demographics, 2000 -2010
Block Population 
Growth 
(Percentage 
Change)
Average 
Household Size 
(Percentage 
Change)
Percent Change 
in Percent 
White43
Percent Change 
in Percent 
Hispanic
Percent Change 
in Percent 
Family House-
holds
Percent Change 
in Percent 
Rental Units
2015 20% 47% 14% 99% 38% -79%
2020 6% -4% 43% 11% -20% -1%
2021 7% 24% -14% -17% -22% -67%
1007 73% 1% 30% 1% -29% 5%
Diridon Station 34% Not available 15% -28% -7% -24%
San Jose 6% -3% -20% 11% -1% 9%
Source: Decennial Census 2000 and 2010, accessed through NHGIS.
Table B12: Summary of Parcel Matches and Primary Land Use Between Assessor and Ground-Truth Data
Block Primary Land 
Use, based on 
Groundtruthing 
data
Percent Land 
Use Matched
Total Number of Units on Block Percent of 
Parcels whose 
Number of Units 
match 
between 
Assessor Data 
and Visual 
Observation
Assessor Data 
(Dataquick)
Visual Observa-
tion 
(Ground-
truthing)
Census Data: 
Total Housing 
Units – 2010
2015 Mostly 
single-family 
homes
70% 41 44 42 81%
2020 Half 
single-family 
detached, half 
commercial/light 
industrial
64% 10 8 12 79%
2021 Half 
single-family 
detached, half 
commercial/light 
industrial
68% 23 35 21 64%
1007 Mix of 
single-family 
detached and 
commercial/in-
dustrial uses
81% 115 125 120 53%
Note: Percent Land Use Matched and Percent Units Matched take as their denominator only those parcels for which a land use or num-
ber of units was indicated by both assessor data and ground-truth data.
Block 2015
This block appears to be changing, but less recently 
and less dramatically than Diridon Station overall. Its 
parcels have a recent median year of last sale (2002); 
19% of parcels sold between 2010-2014 (compared to 
43 Note: For the blocks, this figure refers to all Whites of one 
race, including those that are Hispanic. For the Diridon Station 
and San Jose figures, it refers to Non-Hispanic Whites. The 
“Percent Change” figures all compare percentages over time; 
for example, in Diridon Station, the percent Non-Hispanic White 
in 2000 was 31%, which increased to 35% in 2010—a 15% 
change. 
37% in the case study area); and population increased 
20% between 2000 and 2010 (compared with 34% in 
the case study area). 
However, the most dramatic changes on this bock 
have been inconsistent with gentrification. Its average 
household size increased 47% from 2000 to 2010, 
compared with a 3% decrease in San Jose over-
all. Plus, its share of residents who are Hispanic in-
creased 99% between 2000 and 2010, compared to a 
28% decrease in the case study area. Taken together, 
these changes do not paint a consistent picture of ei-
ther stability or gentrification. 
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The block has a low level of maintenance, with 64% 
of parcels appearing “average,” and none appearing 
“new.” Signs of investment included:  windows in good 
condition and 25% of parcels have new or maintained 
paint. Signs of disinvestment included: 22% of parcels 
have peeling or fading paint. In addition, there was 
some sign of perceived unsafety: 11% of parcels have 
metal security doors and 36% of parcels have security 
alarm signage.
The block has municipal lighting, on-street residen-
tial permit parking, bike racks, and is situated next to 
a nice public park with a playground and basketball 
court.
Overall, the assessor, Census, and ground-truthing 
data are roughly consistent. They show a block that is 
mixed racially and in terms of the quality of its hous-
ing; it is neither fully gentrified nor untouched by new 
investment.
There are also some long-term, owner residents whose houses 
are more personalized and look lived-in for a long time.
Figure B4: Buildings on Block 2015
New windows being installed through out the whole house.
On-going renovation.
Figure B4: Buildings on Block 2015
The block is just a stone throw away from a CalTrain 
station. It is mostly residential but with some commer-
cial uses on one side. Residential properties are well 
maintained and some on-going renovations can be 
observed. There is a good level of public investment, 
and the block is also next to a well-maintained public 
park.
There seems to be some new residents and renters 
based on a few conversations with residents, including 
with one young professional who has been renting for 
two years; he mentioned that the garage on the same 
parcel has been turned into another unit and a new 
renter has just moved in. Another was a middle-aged 
Latina woman who is a long-term resident and said 
the neighborhood has improved over the years.
It appears to be a safe and fairly affluent neighbor-
hood. Racially, the neighborhood was very mixed. 
There is a notable Latino population but there were 
also residents of other races/ethnicities including In-
dian, black and white, and of various ages. There was 
Spanish-language music playing out of two passing 
cars and a few people speaking Spanish. There were 
dog walkers, runners, and cyclists. There were people 
standing on porches. 
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Block 2020
This block does not appear to be gentrifying. From the 
assessor data, it shows almost no recent change: no 
parcels have sold between 2010 and 2014, and the 
median year of last sale is 1995. The median sale price 
was $300,000, not far off from San Jose’s $390,000. 
Census data shows minimal population growth, 
change in average household size, or change in the 
portion of units that are renter-occupied between 2000 
and 2010. The portion of households that are families 
decreased 20% and the portion of residents who are 
white increased 43%, both over the same time frame. 
It is unclear why the portion of whites increased so 
much; it is unlikely due to an influx of investment, given 
the minimal population growth and assessor data.
The block is across a large road from Diridon station 
and it is difficult to walk to the station. It hosts resi-
dential properties as well as some heavy commercial 
uses, including quite a few car garages on one side 
of the block and a large packing/shipping store. It ap-
pears to be a lower-income block. The properties are 
well kept.  
Residents are mostly Latino, mainly families and ap-
pear to have lived on the block for a long time, includ-
ing one woman who said she had lived there seven 
years. Many residents were visible on the block, most-
ly doing house chores. One resident, who had immi-
grated from Mexico a long time ago, mentioned that 
the neighborhood hasn’t changed much. There were a 
few cyclists and pedestrians passing through.
The researcher’s gut feeling was that this block is un-
likely to gentrify as it is pretty run-down and is tucked 
between two wide busy roads. There was also a small 
motorcycle fair on the opposite block which was quite 
loud and seemed disruptive at first; however, there 
were families with a few young children participating. 
There was a police patrol car near the block which 
stayed for a long while.
All parcels were “average” or “below average,” split 
evenly among these two categories. There were no 
significant signs of investment. The only significant 
sign of disinvestment was that 36% of parcels have 
peeling or fading paint. The signs of perceived lack of 
safety included: 21% of parcels have security alarm 
signage, and 21% of parcels have “beware of dog,” 
“Private,” or “No Trespassing” signs.
Figure B5: Buildings on Block 2020
The assessor data for this block shows minimal gen-
trification or change, and the ground-truthing data 
showed the same. The only discrepancy is with the 
portion of households who are families: while Census 
data shows this figure decreased, during ground-truth-
ing there appeared to be mostly families living on the 
block.
Block 2021
This block has experienced recent change consistent 
with gentrification: 27% of parcels were sold between 
2010-2014, the median year of last sale was 2004.5, 
and the percent of households that were families de-
creased 22% between 2000 and 2010. However, be-
tween 2000 and 2010, the portion of residents who 
were white decreased by 14%, which is opposite the 
trend in Diridon Station overall, where the portion 
white increased 15%.
This block is similar to the above where one block face 
is commercial use (mainly garages/car repair shops) 
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but not heavy-duty like on Block 2020. There were a 
number of Hispanic residents (speaking Spanish) but 
the racial/ethnic composition appears more mixed 
than Block 2020, including a few white residents, one 
black owner resident, and a young Russian couple. 
The houses are also larger; a handful have Christ-
mas decorations. Houses across one side of the block 
(Gilford St) appear much nicer and there was some 
on-going renovation. There were a few properties that 
shared a very large backyard that seemed to have ad-
ditional small units and a playground.
Houses across Gilford Street are much nicer, with 
on-going renovation. Across Josefa Street was a bik-
er fair, a bit loud but fairly orderly, families with young 
children attended. 19% of parcels had children or toys 
visible, indicating a high number of family households.
Figure B6: Buildings on Block 2021
41% of parcels were in “average” condition, with anoth-
er 19% “below average,” and only 7% “above average.” 
The block was very middle-of-the-road; there were no 
significant trends in terms of signs of investment nor 
disinvestment. Signs of perceived lack of safety were 
only a few neighborhood watch signs.
Broadly, the assessor, Census, and ground-truthing 
data are consistent on this block: all show some degree 
of change and investment. However, the ground-truth-
ing data shows less significant investment than the 
assessor data.
Block 1007
This block has experienced recent change. The struc-
tures were built more recently than the other blocks 
(median year construction 1948), but show comparable 
recent turnover (20%, between 2010-2014). This block 
has a median sale price ($435,000) higher than the 
other three blocks and San Jose ($390,000), but still 
lower than the Diridon Station area overall ($450,000). 
Census data also shows some change, with a 73% 
population growth between 2000-2010.
The block is mostly residential, however on three sides 
of it—out of 8, given two dead-end streets that cut into 
the middle of the block), over half of the buildings are 
stores, offices, or light industrial uses. Only one build-
ing was taller than two stories. The nicest businesses 
were on Race Street, which was a main street, but 
still relatively quiet. San Carlos, by contrast, is a ma-
jor thoroughfare, and its businesses were much more 
run-down; there was almost no new investment on that 
stretch. 
The stores are mixed between old businesses and 
new ones; for example, there are several salons, one 
that had all African-American people in it, one whose 
workers were all Asian and also did nails, and a third 
that opened in 2012 and had mostly white people in-
side. The block hosts many businesses including a 
used car lot, several restaurants (Cuban, Ethiopian), 
a laundromat, a flower store, several exercise/dance 
studios, two tattoo parlors, one store offering drum les-
sons, a thrift shop, and a Latin American home goods 
store. Some businesses seemed oriented towards 
low-income consumers, like a check-cashing store. On 
top of these uses, the block hosted a handful of park-
ing lots, a junk yard, and, on one lot, both an antique 
store and an auto body shop. 
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The block’s residential buildings were certainly not all 
of a kind. There were homes at all levels of mainte-
nance, including some that appeared abandoned and 
others that appeared recently renovated. Most homes 
were single-family detached, except for one condo-
minium complex.
The two dead-end streets on their own demonstrate 
the changing nature of this block and neighborhood. 
On one, Pacific Avenue, the sidewalk only extended 
halfway down the street. Most homes were run-down, 
with unattractive security fences, debris-strewn yards, 
and dogs. The next dead-end, Parkinson Court, not 
500 yards from the first one, looked immediately differ-
ent. The street is wider, it has a full sidewalk, and no 
dogs. Most homes were much nicer and better main-
tained here, including one that was striking for its level 
of maintenance and landscaping. The photos in Fig-
ures 7 and 8 illustrate the contrast between the streets.
 
Other notable features of the block include:  
-The older commercial buildings had cameras 
and security signs; the newer ones did not.
-According to the representative from the Depart-
ment of Housing, the area is known for hosting 
car shops, antique stores, and gyms—which all 
appeared on this block.
-The block is nestled between two areas the city 
has identified for its “Urban Villages” program. 
New development could be seen down a few 
blocks on San Carlos.
-The area is diverse. Researchers saw people 
of all races on the block. However, the housing 
department representative commented that just 
a few blocks north of Park is much whiter, and 
west of Race is a really nice neighborhood. So 
this block seems to be the “edge” of already-com-
pleted gentrification.
-There did not appear to be much public invest-
ment throughout the block. However, on Park Av-
enue, bike lanes are coming in soon, which will 
mean the on-street parking will be gone. Busi-
nesses have been concerned about this. San 
Carlos will also be receiving some public invest-
ment soon.
The block has a wide range of levels of maintenance: 
2% new, 38% above average, 35% average, 15% be-
low average, and 3% poor. Signs of investment includ-
ed: 46% of parcels have new or maintained paint, 15% 
have a new or updated front door, and 15% of parcels 
have fencing for aesthetic purposes. Some signs of 
disinvestment included: 5 vacant lots, 5 parcels with 
cracked windows, bars on windows, boarded windows, 
and/or dirty windows, 26% of parcels have peeling/
fading paint, and 17% of parcels have litter or debris. 
Signs of perceived unsafety included: 21% of parcels 
have a metal security door, and 15% have signs say-
ing “Beware of dogs,” “Private,” or “No trespassing.”
A stakeholder who toured the blocks with us comment-
ed that he expected the block to change more in future 
years as the development that has been happening 
just a few blocks away spreads.  Here again, the data 
sets align. Both paint a picture of change, with much 
Figure B7: Parkinson Court, with its broad street, side-
walks, and nice homes 
Figure B8: A home on Pacific Ave, which was only one 
block away from Parkinson Court but not as well-main-
tained, with half the street missing a sidewalk
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recent investment but still some existing run-down and 
industrial structures.
Broadly, the secondary data sets and ground-truth-
ing data paint similar pictures of change on these 
four blocks, showing few signs of gentrification. All 
four blocks, however, have the potential to gentrify 
given their proximity to Diridon Station and the many 
changes happening around them and throughout 
the case study area. On Block 2021, for example, 
where secondary data showed many recent sales but 
ground-truthing data showed minimal investment, per-
haps gentrification is just beginning: homes are turn-
ing over ownership, demographics are beginning to 
change, etc, and the physical signs will follow soon.
In terms of comparing data sets, unmatched parcels 
was not a major problem. However, land uses fre-
quently did not match. While the number of units re-
corded for each parcel was often unmatched, the total 
number of parcels on the block according to three data 
sets were roughly comparable.
Macarthur Station Area Ground-Truthing 
Results
In Fall 2014, two researchers from the Center for 
Community Innovation (CCI) surveyed three blocks, 
Block 3009 in Tract 4011 and Block 2003 in 4010. The 
ground-truthing exercise is meant to provide an addi-
tional set of data to verify conclusions reached through 
analyzing assessor and Census data. Complicating 
this effort is that the data sets do not have the same 
set of parcels. All data reported from the assessor data 
(Dataquick) includes all parcels in that set; likewise, all 
data reported from the ground-truthing data collection 
includes all parcels in that set (which is based on par-
cels from Boundary Solutions). 
Table B13: Parcel Mismatch Among Datasets
Block and Tract # Parcels in Assessor But 
Not Ground-truth
Block 3009, Tract 4011 24 / 54
Block 2003, Tract 4010 2 / 45
Table B14: Sales History of Parcels since Construction
Block Median Year of 
Construction
Median Year of Last 
Sale
Median Sale Price Median Sale Price Per 
Square Foot
3009 1919 2006 $226,500 $202
2003 1920 2004 $283,000 $209
Source: Dataquick, 2014. These figures refer to all parcels in the area, including non-residential uses.
Table B15: Sales History of Parcels Sold Since 2007 and 2010
Block Percent Sold 2007-
2014
Percent Sold 2010-
2014
Median sales price 
per square foot if sold 
2007 or later
Median sales price 
per square foot if sold 
2010 or later
3009 38 18 $258,000 $276,000
2003 31 24 $315,000 $315,000
         Source: Dataquick, 2014. These figures refer to all parcels in the area, including non-residential uses.
Table B16: Summary of Parcel Matches and Primary Land Use
Block Primary Land 
Use, based on 
Ground-
truthing data
Percent Land 
Use Matched
Total Number of Units on Block Percent of 
Parcels whose 
Number of Units 
match 
between 
Assessor Data 
and Visual Ob-
servation
Assessor Data 
– Dataquick
Visual 
Observations on 
Ground-
truthing
Census Data: 
Total Housing 
Units – 2010
3009 Multi-family and 
single-family
48% 150 105 115 17%
2003 Single-family 70% 73 67 72 59%
Note: Percent Land Use Matched and Percent Units Matched take as their denominator only those parcels for which a land use or num-
ber of units was indicated by both assessor data and ground-truth data.
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Monument Corridor Ground-Truthing 
Results
On October 26, 2014, two researchers from the Center 
for Community Innovation (CCI), along with two staff 
members of Monument Impact (also Monument res-
idents) surveyed three blocks, 1001, 2007 and 1003. 
On January 15, 2015, one of the CCI researchers and 
one of the Monument Impact staff members went back 
to survey a final block, 3005 in Tract 33602.02.44 The 
ground-truthing exercise is meant to provide an addi-
tional set of data to verify conclusions reached through 
analyzing assessor and Census data. Complicating 
this effort is that the data sets do not have the same 
set of parcels. All data reported from the assessor data 
(Dataquick) includes all parcels in that set; likewise, 
all data reported from the ground-truthing data collec-
tion includes all parcels in that set (which is based on 
parcels from Boundary Solutions). For two variables—
land use and number of units—comparisons are made 
on a parcel-by-parcel basis; only parcels that appear 
in both data sets are used for this comparison. 
The largest discrepancy between the two datasets ap-
pears in Block 1000. Here, 34 of the 39 parcels from 
the assessor data that do not appear in the ground-
truth data are part of one condominium complex (1790 
Ellis Street). The Boundary Solutions data set had a 
total of 19 parcels at this address – much fewer than 
the number of parcels at this address in the Asses-
sor Data.  While observations were only recorded for 
the 19 available Boundary Solutions parcel numbers, 
based on the number of mailboxes, researchers re-
ported 52 units in the complex; this number is closer 
to the assessor data’s record of the number of parcels 
at 1790 Ellis.  A possible explanation for the discrep-
ancy between the Boundary Solutions and Assessor 
datasets is that a number of units in the complex were 
converted into condos after Boundary Solutions had 
last been updated in 2012.  The discrepancy may also 
be some duplicate listings of condos at the 1790 Ellis 
Street address within the assessor data.
Table B17: Parcel Mismatch Among Datasets
Block and Tract # Parcels in 
Assessor But Not 
Ground-truthed
# Parcels Ground-
truthed but not in 
Assessor data
Block 1001
Tract 3361.01
39 / 87 2 / 51
Block 2007
Tract 3362.01
9 / 29 5 / 27
Block 1003
Tract 3362.02
5 / 52 2 / 51
Table B18: Sales History of Parcels since Construction
Block Median Year of 
Construction
Median Year of Last 
Sale
Median Sale Price Median Sale Price Per 
Square Foot
1001 1980 2003 $145,000 $135
2007 1951 2002 $150,000 $142
1003 1956 2003 $202,000 $141
Monument 1964 2004 $159,000 $128
Concord 1954 2002 $225,000 $148
Source: Dataquick, 2014. These figures refer to all parcels in the area, including non-residential uses.
Table B19: Sales History of Parcels Sold Since 2007 and 2010
Block Percent Sold 
2007-2014
Percent Sold 
2010-2014
Median sales price 
per square foot if sold 
2007 or later
Median sales price 
per square foot if sold 
2010 or later
1001 41% 30% $168 $140
2007 43% 29% $162 $129
1003 43% 24% $177 $152
Monument 43% 26% $140 $132
Concord 33% 21% $196 $193
         Source: Dataquick, 2014. These figures refer to all parcels in the area, including non-residential uses.
44 The ground-truthing data from this block was not used in the evaluation of the assessor data.
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Table B20: Indicators of Neighborhood Change: Census Data/Demographics, 2000 -20102
Block
(2010 
Census)
Population 
Growth (Per-
centage 
Change)
Average House-
hold Size 
(Percentage 
Change)
Percent Change 
in Percent 
White45 
Percent Change 
in Percent His-
panic
Percent Change 
in Percent Fam-
ily Households
Percent Change 
in Percent Rent-
al Units
1001 3.1 12.3 -20.8 40.0 18.5 -2.4
2007 -6.9 6.1 8.9 27.5 13.7 0
100346 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1003+100447 22.4 -7.8 16.7 6.4 0 10.1
Monument 6.0 6.9 -39.4 28.6 3.3 0
Concord 69.9 -11.6 -17.4 40.4 -1.5 4.0
Table B21: Census Data/Demographics, 20103
Block
(2010 Census)
Population Average 
Household Size
Percent White Percent 
Hispanic
Family 
Households
Percent Rental 
Units
1001 868 3.19 42% 71% 64% 85%
2007 95 3.28 61% 51% 83% 24%
1003 179 3.73 53% 49% 85% 38%
1003+1004 973 3.97 49% 83% 86% 87%
Monument 24,411 3.10 20% 63% 63% 76%
Concord 122,067 2.73 50% 31% 68% 39%
Table B22: Summary of Parcel Matches and Primary Land Use
Block Primary Land 
Use, based on 
Groundtruthing 
data
Percent Land 
Use Matched
Total Number of Units on Block Percent of Parcels 
whose Number of 
Units match 
between 
Assessor Data and 
Visual Observation
Assessor Data 
– Dataquick
Visual 
Observations on 
Ground-
truthing
Census Data: 
Total Housing 
Units – 2010
1001 Half 
single-family 
detached, half 
apartment/condo 
complexes
89% 48 536 318 301 85%
2007 All 
single-family 
detached
95% 49 29 27 31 100%
1003 Almost all 
single-family 
detached
96% 61 50 52 94%
Note: Percent Land Use Matched and Percent Units Matched take as their denominator only those parcels for which a land use or 
number of units was indicated by both assessor data and ground-truth data.
45 For the blocks, this figure refers to all Whites of one race, including those that are Hispanic. For the Monument and Concord fig-
ures, it refers to Non-Hispanic Whites. The “Percent Change” figures all compare percentages over time; for example, in the Monu-
ment, the percent Non-Hispanic White in 2000 was 33%, which decreased to 20% in 2010—a 36% change.
46 In 2010, the US Census Bureau split the boundaries of the 2000 Census Block in this area (Block 6003) into two separate blocks.  
Because 2000 Census data could not be parsed to isolate the 2010 block boundary, figures for this block are thus skewed, showing 
the change between the larger geography of Block 6003 for the year 2000 and only part of this geography (Block 1003), in 2010.  
47 To provide a point of comparison, this row uses combined data for the two 2010 blocks (Blocks 1003 and 1004) that comprised the 
original 2000 block (Block 6003) and compares it to the census data for the full 2000 block.   
48 This discrepancy is primarily due to parcels classified as multi-family that researchers perceived as single-family while ground-truth-
ing.
49 The discrepancy between the three data sets appears to be due to an error with the assessor data.  Dataquick shows multiple 
listings of 52 units at 1790 Ellis Street as one parcel, as well as individual listings for each of the units at this address, which results in 
a much higher unit count than the ground-truthing and census data.  
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Validity of Assessor Data
The parcel data from the Contra Costa County Asses-
sor’s office appears to have a few minor issues.  Our 
comparison of the assessor data to the ground-truth-
ing data shows that most of these issues relate to 
attached single-family condominiums. In the case of 
1790 Ellis Street, each unit (numbered 1 through 52) is 
recorded only once within the assessor data, but four 
of the 52 entries list the number of units as 52 rath-
er than 1.  Other discrepancies between the asses-
sor data and ground-truthing data can be attributed to 
differences between the Boundary Solutions shapefile 
data and the Dataquick dataset, which do not present 
any problems for the overall research since it only uses 
the Dataquick dataset.  Some discrepancies, primarily 
those related to differences in land use type, are due 
to human error in during the ground-truthing process.  
Indicators of Gentrification or Displacement Pressure
Notable signs of possible gentrification differ from 
block to block.  On the blocks with primarily single-fam-
ily homes, these include new paint and other structural 
upgrades such as new roofing, new windows, and new 
landscaping that appear to indicate a change in own-
ership.  On the block that had several large multi-family 
complexes (both apartments and condos), the most 
visible sign of gentrification was the remodeling of an 
entire complex, which was confirmed by stakeholder 
interviews.  This interview revealed that residents in 
this particular building have been displaced due to 
pressure from the new landlord that has led to attrition. 
 
Broad Observations of the Monument from 
Ground-Truthing
Residential blocks within the Monument vary greatly in 
land use type, levels of investment, and demograph-
ics.  According to Census data some areas observed 
have a very large Latino majority population, while a 
few are primarily White.  From our field observation, 
we were only able to identify a few signifiers that seem 
to confirm these demographics, such as the presence 
of American flags outside homes, Spanish music over-
heard from homes, and limited interaction with resi-
dents.  From what we were able to observe, these ma-
jority White blocks appear to be more likely blocks of 
single-family homes rather than apartments or condos. 
Conversations with our ground-truthing partners from 
Monument Impact reveal that the most vulnerable res-
idents are renters, as the City as a whole has faced 
significant issues with landlords who fail to respond to 
tenants concerns (which led to the passage of Con-
cord’s bed bug ordinance), engage in intimidation of 
tenants, and who do not have to be held accountable 
to a just cause eviction policy.  Staff from Monument 
impact also have observed that many tenants are 
struggling with regularly increasing rents, with many 
coping by living together in overcrowded quarters.  
Redwood City Ground-Truthing Results 
On November 14, two researchers with the Center of 
Community Innovation performed the ground-truthing. 
The researchers walked the blocks with three stake-
holders familiar with the area.
Figure B9: Map of Redwood City with Ground-truthed 
Blocks in green
Note: The data from Block 1002 was unusable and so does not 
appear here.
Table B23: Parcel Mismatch Among Datasets
Block # assessor 
parcels matched 
to ground-truth 
parcels, of total 
assessor 
parcels
# ground-truth 
parcels matched 
to assessor 
parcels, of total 
ground-truth 
parcels
Tract 6109 
Block 2000
19 / 19 19 / 19
Tract 6102.01 
Block 4003
17 / 20 18 / 19
Tract 6102.01 
Block 4004
16 / 16 16 / 16
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The ground-truthing exercise is meant to provide an 
additional set of data to verify conclusions reached 
through analyzing assessor and Census data.
The data sets align well in terms of total number of 
units (except for the high Census figure) and land 
uses, but not for the number of units listed for each 
parcel.
Table B24: Sales History and Assessed Value of Residential Parcels
Area Median Year of 
Construction
Median Year of 
Last Sale
Percent Sold 
2010-2013
Median Sale 
Price
Median Sale 
Price Per 
Square Foot
Assessed Value 
Per Square 
Foot (2013)
Block 2000 1926 2004 21% $497,500 $540 $503
Block 4003 1943 2001 15% $502,000 $189 $239
Block 4004 1944 2000.5 19% $409,500 Insufficient Data Insufficient Data
Redwood City 1946 2002 16% $430,000 $259 $267
San Mateo 
County
1958 2001 16% $449,000 $168 $220
Source: Dataquick, 2014
Table B25: Indicators of Neighborhood Change: Census Data/Demographics, 2000 -2010
Area Population 
Change 
(Percentage 
Change)
Average 
Household 
Size 
(Percentage 
Change)
Percent 
Change in 
Percent 
White 50
Percent 
Change in 
Percent 
Hispanic
Percent 
Change in 
Percent 
Black
Percent 
Change in 
Percent Family 
Households
Percent 
Change in 
Percent 
Rental Units
Tract 6109 
Block 2000
30% 22% -41% 48% -12% 34% -2%
Tract 6102.01 -38% -23% 190% 9% -100% 
(5 to 0)
-25% -32%
Block 4003 -0.2% Not Available -22% 15% -2% 2% -4%
Redwood 
City
2% Not Available -16% 16% -20% .3% .3%
San Mateo 
County
-5% 16% 7% -21% Not 
available
40% -6%
Source: US Decennial Census 2000, 2010. Note: Data for Block 4004 not available due to a change in blocks from 2000 to 2010.
Table B26: Summary of Parcel Matches and Primary Land Use
Block Primary Land Use, based 
on Groundtruthing data
Percent 
Land Use 
Matched
Total Number of Units on Block Percent of Parcels whose 
Number of Units match 
between Assessor Data 
and Visual Observation
Assessor Data 
– 
Dataquick
Visual 
Observations on 
Ground-
truthing
Block 2000 Mix of single-family and 
multi-family 
buildings
74% 62 73 53%
Block 4003 Mix of single-family, com-
mercial (mostly auto), and 
a few 
mutli-family
70% 13 17 75%
Block 4004 Mix of commercial, sin-
gle-family and multi-family 
buildings
88% 96 90 63%
Note: Percent Land Use Matched and Percent Units Matched take as their denominator only those parcels for which a land 
use or number of units was indicated by both assessor data and ground-truth data.
50 Note: For the block, this figure refers to all Whites of one race, including those that are Hispanic. For the Redwood City and San 
Mateo County figures, it refers to Non-Hispanic Whites. The “Percent Change” figures all compare percentages over time.
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Block 2000
This block is older than Redwood City overall, with 
a 1926 median year of construction. Between 2000 
and 2010, the block experienced population growth, 
an increase in average household size, percent fami-
lies, and percent of people Hispanic; the percent white 
decreased. These trends are inconsistent with gentri-
fication. However, more recently, it has experienced 
slightly more sales than Redwood City, with 21% of 
parcels sold between 2010-2013, and a 2004 median 
year of last sale. Sales on the block show a remarkably 
higher price per square foot ($540) than Redwood City 
($259) or San Mateo County ($168), though many par-
cels are missing data so this figure is off. Still, invest-
ment is clearly occurring on the block.
About half of the units had an “above average” level 
of maintenance, while the rest were average (32%), 
below average, or poor. Some visual clues that sug-
gested this include well-maintained landscape, in-
cluding fruit trees, new porch furniture, BBQ grills in 
yard, vegetable gardens. A number of properties have 
well-maintained/new paint (47%) or a new front door 
(21%). Several houses appear to have been flipped.
Other signs of investment or disinvestment were not 
very pronounced; a few buildings showed each of our 
indicators, but no indicator was present for a major-
ity of parcels. Nearly half of the parcels had litter or 
debris. This block has more security alarm signs than 
the above, though only 26% of parcels had them, and 
there were otherwise few signs of disorder.  Together, 
these signs indicate stability on the block with some 
recent investment. The data sources are consistent, 
though from assessor data alone, the block would 
seem to be more invested-in than the ground-truthing 
shows, where stability is the more pronounced take-
away.
Block 4003
Between 2000 and 2010, this block experienced pop-
ulation loss, a decrease in average household size, 
a decrease in family households, and a decrease in 
the percent rental units; it also experienced a large in-
crease in the percent white. These patterns are con-
sistent with gentrification, though not very dramatic 
change, except the 190% increase in percent white. 
In terms of assessor data, the block appears on par 
with Redwood City and San Mateo County across the 
board. In recent years, it appears stable and not expe-
riencing much investment.
This block hosts residential and commercial struc-
tures. A few of the businesses on the block appear to 
be operated by Asians or Latinos. About 40% of par-
cels appear “above average,” with a comparable num-
ber “average;” the rest are “new” or “below average.”
Some signs of investment were observed; 37% of par-
cels had well-maintained/new paint and/or new front 
doors. There are signs that these are either long-term 
residents or owner-residents given the personalized 
touches to the properties. 
There are some neighborhood watch signs, plus secu-
rity alarm signage on a quarter of parcels, but fencing 
for safety appears on only two parcels. But signs of 
disorder or disinvestment are otherwise negligible. The 
two data sets align to show a stable, minimally-chang-
ing block.
Block 4004
On this block, 19% of parcels sold between 2010-
2013, indicating high turnover. However, the median 
sale price on the block, $409,500, is lower than in Red-
wood City and San Mateo County. Similar to above, 
this is a mixed-use block with commercial property 
along one block face. There are signs that some prop-
erties are long established family homes. About 40% 
of parcels appear “above average,” with a comparable 
number “average;” the rest are “below average.” 
The sidewalks have been recently paved and half of 
parcels have new or well-maintained paint. Otherwise, 
there were no notable signs of investment nor dis-
investment. Signs of disorder were that a quarter of 
parcels had ‘Beware of Dogs’ or ‘Private’ signs. One 
Latino man on the block, who was visiting a friend, 
remarked that he was leaving Redwood City because 
“it’s getting too expensive.”
Canal Ground-Truthing Results
On November 11, 2014, a researcher with the Center 
of Community Innovation performed the ground-truth-
ing in Canal with a representative from Marin Grass-
roots.
The data sets align well in terms of total number of 
units (except for the high Census figure) and land 
uses, but not for the number of units listed for each 
parcel.
This block is slightly older than the rest of Canal and 
Marin County, with a median year of construction 10 
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years earlier than those areas. It also has a higher me-
dian sale price than Canal or Marin County, but that 
figure is in part misleading because several multi-fam-
ily buildings and expensive single-family homes are 
pulling up the median. 
The structures on this block have a range of levels of 
maintenance, with 14% new, 29% above average, 43% 
average, and 14% below average. Signs of investment 
include: 43% of parcels have new or maintained paint. 
Signs of disinvestment include: 43% of parcels have 
litter or debris, and 29% have peeling or fading paint. 
Signs of perceptions of safety include: 36% of parcels 
have a metal security doors and 43% have security 
alarm signage. There seem to be many families on the 
block, with 43% of parcels having children or toys vis-
ible.
The data-sets align for this block. Both paint a picture 
of a block that is not experiencing rapid change. It is 
mixed in terms of levels of investment and appears 
stable.
Table B27: Sales History and Assessed Value of Residential Parcels
Area Median Year of 
Construction
Median Year of 
Last Sale
Percent Sold 
2010-2013
Median Sale 
Price
Median Sale 
Price Per 
Square Foot
Assessed Value 
Per Square 
Foot (2013)
Block 1001 1964 2004 21% $630,000 $253 $258
Canal 1973 2003 19% $290,000 $204 $162
Marin County 1973 2003 22% $552,000 $307 $258
Source: Dataquick, 2014
Table B28: Summary of Parcel Matches and Primary Land Use
Block Primary Land 
Use, based on 
Groundtruthing 
data
Percent Land 
Use Matched
Total Number of Units on Block Percent of 
Parcels whose 
Number of 
Units match be-
tween Assessor 
Data and Visual 
Observation
Assessor Data 
– Dataquick
Visual 
Observations 
on Ground-
truthing
Census Data: 
Total Housing 
Units – 2010
Block 1001 Mixed multi-fam-
ily and 
single-family
91% 475 430 548 33%
Note: Percent Land Use Matched and Percent Units Matched take as their denominator only those parcels for which a land use or num-
ber of units was indicated by both assessor data and ground-truth data.
 
Figure B10: Map of Canal with Ground-truthed Block 
1001 (Census Tract 1122.01) in green
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East Palo Alto Ground-Truthing Results
On November, 14, 2014, two researchers from the 
Center for Community Innovation surveyed three 
blocks in the area: 2018, 4002, and 4003. On Janu-
ary 10, 2015, one of the same researchers, along with 
three community members, surveyed blocks 2002 and 
5010. 
Table B29: Total Ground-Truth Parcels
Block and Tract # Parcels in Ground-truth
Block 2002, Tract  611900 38
Block 2018, Tract 612000 23
Block 4002, Tract  612100 8
Block 4003, Tract 612100 9
Block 5010, Tract 612100 21
Table B30: Sales History and Assessed Value of Residential Parcels
Block Median Year of 
Construction
Median Year of 
Last Sale
Percent Sold 
2010-2014
Median Sale 
Price
Median Sale 
Price Per 
Square Foot
Assessed Value 
Per Square 
Foot (2013)
2002 1954 2006 28% 243,000 $162.00 $185.00
2018 1950 1999 33% 155,000 $179.00 $176.00
4002 1949 2010 88% 1,130,541 $318.00 $276.00
4003 1952 2010 82% 777,041 $375.00 $241.00
5010 1961 2010 68% 1,890,367 $360.00 $363.00
Source: Dataquick, 2014. These figures refer to all parcels in the area, including non-residential uses.
Table B31: Assessor Data
Block # Matched Parcels 
(2004-2014)
Average Change 
in Improvement to 
Land Ratio 
(2004-2014)
% Change Owner 
Occupancy (Rent 
to Own or Own to 
Rent, 2004-2014)
% Sold Since 2012 Average Change 
in Sq. ft. 
(2004-2014)
Block 2002 39 -11.7% 17.9% 20.5% 1.8%
Block 2018 23 4.2% 21.7% 17.4% -2.2%
Block 4002 8 -30.3% 0.0% 0.0% 1.7%
Block 4003 9 -49.1% 22.2% 0.0% 2.4%
Block 5010 21 -36.7% 9.5% 0.0% 2.4%
Source: Dataquick, 2014. These figures refer to all parcels in the area, including non-residential uses.
Table B32: Census Data 2000 - 2010
Block Population 
Growth (% 
change)
Average 
Household 
Size (% 
change)
Percent 
Change in 
Percent 
White
Percent 
Change in 
Percent Black
Percent 
Change in 
Percent His-
panic
Percent 
Change in 
Percent Family 
Households
Percent 
Change in 
Percent 
Rental Units
East Palo Alto 39.% -8.5% 1.8% -9.0% 7.6% -0.3% 8.6%
Block 2002 26.1% 0% 5% -12% 14% -5% -20%
Source: Census, 2000-2010. Note, the missing blocks did not have consistent borders.
Table B33: Census 2010 Demographics
Block Population Average 
Household 
Size
Percent 
White
Percent Black Percent His-
panic
Percent 
Family House-
holds
Percent 
Rental Units
2002 147 4.58 36% 18% 61% 82% 26%
2018 142 4.73 19% 6% 82% 90% 67%
4002 277 4.29 59% 8% 88% 73% 100%
4003 273 3.07 49% 5% 85% 62% 100%
5010 1434 2.92 36% 12% 68% 55% 100%
Source: Census, 2010.
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Table B34: Summary of Parcel Matches and Primary Land Use
Block Primary Land Use, based 
on Groundtruthing data
Percent 
Land Use 
Matched
Total Number of Units on Block Percent of Parcels whose 
Number of Units match 
between Assessor Data 
and Visual Observation
Assessor Data 
– 
Dataquick
Visual 
Observations on 
Ground-
truthing
2002 Single-family residential 100% 39 44 100%
2018 Single-family residential 87% 28 34 96%
4002 & 4003 Multi-family residential 88% 200 155 94%
5010 Multi-family residential 90% 457 517 95%
Note: Percent Land Use Matched and Percent Units Matched take as their denominator only those parcels for which a land 
use or number of units was indicated by both assessor data and ground-truth data.
Block 2002
The parcels on Block 2002 have a relatively recent 
median year of last sale (2006), with 28% of parcels 
being sold between 2010 and 2014. Although this 
is a high level of sales, and indicates neighborhood 
change, the median price per square foot is below the 
2013 assessed value per square foot, indicating that 
prices are not going up rapidly in this block. Between 
2000 and 2010 there have been relatively large demo-
graphic changes on the block, with the Black popula-
tion decreasing by 12%, while the Hispanic population 
has increased by 14%. Of additional interest is the 
20% decrease in rental units on the block, indicating 
increased homeownership. Thus, the data indicates 
that neighborhood is changing, but real estate prices 
may not be escalating quickly. 
Black 2002 is located on the east side of East Palo 
Alto. The block is 100% single-family residential. While 
no parcels on the block were considered “new,” 54% 
were deemed “above average” and 32% were con-
sidered “average.” Thus, the residences were over-
all well-maintained. No properties on the block were 
abandoned, for sale or for rent on the block. Resi-
dence on the block appeared relatively stable as 89% 
had permanent blinds or curtains. 24% of the parcels 
has children/toys visible. In total the block has very 
few signs of disorder. However, there were a number 
of signs of perceived unsafety: 74% of parcels have 
safety fencing, 45% of parcels have security alarm sig-
nage, and 16% have “Beware of Dog,” “Private” or oth-
er trespassing signs. Residents appear to be primarily 
Latino, although there were also signs of Pacific Island 
and Asian. 
Block 2018 
According to the assessor data, there seems to be min-
imal neighborhood change taking place on this block. 
The median year of last sale is 1999, although 33% of 
parcels were sold between 2010 and 2014. The medi-
an sale price of parcels is close to the assessed value 
per square foot, thus housing prices do not appear to 
be rising quickly. One change on the block is that there 
has been a change in tenure for 21.7% of parcels on 
the block. 
This block is also located on the east side of high-
way 101, close to the highway. The primary land use 
is residential, while there was 1 commercial property. 
The majority, 54% of parcels were characterized as 
“average.” 25% were considered “below average.” The 
major of parcels were single-family (75%), while 21% 
were multi-family. 25% of parcels has children toys 
visible. Stability in the neighborhood was indicated by 
0% abandoned properties, 0% for sale and only 4% 
of properties being “for rent.” Signs of investment in-
cluded: 29% of parcels had vegetable gardens, 25% 
new or maintained paint and 38% had aesthetic fenc-
ing. The only significant sign of disinvestment was that 
58% of parcels have peeling or fading paint, while 29% 
of parcels had some litter or debris.  Observed individ-
uals were primarily Black or Hispanic. Safety seemed 
to be of concern to residents. Signs of perceived safe-
ty include:  38% of parcels have security alarm sig-
nage, 21% “beware of dog,” “Private,” or “No Trespass-
ing” signs, 29% have bars on window, 46% have metal 
security door, and 42% safety fencing.
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Blocks 4002 and 4003
These blocks were chosen due to their presence on 
the west side of Highway 101, and assessor data in-
dicates relatively high levels of neighborhood change. 
The median year of last sale for parcels was 2010 for 
both blocks, with over 88% of parcels being sold be-
tween 2010 and 2014. Both blocks also had median 
sale price per square foot which is substantially high-
er than the assessed value per square foot. This indi-
cates that property values are rising quickly. 
Blocks 4002 and 4003 are located on the west side 
of Highway 101 in East Palo Alto. The blocks are pri-
marily multi-family housing (78%). The remaining par-
cels are split between single-family and commercial 
properties, which include a laundromat and a market. 
All the multifamily housing appeared to be owned by 
Woodland. Overall, the block had few signs of disorder. 
The large multifamily buildings on many of properties 
made it difficult to estimate the number of units pres-
ent, and also restricted view of individual properties. 
There were residents of diverse ages and ethnicities 
on the blocks. Signs of investment included: 72% per-
manent blinds or curtains and 28% new or maintained 
paint. Few signs of disinvestment existed: 11% spray 
paint or graffiti and 17% peeling/fading paint. Howev-
er, residents did appear to be concerned about safety: 
22% of parcels had metal security door, 50% had safe-
ty fencing, and 28% had “beware of dog,” “Private,” or 
“No Trespassing” signs. Public investment on the block 
includes well-repaired streets and municipal lighting. 
Block 5010
This block had a substantially higher median sale 
price of all blocks that were ground-truthed. The fact 
that the blocks median sale price closely aligns with 
its assessed value per square foot indicates that while 
prices are high, they may not be increasingly rapidly. 
Of note is that the block has a -36.7% average change 
in improvement to land ratio. 
On this block the majority of parcels were observed to 
be “average” (76%), while there were also parcels that 
were “above average” (19%) and some below average 
(5%). 75% of parcel on the block are multi-family, while 
20% were single-family and 5% were commercial. 
All apartments on the block are owned by Woodland 
Development. Due to the high number of multi-family 
units on the block, the parcels are visually highly uni-
form making it difficult to gain insight into the people 
living there. Children toys were visible on 20% of the 
parcels. There were multiple indications of Hispanic 
populations on the block, including the commercial 
establishments. There was a diversity in the residents 
of the multi-family buildings. There were few signs of 
disinvestment on the block, yet perceived safety was 
potentially low:  45% of parcels had “beware of dog,” 
“Private,” or “No Trespassing” signs, 55% had metal 
security door, and 45% safety fencing.
Marin City Ground-Truthing Results 
On November 11, a researcher with the Center of 
Community Innovation performed the ground-truth-
ing analysis in Marin City. The researcher walked the 
blocks there with Esther Williams, a lifelong resident, 
and John Young, director of a community organization 
and former resident, who provided perspective on the 
buildings and neighborhood.
Figure B11: Map of Marin City with three Ground-
Truthing blocks in green
Note: All of the blocks fall in Marin County Census Tract 1290.
Table B35: Parcel Mismatch Among Datasets
Block # assessor 
parcels matched 
to ground-truth 
parcels, of total 
assessor parcels
# ground-truth par-
cels matched to 
assessor 
parcels, of total 
ground-truth par-
cels
1000 31 / 54 32 / 33
1004 38 / 50 38 / 49
1005 33 / 34 34 / 34
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Marin City is small—one could probably walk the 
length of it in 30 minutes or so. With only one road in 
to the community from Highway 101, it can seem like a 
cookie-cutter suburb, and parts of it are, like the multi-
ple townhome developments and a standard shopping 
center in the middle. However, the area is also host 
to older, diverse homes in the hills and a significant 
stock of subsidized housing—604 units. Nearly half of 
these are in a collection of high-rise buildings called 
Golden Gate Village, which feature great views out on 
to Richardson Bay, a small inlet of the San Francisco 
Bay. Driving with Esther around these buildings, the 
researcher noticed a lot of trash, severely damaged 
driveways, and dirty, poorly maintained buildings.
People along the route commented that the area was 
mixed racially and had been stable over time. Through-
out the tour of Marin City, Esther and John happened 
upon nearly a dozen people they knew. These interac-
tions gave the impression that Marin City is not only 
small geographically, but socially; there seem to be 
rich social networks in the area. 
Table B36: Sales History and Assessed Value of Residential Parcels
Block Median Year of 
Construction
Median Year of 
Last Sale
Percent Sold 
2010-2013
Median Sale 
Price
Median Sale 
Price Per 
Square Foot
Assessed Value 
Per Square 
Foot (2013)
1000 1965 2005.5 30% $396,000 $286 $219
1004 1997 2001.5 20% $245,750 $163 $195
1005 1996 2000.5 26% $229,000 $154 $197
Marin City 1979 2002.5 21% $287,500 $207 $193
Marin County 1973 2003 22% $552,000 $307 $258
Source: Dataquick, 2014
Table B37: Indicators of Neighborhood Change: Census Data/Demographics, 2000-2010
Block Population 
Change 
(Percent 
Change)
Average 
Household 
Size 
(Percent 
Change)
Percent 
Change in 
Percent 
White7
Percent 
Change in 
Percent 
Hispanic
Percent 
Change in 
Percent Black
Percent 
Change in Per-
cent Family 
Households
Percent 
Change in 
Percent 
Rental Units
1000 -24% 1% 55% 1085% -33% -11% -5%
1004 62.6% 33% 407% 1715% -71% 21% -15%
1005 -85.7% -15% 16% -55% -11% 3% -74%
Marin City -6% Not 
Available
-25% 88% 0% 11% 17%
Marin County 2% 1% -7% 40% -7% 1% 3%
Source: US Decennial Census 2000, 2010. Note: Marin City is defined as Marin County Census Tract 1290. 
Table B38: Summary of Parcel Matches and Primary Land Use
Block Primary Land 
Use, based on 
Ground-
truthing data
Percent Land 
Use Matched
Total Number of Units on Block Percent of 
Parcels whose 
Number of Units 
match 
between 
Assessor Data 
and Visual Ob-
servation
Assessor Data 
– Dataquick
Visual 
Observations on 
Ground-
truthing
Census Data: 
Total Housing 
Units – 2010
1000 Single-family 
residential
74% 81 71 87 65%
1004 Single-family 
residential
97% 105 104 133 95%
1005 Single-family 
residential
88% 32 34 33 100%
Note: Percent Land Use Matched and Percent Units Matched take as their denominator only those parcels for which a land use or num-
ber of units was indicated by both assessor data and ground-truth data.
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Block 1000: Single Family Homes in the Hills
The homes on this block are older than those in Marin 
City and Marin County, but have the most recent me-
dian year of last sale of the three blocks surveyed and 
the surrounding area; 30% were sold between 2010-
2013. These homes also post a higher median sale 
price per square foot, at $286, compared with $207 in 
Marin City, though it is still lower than Marin County’s 
$307 figure. Together, these data points indicate re-
cent turnover and investment. This block, up a large 
hill, is host to older, bigger, more varied single-fami-
ly homes than those in the “flats” area of Marin City 
(such as Blocks 1004 and 1005 below) as well as a 
21-unit townhouse development and a large cooper-
ative. Here, there were fewer people walking around.
Looking at Census data for the block, it actually lost 
population between 2000 and 2010, perhaps related 
to a decrease in the percent of family households. 
The block also experienced an increase in the per-
cent white and a decrease in the percent black. These 
changes, except for the population decrease, are con-
sistent with gentrification.
Most parcels (64%) on this block had a level of main-
tenance of above average, or were new, while the rest 
were below average or poor. There were not more than 
a few signs of investment, disinvestment, nor percep-
tions of safety on this block. The only signs were: 21% 
of parcels have security alarm signage (some concern 
about safety) and 24% have fencing for aesthetic pur-
poses (some investment). Public investment on the 
block included municipal lighting and bus stops. The 
two data sets paint similar pictures of a block with re-
cent investment and turnover.
Block 1004
This block was almost wholly created in the mid-
1990s when the townhouse development was built; 
this is clear from the median year of construction be-
ing 1997. Since construction, the homes have showed 
only some turnover, with a median year of last sale of 
2001.5 and 20% sold between 2010 and 2013. The 
homes here sell for less than those in the hills on Block 
1000, with a median sale price per square foot of 
$163. Between 2000 and 2010, the block experienced 
population growth—likely related to an increase in the 
average household size, which may be related to a 
dramatic increase in the percent Hispanic, who tend to 
have larger households—and percent white increased 
while percent black decreased. So even though there 
has been only partial change in the last few years, in 
the ten years prior to that, there was a lot of demo-
graphic change.
The homes on this block were in good shape, well main-
tained and with attractive landscaping. Most homes 
had signage indicating security systems—Esther re-
ported there have been some robberies—though the 
area felt very safe. The streets are pleasant, with min-
imal vehicle traffic and a little activity even on a Tues-
day morning; there was always someone walking by. 
Residents on the street were diverse racially and in 
terms of age. Passing residents commented that the 
blocks have been pretty stable in terms of ownership 
changes; one resident had lived in her home since it 
was built and said her neighbors had only changed 
over once in that nearly-20 year period.
In the center of Block 1004 there is a park with a basket-
ball court and open space. It did not seem well-main-
tained. On the rest of the block there is a church and a 
large apartment/townhouse complex.
A challenge of the groundtruthing methodology on this 
block was that most of the homes were nearly identi-
cal—in design, but also in terms of upkeep, security 
signage, etc. These features of the homes are likely 
not a result of individual residents’ investment or dis-
investment but of the relative newness of the develop-
ment overall and the homogeneity of the block. In its 
sameness, the usual signs of gentrification are difficult 
to spot. In terms of perception of safety, 41% of par-
cels had security alarm signage; however, this may be 
less of an indication of a concern around safety and 
more related to the townhomes coming standard with 
security features. 
The data sets paint similar pictures: a block that has 
experienced only some recent change and is mostly 
stable. However, the Census data is intriguing and un-
explained by the ground-truthing.
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Block 1005
The assessor data tells a nearly identical story for 
this block as it did for Block 1004: median year of con-
struction in the mid-90s, median year of last sale a 
few years later, and 26% sold between 2010-2013, at 
similar prices as Block 1004.
Census data, on the other hand, is very different than 
on Block 1004. Population decreased here between 
2000-2010, and the percent white increased only 
slightly, while percent Hispanic decreased instead of 
increasing. Perhaps these points are different than on 
Block 1004 because this block does not have a large 
rental building like Block 1004 does.
Most parcels on this block had an average level of 
maintenance (66%) with the rest split evenly between 
above average and below average levels. There are 
no signs of investment. In terms of disinvestment, 26% 
of parcels had peeling or fading paint. 50% had secu-
rity alarm signage, which is likely related to this being 
standard, as on Block 1004. The only public invest-
ment was municipal lighting. As with Block 1004, the 
assessor and ground-truthing data are aligned, but the 
demographic change does not tell a clear story.
The secondary data sets and ground-truthing data tell 
the same basic stories for each block. On one block, 
1004, all three data sets are needed to fully under-
stand the changes: assessor data and ground-truth-
ing data together show the stability in owner-occupied 
housing, while the Census data draws attention to the 
large demographic shifts; given the assessor data, 
these are likely explained by changes in the residents 
of the rental units on the block. Absent any of these 
three sources, the picture would be incomplete.
In terms of comparing data sets, unmatched parcels 
was not a major concern. Parcels generally matched 
in terms of land uses and number of units, and the 
total number of units was fairly consistent across three 
data sources. 
Finally, the quality and age of buildings was compa-
rably assessed by both methods, while perception 
of safety and public investment cannot be ascer-
tained from the secondary data sources but only from 
ground-truthing. The limited number of signs of eth-
nicity across all blocks made it difficult to ground-truth 
demographic data.
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Appendix C. 
Additional Methodology 
and Information for the 
Mission Case Study
Methodology for Analyzing Proportion of 
Hispanic-Owned Businesses
We followed a methodology used by researchers at 
UCLA to analyze changes in Asian-owned businesses 
in several Los Angeles neighborhoods (Paul M. Ong, 
Chhandara Pech, Rosalie Ray, 2014). We began with 
the National Establishment Time-Series database, 
which includes businesses’ opening and closing dates 
and owners’ names. We pulled this data for business-
es in the zip code 94110, which contains the 24th 
Street corridor. We removed any record without a busi-
ness name and/or officer name and then removed all 
records except those with an address between 2700 
24th Street and 3278 24th Street, which runs from 
Protero to Mission Streets. We then compared the sur-
names of each businesses’ officer with a list of Hispan-
ic surnames, which we created from a list of all names 
with 100 or more respondents from the 2000 Census. 
We created a list of surnames whose percentage of 
respondents was at least 75% Hispanic. If the name 
of the business owner was on this Hispanic surname 
list, we concluded that the business was owned by a 
Hispanic person.
Public Investment in the Mission District—
Additional Detail
Completed Projects
On Folsom Street between 19th and Cesar Chavez 
Streets, a $5.44 million streetscape improvement 
project was finished this year to reduce the number 
of vehicle lanes, add bike lanes, repave streets, add 
bus bulb-outs, and add trees (City and County of San 
Francisco Department of Public Works, n.d.-b).
A larger-scale plan for the entire Mission District was 
developed in 2008 and 2009, when the planning de-
partment led a community process to create a streets-
cape plan as part of the larger Eastern Neighborhoods 
planning process. A final plan was generated in 2010 
that called for “a system of neighborhood streets with 
safe and green sidewalks; well-marked crosswalks; 
widened sidewalks at corners; creative parking ar-
rangements; bike paths and routes; close integration 
of transit; and roadways that accommodate automo-
bile traffic but encourage appropriate speeds” (San 
Francisco Planning Department City Design Group, 
2009). Overall, these changes would make the streets 
more accessible to pedestrians, bikers, and users of 
transit. The total estimated cost of the improvements 
is $95.5 million (San Francisco Planning Department, 
2010). 
The plan touches all the main commercial areas in the 
District, and includes 28 projects that were cleared 
through the environmental review process. The follow-
ing projects have been completed: 
-Plaza at the 24th St BART station
-Bryant St between 23rd and Cesar Chavez – 
road diet with new median
-Folsom St. between 17th and 25th – road diet 
with bike lanes has been created through re-strip-
ing street, though the planned median is not built 
and not in the budget
-Intersection of Mission, Capp, and Cesar Chavez 
Streets – new plaza
Another project along the southern edge of the Mis-
sion district—Cesar Chavez Street—is a streetscape 
improvement project (City and County of San Francis-
co Department of Public Works, n.d.-a). The project, 
which will cost $11.6 million, includes many improve-
ments, such as “widening the center median and in-
stalling bulb-outs at intersections and mid-blocks,” new 
trees, drainage improvements, bike lanes, and public 
plazas (City and County of San Francisco Department 
of Public Works, n.d.-a). The median and bike improve-
ments are near completion or complete.
Planned Projects
The following projects from the overall Mission District 
plan are in progress: 
-Intersection of Mission and Valencia, the “Green 
Gateway” – A new plaza should be finished by 
March 2015 that will include sidewalk widening 
on west side and will incorporate existing bus 
stop.
-Intersection of San Jose and Guerrero – The 
community benefits agreement for a new hospital 
project in the vicinity includes funding to improve 
the safety of this intersection.
-Bryant St between 21st and 22nd – The block 
will be redone starting in November 2014 as a 
shared street incorporating the public open mar-
ket previously there.
-Intersection of Dolores St and 18th St – The in-
tersection will be rebuilt, possibly as early as Oc-
tober 2015.
Additional projects remain in the plan, including re-
vamped alleyways parallel to Mission Street for much 
of its length in the District and median improvements 
for the major streets in the District.
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